LIGHTNING VS FATE
Dee Finney's blog
start date July 20, 2011
Today's date: February 11, 2012
TOPIC: GODS OF FATE AND DESTINY
THIS P;AGE BEGAN WITH A SHARING OF A DREAM I HAD THIS MORNING
very, just as I was typing this, it came to me that
it could have meant O GAS EE.
STUPID, H
e-mail received from the reader:
> Yesterday I went through the pantry where Bryan stores things and threw out 4 huge bags full of OLD food stuffs that I was afraid to give away to anyone because they might be bad. Anyway I think Dee Finney blog the word has to do with Gog/Magog and Assi….See below….
,
a contraction of Rab or Rabbi Assi):Table of Contents
A prænomen of several amoraim, which, with its variants, is a
modification or diminutive of "Joseph" (compare Bacher, "Ag. Tan." ii. 371;
"Ag.Pal. Amor." ii. 151, 8). "Assi" is of Babylonian origin, while other
forms are Palestinian. Hence in the Babylonian Talmud, except in cases of
clerical error, "Assi" is the only form used; whereas in the Palestinian
Talmud and Midrashim all forms are used indifferently, two or even more
appearing in a single passage (for instance, Yer. Kil. ix. 32b) or in
parallel passages (compare Yer. 'Er. vi. 23d; Yer. Sheḳ.
ii. 46d, vii. 50c; Yer. Naz. iv. 53b). As to the
bearers of the name, most of those having additional patronymics or
cognomens are better known by the appellation of "Jose." The two that are
best known by their simple prænomen, without further designation, are
considered here. Great care is requisite in determining the authorship of
doctrines and sayings bearing the above name. Both the Assis are halakic
authorities, are native Babylonians, and are cited in both Talmudim, and
they flourished within about half a century of each other. They can
therefore be distinguished only by observing the persons with whom they are
associated or who transmit their opinions. Thus, where Assi appears in
company with Rab, with Samuel, or with their contemporaries, Assi I. is
meant; but where the associates are members of a later generation, it is
Assi II. Again, where Huna I., Judah b. Ezekiel, or their contemporaries or
predecessors cite the name, it is Assi I.; but where their disciples, or
their younger contemporaries or successors (particularly in the Palestinian
Talmud and Midrashim) report, it is most frequently Assi II. Where, finally,
none of these landmarks is present, a positive determination is well-nigh
impossible, nor can the presence or absence of the titles Rab and Rabbi, on
which (according to Tos. Ḥul.
19a, s.v. Amar) many rely, be accepted as a clue.
Assi (Assa, Issi) I., Rab:
Status.
A Babylonian amora of the first generation, third century; contemporary
of Rab (Abba
Arika) and his equal in dialectics, though inferior to him in general
knowledge of the Halakah (Sanh. 36b). But even in the latter branch
Rab manifested great deference for Assi's opinions, often adopting these in
preference to his own (Meg. 5a;
Ḳid. 45b;
Sanh. 29b; B. B. 62a). Socially, also, Rab treated Assi as an
equal (Shab. 146b). Mar Samuel, also, treated Assi with great respect
(B. Ḳ. 80a et
seq.). Rab Assi is better known in the field of the Halakah than in that
of the Haggadah, where he is found in association with Kahana and putting
questions to Rab (Giṭ.
88a; compare Lam. R., Introd. 33; Yoma 10a).
According to a Talmudic narrative combining fact and fiction, Assi's end
was precipitated by grief. Commissioned by his dying teacher and friend,
Rab, to bring about Shela b. Abuna's retraction of a certain decision on the
ritual, Assi visited the latter, when the following conversation took place:
Assi: "Retract thy decision because Rab has retracted his opinion on which
thy decision was based." Shela: "Had Rab renounced his opinion he would have
told me so himself." Assi, misunderstanding the instructions of Rab,
thereupon excommunicated his colleague. Shela: "Does the master not fear the
fire for abusing a scholar?" (compare Ab. ii. 10.) Assi: "I am a mortar
["Asita," a play on his name] of brass, over which decay has no power."
Shela: "And I am an iron pestle that may break the brass mortar." Assi soon
after sickened and died; whereupon Shela, to prevent his adversary from
carrying evil reports of him to Rab, prepared his own shroud and died also.
At the double funeral it was observed that the myrtle branches which lay on
the two biers leaped from one to the other, whence it was inferred that the
departed spirits had become reconciled (Niddah 36b et seq.; the names
Isi b. Judah, etc., used in Assi's reply to Shela are a glossator's
interpolation borrowed from Pes. 113b). Of Assi's last hours the
Midrash relates the following: As Rab Assi was about to depart from this
world, his nephew entered the sick-room and found him weeping. Said the
nephew: "My master, why weepest thou? Is there any part of the Torah which
thou hast not learned or taught? Look at the disciples before thee. Is there
any one good deed that thou hast not practised? And does not above all thy
noble traits stand the fact that thou hast never acted as judge and hast
never permitted thyself to be appointed to public office?" Then answered Rab
Assi: "My son, this is just the reason why I am weeping. Perhaps I shall be
required to answer for being able to administer justice and not doing so,
thus exemplifying in myself what theScripture means by saying (Prov. xxix.
4), 'The king by judgment establisheth the earth; but the man that holdeth
himself aloof ["terumah" = separation] overthroweth it'" (Tan., Mishpaṭim,
2). Some writers regard this scene as occurring at the death of Assi II.;
but the concluding words of the visitor's address, as well as the dying
teacher's reason for his anxiety, are entirely inconsistent with the career
of Assi II., whose activity as judge is a prominent feature of his life.
(Yer. Shab. i. 3a; Yer. Sheḳ.
vi. 50b; Yer. Suk. i. 52a; Yeb. 16b; Ned. 21b;
Yer. Ned. iii. 37d; Yer. Giṭ.
ix. 50d; B. B. 126a; Shebu. 26a, 41a;
Ḥul. 19a, 20a).
Bibliography:
Assi (Assa, Issi, Jesa, Josah, Jose)
II., R.:
A Palestinian amora of the third generation, third and fourth centuries;
one of the two Palestinian scholars known among their Babylonian
contemporaries as "the Palestinian judges" and as "the distinguished priests
of Palestine," his companion being R. Ammi (Giṭ.
59b; Sanh. 17b). Assi was born in Babylonia, where he attended
the college of Mar Samuel (Yer. Ter. i. 40a; Yer. 'Er. vi. 23d),
but later emigrated in consequence of domestic trouble. On his arrival in
Tiberias, Assi had an adventure with a ruffian, which ended disastrously for
the latter. Assi was making his way toward the baths, when he was assaulted
by a "scorner." He did not resent the assault, except by remarking, "That
man's neck-band is too loose," and continued on his way. It so happened that
an archon was at that very hour trying a thief, and the scoffer, still
laughing at the adventure with Assi, came to witness the trial just when the
judge interrogated the culprit as to accomplices. The culprit, seeing the
man laughing, thought that it was at his discomfiture, and to avenge himself
pointed to the ruffian as his accomplice. The man was apprehended and
examined. He confessed to a murder he had committed, and was sentenced to be
hanged with the convicted thief. Assi, on returning from the baths,
encountered the procession on its way to the execution. His assailant on
seeing him exclaimed, "The neck-band which was loose will soon be
tightened"; to which Assi replied, "Thy fate has long since been foretold,
for the Bible says (Isa. xxviii. 22), 'Be ye not scorners lest your bands be
made strong '" (Yer. Ber. ii. 5c).
Assi became a disciple of R. Johanan, and so distinguished himself that
R. Eleazar called him "the prodigy of the age" ("mofet ha-dot"; Hul. 103b),
and as such legend pictures him. Concerning the futile longings of many to
communicate with the departed spirit of R. Hiya the Great, legend relates
that R. Jose fasted eighty days in order that a glimpse of R. Hiya might be
granted him. Finally the spirit of the departed appeared; but the sight so
affected R. Jose that his hands became palsied and his eyes dim. "Nor must
you infer from this," the narrator continues, "that R. Josah was an
unimportant individual. Once a weaver came to R. Johanan and said, 'In a
dream I have seen the skies fall, but one of thy disciples held them up.'
When asked whether he knew that disciple, the weaver replied that he would
be able to recognize him. R. Johanan thereupon had all his disciples pass
before the weaver, who pointed to R. Josah as the miraculous agent" (Yer.
Kil. ix. 32b; Eccl. R. ix. 10). Another adventure, which, however,
bears the impress of fact, is related of him, wherein he was once abducted
in a riot and given up as lost, but R. Simon ben Lakish, the former
gladiator, rescued him at the risk of his own life (Yer. Ter. viii. 46b).
Assi's professional career in Palestine is so closely intertwined with
that of R. Ammi that the reader may be referred to the sketch of the latter
for information on that subject. R. Assi was very methodical in his
lectures, making no digressions to answer questions not germane to the
subject under discussion; and whenever such were propounded to him, he put
off reply until he reached the subject to which they related (Yer. Shab.
xix. 16d; Yer. 'Er. vi. 24a).
R. Assi is frequently quoted in both Talmudim and in the Midrashim.
Profound is his observation: "At first the evil inclination is like a
shuttle-thread (or spider-web), but eventually it grows to be like a cart
rope, as is said in the Scriptures (Isa. v. 18), 'Wo unto them that draw
iniquity with cords of vanity, and sin as if it were with a cart rope'"
(Suk. 52a). An anecdote characteristic of rabbinical sympathy for
inferiors and domestics is thus related: The wife of R. Jose had a quarrel
with her maid, and her husband declared her in the wrong; whereupon she said
to him, "Wherefore didst thou declare me wrong in the presence of my maid?"
To which the rabbi replied, "Did not Job (xxxi. 13) say, 'If I did despise
the cause of my manservant or of my maidservant, when they contended with
me, what then shall I do when God riseth up? And when He visiteth, what
shall I answer Him?'" (Gen. R. xlviii. 3). When Assi died, R. Hiya b. Abba,
who had been his associate as judge and as teacher, went into mourning as
for a relative (Yer. Ber. iii. 6a). The day of his death is recorded
as coincident with a destructive hurricane (M.
Ḳ. 26b).
The suggestion may here be offered that R. Assi, before his emigration to
Palestine, was known as Assi (Issi, Jose) b. Nathan, the one that is met
with in an halakic controversy with Ulla (b. Ishmael, Ber. 62a),
propounding a ritual question to Hiya b. Ashi (Shab. 53a), and
seeking an interpretation of a Baraita from the mouth of Rab Sheshet (Ned.
78a; B. B. 121a).
Bibliography:
J. Sr. S. M.
From:
Dee777@aol.com [mailto:Dee777@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2012 10:09 AM
To: rainlyre@kbwebhosts.com
Subject: GODS
EditThe elemental lords Akadi, Grumbar, Istishia and Kossuth are called the cold gods of the elements in the Land of Fate and seen as uncaring for mortals and opposed to the culture of Enlightenment. Still some people worship them to gain part of their vast power.
EditBesides the deities almost all Zakharans believe in the power of Fate. It is not seen as a god and not worshiped, but it is believed to influence mortals and deities alike. Because of this, Fate is often payed homage to and sometimes called on in great danger. The whole of Zakhara is called the Land of Fate to signify its importance.
EditAnother group of power-like beings are the rulers of the genie races. They are no deities but have power akin to them. As genies play an important role in the Land of Fate, these sovereigns sometimes take a hand in Zakharan affairs.[1] They are:[2]
Predestination is the Divine foreordaining or foreknowledge of all that will happen; with regard to the salvation of some and not others. It has been particularly associated with the teachings of John Calvin. Predestination may sometimes be used to refer to other, materialistic, spiritualist, non-theistic or polytheistic ideas of determinism, destiny, fate, doom, or adrsta. Such beliefs or philosophical systems may hold that any outcome is finally determined by the complex interaction of multiple, possibly immanent, possibly impersonal, possibly equal forces, rather than the issue of a Creator's conscious choice.
For example, some may speak of predestination from a purely physical perspective, such as in a discussion of time travel. In this case, rather than referring to the afterlife, predestination refers to any events that will occur in the future. In a predestined universe the future is immutable and only God's ordained set of events can possibly occur; in a non-predestined universe, the future is mutable. In Chinese Buddhism, predestination is a translation of yuanfen, which does not necessarily imply the existence or involvement of a deity. Predestination in this sense takes on a very literal meaning: pre- (before) and destiny, in a straightforward way indicating that some events seem bound to happen. The term, however, is often used to describe relationships instead of all events in general.
Finally, antithetical to determinism of any kind are theories of the cosmos that assert that any outcome is ultimately unpredictable. The ludibrium of luck, chance, or chaos theory have determinist implications, as a logical consequence of the idea of predictability. But predestination usually refers to a specifically religious type of determinism, especially as found in various monotheistic systems where omniscience is attributed to God, including Christianity and Islam.
Discussion of predestination usually involves consideration of whether God is omniscient, or eternal or atemporal (free from limitations of time or even causality). In terms of these ideas, God may see the past, present, and future, so that God effectively knows the future. If God in some sense knows ahead of time what will happen, then events in the universe are effectively predetermined from God's point of view. This is a form of determinism but not predestination since the latter term implies that God has actually determined (rather than simply seen) in advance the destiny of creatures.
Within Christendom, there is considerable disagreement about God's role in setting ultimate destinies (that is, eternal life or eternal damnation). Christians who follow teachers such as John Calvin generally accept that God alone decides the eternal destinations of each person without regard to man's choices, so that their future actions or beliefs follow according to God's choice (Romans 9:14-16). A contrasting Christian view maintains that God is completely sovereign over all things but that he chose to give each individual self-determining free will through prevenient grace. Classically, this view is called Arminianism, which holds that each person is able to accept or reject God's offer of salvation and hence God allows man's choice to determine salvation (John 3:16-18).
Judaism may accept the possibility that God is atemporal; some forms of Jewish theology teach this virtually as a principle of faith, while other forms of Judaism do not. Jews may use the term omniscience, or preordination as a corollary of omniscience, but normally reject the idea of predestination as being incompatible with the free will and responsibility of moral agents, and it therefore has no place in their religion.
Islam traditionally has strong views of predestination similar to some found in Christianity. In Islam, Allah knows what choices humans are going to make and allows the actualization of the consequences of those choices based on his attributes of justice and mercy. Muslims believe that Allah is literally atemporal, eternal and omniscient.
In philosophy, the relation between foreknowledge and predestination is a central part of Newcomb's paradox.
| Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (July 2011) |
A number of speculative ideas have appeared that attempt to explain the relationship between time and eternity, which have bearing on the subject of predestination. Some regard all speculation about predestination and its implications as all alike, pernicious, and offensive to God.
A common pre-Kantian idea of time and eternity, describes "eternity" as a trans-temporal mode of being - such that all the moments of time are in some sense present in eternity. God looks into the realm of temporal reality from outside of it, as though it were a surface or a line stretched out: the edges or ends of which are fully "visible" to God, so that He is in a somewhat spatial sense "omnipresent" with regard to time. In such a speculative view, the past, present and future are all in some sense simultaneously present in the eternal perspective of God. From a temporal point of view, the past seems to disappear and the future doesn't yet exist, and God always appears to act from moment to moment. But from an eternal perspective, there is nothing temporal about time. Non-determinism is not possible on such a view, but predestination may be excluded if the belief system does not permit the direct interference of the non-temporal God and the temporal plane of existence.
Some belief systems allow for the possibility that only God and the present moment are the sum of what is "real". The past persists only in its effects, and the future does not yet exist, and thus only the present is directly knowable. Further, the "eternity" of God is presumed by some not to be accessible to understanding, and therefore no speculation can be meaningfully based upon it.
Nevertheless, these belief systems may retain an idea of God's decision eternally determining the present or future, in the sense of God's decision being logically prior, or "transcendentally necessary" to all existence. Time is not a "thing", but rather, a succession of the intersections of God's manifold purposes being revealed in the creation. Time is the succession of events, identified as moments by an intentional, mental act of setting one event apart from another and noticing their relation to one another - but, otherwise time does not exist as irreducible, discrete moments. Time is coherent, because God consistently acts according to his own character.
Strong predestinarian views are basically undisturbed by these assumptions, because strong predestination is based upon God's knowledge of Himself and of His own purposes. The effect of these new views of time are more clearly seen among those who reject strong predestinarian views, because those views classically share a comparable conception of the relation between time and eternity.
Predestinarian version: God, in comparison to temporality, always is. Temporal things however, exist from each fleeting moment of being to the next, only in the present. Such a conception of reality may be thoroughly predestinarian, if God is the personal cause of continued existence and the orchestrator or determiner of the relationship between each present event and each subsequent present event; but, it is only predestination if in this conception God acts with absolute freedom and entire knowledge of Himself. God brings to pass each moment in its turn by a continuous, timeless act of self-revelation. God sustains the effectiveness of all secondary causes and choices, and so on. Thus, each moment is a disclosure of God's character. The meaning of time and experience is disclosed not in the subjective relation of the present to the past and the future, but rather, because of the relation of all created things, in every aspect, to the will of God. As a logical consequence, the meaning of history is known only through the knowledge of God (an idea similar to this can be found in the speculations of Augustine of Hippo and some Calvinist philosophers, such as Herman Dooyeweerd).
Anti-predestinarian version: If the idea of absolute freedom and entire self-knowledge is absent from this kind of idea of God's acts in time, then God Himself is (to express the idea anthropomorphically) becoming something new, or discovering something new about Himself with each new moment, just as we are. It's as though God is waking up to the possibilities that are inherent in temporally limited acts, and like an artist developing his ideas in dynamic interaction with an ever-changing medium, He is making new discoveries about himself every day. A summary of such a view might be that, the present is an encounter "in God" with new possibilities (where "God" is sometimes not understood "theistically", in the sense of a "person"), and the past is thus a record or remembrance "by God" of the experiences of existent beings. Or, put another way, the past is what God has thus far become in the process of all experience, and the future is pure possibility. Predestination is completely excluded from such a system, except possibly in the most broad outlines of God's intentions. God's decision, on such a view, is an inventive experience, almost precisely equivalent to the unfolding process of historical events (thinking like this can be found in modern process theology and open theism).
There are other types of Christian or Christian-influenced belief, which exclude the personality, or the volitional aspect of the personality of God, so that even if they express some form of determinism, it is not predestination in a theistic sense.
Predestination may be described under two types, with the basis for each found within their definition of free will. Between these poles, there is a complex variety of systematic differences, particularly difficult to describe because the foundational terms are not strictly equivalent between systems. The two poles of predestinarian belief may be usefully described in terms of their doctrinal comparison between the Creator's freedom, and the creature's freedom. These can be contrasted as either univocal, or equivocal conceptions of freedom.
In terms of ultimates, with God's decision to create as the ultimate beginning, and the ultimate outcome, a belief system has a doctrine of predestination if it teaches:
There are numerous ways to describe the spectrum of beliefs concerning predestination in Christian thinking. To some extent, this spectrum has analogies in other monotheistic religions, although in other religions the term "predestination" may not be used. For example, teaching on predestination may vary in terms of three considerations.
Furthermore, the same sort of considerations apply to the freedom of man's will.
The univocal conception of freedom holds that human will is free of cause, even though creaturely[clarification needed] in character. These belief systems hold that the Creator (or, in the scientific perspective, Nature/Evolution) has fashioned a system of absolute freedom: human volition that features a free and independent nature.
On the other end of the spectrum is the position that the Creator (or a foreign Being, object, etc.) exercises absolute control over human will and/or that all decisions originate with some outside cause, leaving no room for freedom.
At the other end of the spectrum are analogical conceptions of freedom. These versions of predestination hold that individual choice is not excluded from the fashioning work of the Creator. Man's will is free because it is determined, boundaried or created by God. In other words, apart from God's will determining man's will in a divine sense, only chaos or enslavement to mindless and impersonal forces is possible. Man's will may be called free and responsible, but not in an absolute sense; the choice of good or of evil must be uncoerced to be free, but it is never uncreated or uncaused. The likeness of creaturely freedom to divine freedom is analogical, not univocal.
It is important to note that among predestinarians there is no significant representation for the idea that human choices are unreal, but merely that they are the direct expression of the Creator's will. The analogy implied here means that however else human and divine freedom may be comparable, there is an unlikeness between the free will of the Creator and human freedom, which depends on the Creator for existence and power. With no significant exception, when predestinarians deny that man has freedom of will, it is to deny that man's will is free in the same sense as the Creator's will, or to affirm that man's choices are entirely subject to divine causation. Men are responsible without being absolutely original. This is particularly true in these systems, if they acknowledge a doctrine of Original Sin, whereby every person is understood to be born into a condition of helplessness under the power or the effects of sin; for whom, either through inherited guilt, or the inherited consequences of guilt, a purely free choice of the good is not possible without the aid of God's undeserved grace.
Traditional Islam holds to the powerlessness of human will, apart from the aid of Allah, and yet without a doctrine of Original Sin. Thus, Islam has a simpler version of predestination, viewing all that comes to pass as the will of Allah. And yet, the Qur'an affirms human responsibility, saying for example: "Allah changeth not the condition of a people until they change what is in their hearts". There is no significant view of predestination that entirely relieves man of responsibility for his own choices.
Therefore, all significant versions of predestination account for the differences between people (perhaps in life or, in death, or both) by reference to the will of the Creator. Also, all versions of predestination incorporate into the doctrine various concepts of human responsibility, which differ from one another in terms of the kind of volitional freedom possible for the creature.
Christians understand the doctrine of predestination in terms of God's work of salvation in the world. The doctrine is a tension between the divine perspective in which God saves those whom he chooses from eternity apart from human action and the human perspective in which each person is responsible for his or her choice to accept or reject God. The views on predestination within Christianity vary somewhat in emphasis on one of these two perspectives.
Some Biblical verses often used as sources for Christian beliefs in predestination are below. Note that most of these verses do not distinguish between the conditional election (Arminian) and unconditional election (Calvinist), but are simply evidence of some type of election.
Examples of Biblical passages used to argue for free will:
Note, however, that II Peter 3:1 and 3:8 address the "beloved," which are assumed to be the elect, or Christians. Therefore, the context may determine that II Peter 3:9 means "...but that all 'the elect' should come to repentance." This could mean that God will not lose even one of those he has chosen for salvation. This concept may be supported in John 10:28: "And I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand."
Furthermore, Martin Luther wrote in his book "Bondage of the Will" that the "imperative does not imply the indicative." In other words, just because God commands us to believe does not indicate that we are capable of it.
The early church fathers consistently uphold the freedom of human choice. This position was crucial in the Christian confrontation with Cynicism and some of the chief forms of Gnosticism, such as Manichaeism, which taught that man is by nature flawed and therefore not responsible for evil in himself or in the world. At the same time, belief in human responsibility to do good as a precursor to salvation and eternal reward was consistent. The decision to do good along with God's aid pictured a synergism of the human will and God's will. The early church Fathers taught a doctrine of conditional predestination.[2] A list of quotations by the Early Church Fathers regarding free will and predestination can be found here.[3]
Augustine of Hippo marks the beginning of a system of thought that denies free will (with respect to salvation) and affirms that salvation needs an initial input by God in the life of every person. While his early writings affirm that God's predestinating grace is granted on the basis of his foreknowledge of the human desire to pursue salvation, this changed after 396. His later position affirmed the necessity of God granting grace in order for the desire for salvation to be awakened. However, Augustine does argue (against the Manicheans) that humans have free will; however, their will is so distorted, and the Fall is so extensive, that in the postlapsarian world they can only choose evil.
Augustine's position raised objections. Julian bishop of Eclanum, expressed that Augustine was bringing Manichee thoughts into the church.[4] For Vincent of Lérins, this was a disturbing innovation.[5] This new tension eventually became obvious with the confrontation between Augustine and Pelagius culminating in condemnation of Pelagianism (as interpreted by Augustine) at the Council of Ephesus in 431. The British monk Pelagius denied Augustine's view of "predestination" in order to affirm that salvation is achieved by an act of free will.
The influence of Augustine also then showed in translations of the bible from that time on—variations that are not in themselves visible in the syntax or grammar of the New Testament Greek text. Perhaps the best example of this in the Vulgate is the addition of 'prae' to 'ordinati' in Acts 13:48, which is there only to give the idea this was God who did this. Later translations show this influence of the doctrine by the additions of the word 'his' in Romans 8:28 and 11:22 all suggesting an interpretation consistent with unconditional election.
The Eastern Orthodox Church tradition has never adopted the Augustinian view of predestination, and formed a doctrine of predestination by another historical route, sometimes called Semi-Pelagianism in the West. The Western Church, including the Catholic and Protestant denominations, are predominantly Augustinian in some form, especially as interpreted by Gregory the Great and the Council of Orange (a Western council that anathemitized Semi- Pelagianism as represented in some of the writings of John Cassian and his followers). This council explicitly denies double predestination.
In Catholic doctrine, the accepted understanding of predestination most predominantly follows the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, and can be contrasted with the Jansenist interpretation of Augustinianism, which was condemned by the Catholic Church during the Counter-Reformation. The only important branch of Western Christianity that continues to hold to a double predestination interpretation of Augustinianism, is within the Calvinist branch of the Protestant Reformation. The meaning of this term is discussed under the subsection on Calvinism, below.
In broad Christian conversation, predestination refers to the view of predestination commonly associated with John Calvin and the Calvinist branch of the Protestant Reformation; and, this is the non-technical sense in which the term is typically used today, when belief in predestination is affirmed or denied.
Augustine's formulation is neither complete nor universally accepted by Christians. But his system laid the foundation onto virgin ground for the then later writers and innovators of the Reformation period.
Conditional Predestination, or more commonly referred to as conditional election, is a theological stance stemming from the writings and teachings of Jacobus Arminius, after whom Arminianism is named. Arminius studied under the staunch Reformed scholar Theodore Beza, whose views of election, Arminius eventually argued, could not reconcile freedom with moral responsibility.
Arminius used a philosophy called Molinism (named for the philosopher Luis de Molina) that attempted to reconcile freedom with God's omniscience. They both saw human freedom in terms of the Libertarian philosophy: man's choice is not decided by God's choice, thus God's choice is "conditional", depending on what man chooses. Arminius saw God "looking down the corridors of time" to see the free choices of man, and choosing those who will respond in faith and love to God's love and promises, revealed in Jesus.
Arminianism sees the choice of Christ as an impossibility, apart from God's grace; and the freedom to choose is given to all, because God's prevenient grace is universal (given to everyone). Therefore, God predestines on the basis of foreknowledge of how some will respond to his universal love ("conditional"). In contrast, Calvinism views universal grace as resistible and not sufficient for leading to salvation—or denies universal grace altogether—and instead supposes grace that leads to salvation to be particular and irresistible, given to some but not to others on the basis of God's predestinating choice ("unconditional"). This is also known as "double-predestination."
Temporal predestination is the view that God only determines temporal matters, and not eternal ones. This Christian view is analogous to the traditional Jewish view, which distinguishes between preordination and predestination. Temporal matters are pre-ordained by God, but eternal matters, being supra-temporal, are subject to absolute freedom of choice.
Infralapsarianism (also called sublapsarianism) holds that predestination logically coincides with the preordination of Man's fall into sin. That is, God predestined sinful men for salvation. Therefore according to this view, God is the "ultimate cause", but not the "proximate source" or "author" of sin. Infralapsarians often emphasize a difference between God's decree (which is inviolable and inscrutable), and his revealed will (against which man is disobedient). Proponents also typically emphasize the grace and mercy of God toward all men, although teaching also that only some are predestined for salvation.
In common English parlance, the doctrine of predestination often has particular reference to the doctrines of Calvinism. The version of predestination espoused by John Calvin, after whom Calvinism is named, is sometimes referred to as "double predestination" because in it God predestines some people for salvation (i.e. Unconditional election) and some for condemnation (i.e. Reprobation). Calvin himself defines predestination as "the eternal decree of God, by which he determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every man. Not all are created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestined to life or to death.".[6]
On the spectrum of beliefs concerning predestination, Calvinism is the strongest form among Christians. It teaches that God's predestining decision is based on the knowledge of His own will rather than foreknowledge, concerning every particular person and event; and, God continually acts with entire freedom, in order to bring about his will in completeness, but in such a way that the freedom of the creature is not violated, "but rather, established"[7]
Calvinists who hold the infralapsarian view of predestination usually prefer that term to "sublapsarianism," perhaps with the intent of blocking the inference that they believe predestination is on the basis of foreknowledge (sublapsarian meaning, assuming the fall into sin).[8] The different terminology has the benefit of distinguishing the Calvinist double predestination version of infralapsarianism, from Lutheranism's view that predestination is a mystery, which forbids the unprofitable intrusion of prying minds.
Calvinists seek never to divide predestination in a mathematical way. Their doctrine is uninterested, in the abstract, in questions of "how much" either God or man is responsible for a particular destiny. Questions of "how much" will become hopelessly entangled in paradox, Calvinists teach, regardless of the view of predestination adopted. Instead, Calvinism divides the issues of predestination according to two kinds of being, knowledge, and will, distinguishing what is divine from what is human. Therefore, it is not so much an issue of quantity, but of distinct roles or modes of being. God is not a creature nor the creature God in knowledge, will, freedom, ability, responsibility, or anything else. Calvinists will often attribute salvation entirely to God; and yet they will also assert that it is man's responsibility to pursue obedience. As the archetypal illustration of this idea, they believe Jesus in his words and work humanly fulfilled all that he as part of the Trinity had determined from the Father should be done. What he did humanly is distinguishable, but not separate, from what he did divinely.
Drawing on Luther's "Bondage of the Will" written in his debate over free will with Erasmus, Lutherans hold doctrinally to a view of single predestination. That is to say, desiring to save all fallen human beings, God sent his Son Jesus Christ to atone for the sins of the whole world on the cross. Those God saves have been predestined from eternity in Christ. Those who are condemned are condemned because of their fallen will. While these statements may seem like they contradict each other, this is what Luther saw as THE major story-line within scripture and didn't attempt to systematically or logically "fix" it. The underlying question here is, of course, if God wants all to be saved and Jesus died for everyone, why doesn't God convert the fallen will of all? This is a question that Lutherans, following Luther, put into the category of the "hidden God", the God "behind the cross" whom we don't know everything about. The answer to the question lies within God's "hidden counsel" that we are to have nothing to do with. If we doubt our own predestination, we should look for it in the God who has revealed himself in the wounds of Christ on the cross and there see a God who loved us enough to die for us. For Lutherans, systematic treatment of predestination follows the Gospel (What God has done for us in Jesus Christ) rather than being a topic discussed prior to the Gospel. As such, the sole purpose of predestination is to reinforce "Justification by Grace through Faith solely on account of Christ". Believers are reminded "you didn't choose God, God chose you in Christ!"
Supralapsarianism is the doctrine that God's decree of predestination for salvation and reprobation logically precedes his preordination of the human race's fall into sin. That is, God decided to save, and to damn; he then determined the means by which that would be made possible. It is a matter of controversy whether or not Calvin himself held this view, but most scholars link him with the infralapsarian position. It is known, however, that Calvin's successor in Geneva, Theodore Beza, held to the supralapsarian view.
Advocates of open theism, like most who affirm conditional predestination, understand predestination to be as corporate. In corporate election, God does not choose which individuals he will save prior to creation, but rather God chooses the church as a whole. Or put differently, God chooses what type of individuals he will save. Another way the New Testament puts this is to say that God chose the church in Christ (Eph. 1:4). In other words, God chose from all eternity to save all those who would be found in Christ, by faith in God. This choosing is not primarily about salvation from eternal destruction either but is about God's chosen agency in the world. Thus individuals have full freedom in terms of whether they become members of the church or not. Corporate election is thus consistent with the open view's position on God's omniscience, which states that the outcomes of individual free will cannot be known specifically before they are performed since who becomes a Christian is a matter of free will and not knowable.
Lutherans believe that the elect are predestined to salvation.[9] Lutherans believe Christians should be assured that they are among the predestined.[10] However, they disagree with those who make predestination the source of salvation rather than Christ's suffering, death, and resurrection. Unlike some Calvinists, Lutherans do not believe in a predestination to damnation.[11] Instead, Lutherans teach eternal damnation is a result of the unbeliever's sins, rejection of the forgiveness of sins, and unbelief.[12] Martin Luther's attitude towards predestination is set out in his On the Bondage of the Will, published in 1525. This publication by Luther was in response to the published treatise by Desiderius Erasmus in 1524 known as On Free Will. Luther based his views on Ephesians 2:8-10, which says: "For by grace you have been saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God, not of works, lest anyone should boast. For we are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand that we should walk in them."
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The Belgic Confession of 1561 affirmed that God "delivers and preserves" from perdition "all whom he, in his eternal and unchangeable council, of mere goodness hath elected in Christ Jesus our Lord, without respect to their works" (Article XVI).
In this common, loose sense of the term, to affirm or to deny predestination has particular reference to the Calvinist doctrine of Unconditional Election. In the Calvinist interpretation of the Bible, this doctrine normally has only pastoral value related to the assurance of salvation and the absolution of salvation by grace alone. However, the philosophical implications of the doctrine of election and predestination are sometimes discussed beyond these systematic bounds. Under the topic of the doctrine of God (theology proper), the predestinating decision of God cannot be contingent upon anything outside of Himself, because all other things are dependent upon Him for existence and meaning. Under the topic of the doctrines of salvation (soteriology), the predestinating decision of God is made from God's knowledge of his own will (Romans 9:15), and is therefore not contingent upon human decisions (rather, free human decisions are outworkings of the decision of God, which sets the total reality within which those decisions are made in exhaustive detail: that is, nothing left to chance). Calvinists do not pretend to understand how this works; but they are insistent that the Scriptures teach both the sovereign control of God and the responsibility and freedom of human decisions (see "Equivocal or analogical concepts of freedom" above).
This view is commonly called double predestination, although within a Calvinist system this term is usually accepted only with qualifications, and many reject the term altogether as being incompatible with the pastoral use of the doctrine of election.
Double predestination is the eternal act of God, whereby the future of every particular person in the human race has been determined beforehand, by God. Whatever the individual wills or does, for good or for evil, is conceived as performing a functional part, or outworking of that ordained purpose. This prior determination applies to both, the elect and the reprobate. This idea is formed on an interpretation of various Scriptures in the Old and New Testaments. Romans 9 is frequently quoted in explanation of the doctrine.
19 You will say to me then, “Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?” 20 But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, “Why have you made me like this?” 21 Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use? 22 What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, 23 in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory— Romans 9:19-23 (ESV)
Calvinist groups use the term "Hyper-Calvinism" to describe Calvinistic systems that assert without qualification that God's intention to destroy some is equal to His intention to save others. Some forms of Hyper-Calvinism have racial implications, against which other Calvinists vigorously object (see Afrikaner Calvinism). The Dutch settlers of South Africa claimed that the Blacks were members of the non-elect, because they were the sons of Ham, whom Noah had cursed to be slaves, according to Genesis 9:18-19. The Dutch Calvinist theologian Franciscus Gomarus also argued that Jews, because of their refusal to worship Jesus Christ, were members of the non-elect. According to I John 2:22-23, anyone who refuses to believe that Jesus is the Christ is an antichrist. This is what I John 2: 22-23 says: "Who is a liar but he who denies that Jesus is the Christ? He is antichrist who denies the Father and the Son. Whoever denies the Son does not have the Father either; he who acknowledges the Son has the Father also." Martin Luther published in 1543 On the Jews and Their Lies, in which he denounced the Jews for their failure to convert to Christianity.
Expressed sympathetically, the Calvinist doctrine is that God has mercy or withholds it, with particular consciousness of who are to be the recipients of mercy in Christ. Therefore, the particular persons are chosen, out of the total number of human beings, who will be rescued from enslavement to sin and the fear of death, and from punishment due to sin, to dwell forever in His presence. Those who are being saved are assured through the gifts of faith, the sacraments, and communion with God through prayer and increase of good works, that their reconciliation with Him through Christ is settled by the sovereign determination of God's will. God also has particular consciousness of those who are passed over by His selection, who are without excuse for their rebellion against Him, and will be judged for their sins.
By implication, and expressed unsympathetically, the number of the elect subtracted from the total number, leaves an exact number of those who are consciously passed over by the mercy of God, who will dwell forever away from His presence, without regard to anything that otherwise distinguishes people from one another. All are believed to be undeserving, whether they are rich or poor, male or female, murderers or philanthropists, or any other difference. In other words, God determines the exact numbers of the damned and the saved, and these numbers are consciously known and indeed, decided upon by God, before any of these individuals have begun to exist.
Thus, Calvinists may acknowledge with qualifications that, double predestination is a legitimate position, logically deduced from any form of single predestination that does not include universal salvation.
Calvinists typically divide on the issue of predestination into infralapsarians (sometimes called 'sublapsarians') and supralapsarians. Infralapsarians interpret the biblical election of God to highlight his love (1 John 4:8; Ephesians 1:4b-5a) and chose his elect considering the situation after the Fall, while supralapsarians interpret biblical election to highlight God's sovereignty (Romans 9:16) and that the Fall was ordained by God's decree of election. In infralapsarianism, election is God's response to the Fall, while in supralapsarianism the Fall is part of God's plan for election. In spite of the division, many Calvinist theologians would consider the debate surrounding the infra- and supralapsarian positions one in which scant Scriptural evidence can be mustered in either direction, and that, at any rate, has little effect on the overall doctrine.
Some Calvinists decline from describing the eternal decree of God in terms of a sequence of events or thoughts, and many caution against the simplifications involved in describing any action of God in speculative terms. Most make distinctions between the positive manner in which God chooses some to be recipients of grace, and the manner in which grace is consciously withheld so that some are destined for everlasting punishments.
Debate concerning predestination according to the common usage, concerns the destiny of the damned, whether God is just if that destiny is settled prior to the existence of any actual violition of the individual, and whether the individual is in any meaningful sense responsible for his destiny if it is settled by the eternal action of God.
Arminians hold that God does not predetermine, but instead infallibly knows who will believe and perseveringly be saved. This view is known as Conditional Election, because it states that election is conditional on the one who wills to have faith in God for salvation. Although God knows from the beginning of the world who will go where, the choice is still with the individual. The Dutch Calvinist theologian Franciscus Gomarus strongly opposed the views of Jacobus Arminius with his doctrine of supralapsarian predestination.
Critics of the Arminian belief might also believe it supports the concept that God actually created evil. If God knows from the beginning of the world who will go where, why did he bring into existence those he knows will be condemned? So, if he knows person A's 'choices' will ultimately lead him to be lost, then why bring person A into existence?
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Barthians espouse a view of predestination that attempts to circumvent the antithesis between Augustinianism and Pelagianism. In the Barthian scheme, predestination only properly applies to God Himself. Thus, humanity is chosen for salvation in Jesus Christ, at the permanent cost of God's self-surrendered hiddenness, or transcendence. Thus, the redemption of all mankind is a devoutly hoped-for possibility, but the only inevitability is that God has predestined Himself, in Jesus Christ, to be revealed and given for human salvation.
This table summarizes the classical views of three different Protestant beliefs.[13]
| Topic | Lutheranism | Calvinism | Arminianism |
| Election | Unconditional election to salvation only | Unconditional election to salvation and damnation | Conditional election in view of foreseen faith or unbelief |
The Eastern Orthodox view was summarized by Bishop Theophan the Recluse in response to the question, "What is the relationship between the Divine provision and our free will?"
The Catholic Encyclopedia entry on Predestination says,[15]:
Pope John Paul II wrote[16]:
The Catholic Catechism says:
In Hinduism, predestination is called Vidhi or Vidhi niyama. Though the future is believed to be dependent on karma, Vidhi has predestined as to what karma the being does. Thus the decision a being makes to do good or bad is predestined. It is said that even God cannot alter the flow of Vidhi. In the Dvaita school of Vaishnavism, the philosopher Madhvacharya believed in a similar concept.
For example, Madhvacharya differed significantly from traditional Hindu beliefs in his concept of eternal damnation. He divides souls into three classes, one class that qualifies for liberation, Mukti-yogyas, another subject to eternal rebirth or eternally transmigrating due to samsara, Nitya-samsarins, and significantly, a class that is eventually condemned to eternal hell or Andhatamas, known as Tamo-yogyas. He has hypothesized (based on vedic texts and yukti) that souls are eternal and not created ex nihilo by God, as in the Semitic religions. Souls depend on God for their very "being" and "becoming." Madhva has compared this relationship of God with souls to the relationship between a source (bimba) and its reflection (pratibimba).
In Islam, "predestination" is the usual English language rendering of a belief that Muslims call al-qada wa al-qadar in Arabic. The phrase means "the divine decree and the predestination". Free will and predestination have always been conflicting topics in Islamic religious thinking.
This is a difficult concept to understand and translate. In Islam, God's omniscience doesn't suggest that humanity has no free will. God's advance knowledge of what each human will choose with his/her free will is said to not in any way negate the freedom granted to humans.[18] This simply means that God has the foreknowledge of all human action, however, this divine knowledge does not prevent humans from doing whatever they desire.
A few Muslims though suggest that free will doesn't actually exist in Islam. They argue that God is omniscient and so has the power to prevent or allow any action from occurring. Therefore, if God does not prevent an act from occurring, then that act is thought to be Allah's will. People can believe they have control over their lives, but they are not able to do anything without it being God's will first. Nothing is allowed to come to pass unless it is the will of God, hence the phrase Inshallah, Arabic for "if God wills". When referring to the future, Muslims frequently qualify any predictions of what will come to pass with this phrase. It recognizes that human knowledge of the future is limited, and that all that may or may not come to pass is under the control of God. A related phrase, mashallah, indicates acceptance of what God has ordained in terms of good or ill fortune that may befall a believer.
In summary, the main principles that govern the Sunni Islamic perspective on qadar are the following:
This concept is reminiscent of the Free will theodicy of the problem of Evil. If God has precognition rather than predestination, then the evil deeds that occur in the world are caused as a price of us entertaining free will.[19][20]
Shia Islam places a greater emphasis on free will and the importance of personal decisions, are recalled on the Day of Judgement.[21] Predestination is a way of thinking that is challenged by the Imams of Shia Islam in many speeches and letters. The main factor in determining how one's reality is processed has to do with his/her "nearness" to God. Therefore, the levels of relationship that one has with Allah is what determines what a person may be "allowed" to do. For example, drinking alcoholic beverages is a sin according to the religion of Islam (see Islam and alcohol). If a person who has "turned his back" on Allah decides to drink, there will be no obstacle between himself and the drink. Accordingly, a drink voids 40 days of prayers and supplication, which distances that soul "further" from Allah. However, if the person is a "pious" believer who has fallen to despair due to some difficulty and decides to have a drink to give up his state and position, there may be numerous obstacles in the universe between him and the drink, until he finally gives up on that endeavour and returns repentant. The hopelessness in human action is what is disputed by Shia philosophers with those who lean far toward predestination.[22]
This belief is further emphasized by the Shia concept of bada’, which states that God has not set a definite course for human history. Instead, God may alter the course of human history as is seen to be fit.
Although comparable in broad terms, the differences between Christian and Islamic ideas of predestination are complex. These differences are due to the distinctives of each faith's belief system. In broad terms, the doctrine of predestination refers to inevitability as a general principle, and usually more particularly refers to the exercise of God's will as it relates to the future of members of the human race, considered either as groups or as individuals, with special concern for issues of human responsibility as it relates to the sovereignty of God. Predestination always involves issues of the Creator's personality and will; and consequently, the different versions of the doctrine of predestination go hand in hand with appropriately different conceptions of the contribution any creature is able to make toward its own present condition, or future destiny.[23]
Generally speaking Reform Judaism has no strong doctrine of predestination. Some critics[who?] claim that the idea that God is omnipotent and omniscient didn't formally exist in Judaism during the Biblical era, but rather was a later development due to the influence of neo-Platonic and neo-Aristotelian philosophy. Some modern Jewish thinkers in the 20th century (for example, Martin Buber) have resolved the dialectical tension by holding that God is simply not omnipotent, in the commonly used sense of that word. These thinkers are primarily not Orthodox Jews. Orthodox Jewish rabbis generally affirm that God must be viewed as omnipotent, but they have varying definitions of what the word omnipotent means. Thus one finds that some Modern Orthodox theologians[who?] have views that are essentially the same as non-Orthodox theologians, but they use different terminology.
One noted Jewish philosopher, Hasdai Crescas, resolved this dialectical tension by taking the position that free-will doesn't exist. Hence all of a person's actions are pre-determined by the moment of their birth, and thus their judgment in the eyes of God (so to speak) is effectively pre-ordained. However in this scheme this is not a result of God's predetermining one's fate, but rather from the view that the universe is deterministic. Crescas's views on this topic were rejected by Judaism at large. In later centuries this idea independently developed among some in the Chabad (Lubavitch) movement of Hasidic Judaism. Many individuals within Chabad take this view seriously, and hence effectively deny the existence of free will.
However, many Chabad (Lubavitch) Jews attempt to hold both views. They affirm as infallible their rebbe's teachings that God knows and controls the fate of all, yet at the same time affirm the classical Jewish belief in free-will (i.e. no such thing as determinism). The inherent contradiction between the two results in their belief that such contradictions are only "apparent", due to man's inherent lack of ability to understand greater truths and due to the fact that Creator and Created exist in different realities.
One does not have to be a Chabad Hassid to believe in this, however. It is enough to read the statement in Pirkei Avot: "Everything is predetermined but freedom of will is given." The same idea is strongly repeated by Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance, Chapter 5).
Many other Jews (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform and secular) affirm that since free-will exists, then by definition one's fate is not preordained. It is held as a tenet of faith that whether God is omniscient or not, nothing interferes with mankind's free will. Some Jewish theologians, both during the medieval era and today, have attempted to formulate a philosophy in which free will is preserved, while also affirming that God has knowledge of what decisions people will make in the future. Whether or not these two ideas are mutually compatible, or whether there is a contradiction between the two, is still a matter of great study and interest in philosophy today.
In Rabbinic literature, there is much discussion as to the apparent contradiction between God's omniscience and free will. The representative view is that "Everything is foreseen; yet free will is given" (Rabbi Akiva, Pirkei Avoth 3:15). Based on this understanding, the problem is formally described as a paradox, perhaps beyond our understanding.
Many Greek legends and tales teach the futility of trying to outmaneuver an inexorable fate that has been correctly predicted. This form of irony is important in Greek tragedy, as it is in Oedipus Rex and in the Duque de Rivas' play that Verdi transformed into La Forza del Destino ("The Force of Destiny") or Thornton Wilder's The Bridge of San Luis Rey, or in Macbeth's uncannily-derived knowledge of his own destiny, which in spite of all his actions does not preclude a horrible fate.
This aspect is succinctly told by W. Somerset Maugham from an Arab tale:
Death There was a merchant in Baghdad who sent his servant to market to buy provisions and in a little while the servant came back, white and trembling, and said, “Master, just now when I was in the market-place I was jostled by a woman in the crowd and when I turned I saw it was Death that jostled me. She looked at me and made a threatening gesture; now, lend me your horse, and I will ride away from this city and avoid my fate. I will go to Samarra and there Death will not find me.” The merchant lent him his horse, and the servant mounted it, and he dug his spurs in its flanks and as fast as the horse could gallop he went. Then the merchant went down to the marketplace and he saw me standing in the crowd and he came to me and said, “Why did you make a threatening gesture to my servant when you saw him this morning?” “That was not a threatening gesture,” I said, “it was only a start of surprise. I was astonished to see him in Baghdad, for I had an appointment with him tonight in Samarra.[2]
A far older version forms part of the Babylonian Talmud.
Other notable examples include Thomas Hardy's Tess of the d'Urbervilles, in which Tess is destined to the miserable death that she is confronted with at the end of the novel; Samuel Beckett's Endgame; the popular short story "The Monkey's Paw" by W.W. Jacobs.
Destiny is a recurring theme in the literature of Hermann Hesse (1877–1962), including Siddharta (1922) and his magnum opus, Das Glasperlenspiel, also published as The Glass Bead Game (1943). The common theme of these works involves a protagonist who cannot escape a destiny if their fate has been sealed, however hard they try. Destiny is also an important plot point in the hit TV shows Lost, Heroes and Supernatural, as well a common theme in the Roswell TV series. Destiny is a recurring theme in the video-game franchise Kingdom Hearts, with Kingdom Hearts: Birth By Sleep having its story based around the concept of Destiny, and the tagline for the game stating "Destiny is never left to chance."
In the TV series Charmed, about the lives of three sister witches known as the Charmed Ones who take a fourth witch under their tutelage, destiny is inescapable and is protected by the many Angels of Destiny. Destiny is seen as part of the "Grand Design", which is the intended nature of the universe, just as death is, in order to make people live, and Pandora's Box is, to tempt.
Destiny plays a large role in the overall story arc of the re-imagined television series Battlestar Galactica, in which events and characters are guided along by supernatural elements with a planned outcome, often with a cyclical theme of events transpiring again and again in different variations. The most notable example of this is in the Virtual Six character who appears to Gaius Baltar through out the series, claiming to be a messenger from God and directing Gauis' actions and influencing his decisions.
Although the words are used interchangeably in many cases, fate and destiny can be distinguished. It depends on how narrow or broad the definitions are. Broadly speaking, fate is an individual's destiny. More accurately, traditional usage defines fate as a power or agency that predetermines and orders the course of events (Greek definition). Fate defines events as ordered or "inevitable" and unavoidable. Destiny is used with regard to the finality of events as they have worked themselves out; and that same sense of Destination, projected into the future to become the flow of events as they will work themselves out. In other words, fate relates to events of the Future and present of an individual and in cases in literature unalterable, whereas destiny relates to the probable future. Note . This can be seen in our common language usage, e.g. "His calling, his Fate is to be a doctor." Will he definitely be a doctor? Well, it may or not be his destiny or his Ultimate fate if term used interchangeable.
Classical and European mythology features three goddesses dispensing fate, the "Fates" known as Moirai in Greek mythology, as Parcae in Roman mythology, and as Norns in Norse mythology; they determine the events of the world through the mystic spinning of threads that represent individual human Fates.
One word derivative of "fate" is "fatality", another "fatalism". Fate implies no choice, and ends fatally, with a death. Fate is an outcome determined by an outside agency acting upon a person or entity; but with destiny the entity is participating in achieving an outcome that is directly related to itself. Participation happens willfully.
Used with reference to the past, "destiny" and "fate" are both more interchangeable, both imply "one's lot" or fortunes, and include the sum of events leading up to a currently achieved outcome (e.g. "it was her destiny to be leader" and "it was her fate to be leader").
In Hellenistic civilization, the chaotic and unforeseeable turns of chance gave increasing prominence to a previously less notable goddess, Tyche, who embodied the good fortune of a city and all whose lives depended on its security and prosperity, two good qualities of life that appeared to be out of human reach. The Roman image of Fortuna, with the wheel she blindly turned, was retained by Christian writers, revived strongly in the Renaissance and survives in some forms today.[3]
In daily language destiny and fate are synonymous, but with regards to 20th century philosophy the words gained inherently different meanings.
For Arthur Schopenhauer destiny was just a manifestation of the Will to Live. Will to Live is for him the main aspect of the living. The animal cannot be aware of the Will, but men can at least see life through its perspective, though it is the primary and basic desire. But this fact is a pure irrationality and then, for Schopenhauer, human desire is equally futile, illogical, directionless, and, by extension, so is all human action. Therefore, the Will to Live can be at the same time living fate and choice of overrunning the fate same, by means of the Art, of the Morality and of the Ascesis.
For Nietzsche destiny keeps the form of Amor fati (Love of Fate) through the important element of Nietzsche's philosophy, the "will to power" (der Wille zur Macht), the basis of human behavior, influenced by the Will to Live of Schopenhauer. But this concept may have even other senses, although he, in various places, saw the Will to power as a strong element for adaptation or survival in a better way.[4] In its later forms Nietzsche's concept of the will to power applies to all living things, suggesting that adaptation and the struggle to survive is a secondary drive in the evolution of animals, less important than the desire to expand one’s power. Nietzsche eventually took this concept further still, and transformed the idea of matter as centers of force into matter as centers of will to power as mankind’s destiny to face with amor fati.
The expression Amor fati is used repeatedly by Nietzsche as acceptation-choice of the fate, but in such way it becomes even another thing, precisely a “choice” destiny. We find that in § 276 of The Gay Science, where he wrote:
I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love henceforth! I do not want to wage war against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be my only negation. And all in all and on the whole: some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer.
Quote from "Why I Am So Clever" in Ecce Homo, section 10[5]:
My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it—all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary—but love it.
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Fate is a concept involving Time and circumstances, related to those about Destiny, both usually being associated with ideas of predestination, fatalism, or inevitable predetermination, but not necessarily so.
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