compiled by Dee Finney



8-15-2001 - In my dream, I was in a public building, but it was set up like a meeting room.

One alcove of the room was beautiful, with pink walls, and tall pink blooming trees in the center, and a large lamp in one corner.

A woman I knew told me she didn't like the way it looked. She said, "It looks TOO MUCH LIKE HAWAII!!!"

I told her I could rearrange the trees and lamps and it would look better, thinking perhaps the perspective wasn't very good like when you want to paint a picture, the objects in the picture should be arranged nicely, even though the colors were lovely.

I started moving the lamps first. There was an old man standing in the way of a high table with a small lamp on it. He was talking about a short in the electricity. He showed me a plug with bare wires.  I took it and looked at it and pronounced that it was okay.  However, there were about 12 lamp cords all plugged into one outlet by way of a couple of outlet bars like we all use.

I helped the old man sit down in a chair while I fixed things. I started to unplug some of the numerous plugs and move things around, rather ineptly I have to admit.

I started to wake up and had a vision that said, "LAND AND FLEET VEHICLE 598".

End of dream

When I searched the internet to see if there was such a thing, the first page I found was this:  (text provided below)

It is about Army and Marine Corps vehicles and forces needed and how they operate.

Would Hawaii represent PEARL HARBOR?

Remember how we were pulled into the WWII war through FDR's secret meetings behind the scenes and he kept them hidden from us, and then we were forced to go to war because of PEARL HARBOR. FDR knew the attack was imminent and didn't tell anyone until it was too late.

Perhaps GWB talking about dumping the nuclear defense treaty with Russia IS the warning?


NOTE: After reading the articles about how the U.S. has been systematically reducing our capacity to defend our country if we are attacked, I am fully convinced that another Pearl Harbor could take place.

9-11-2001 - A horrific event just occurred which everyone is calling a 'second Pearl Harbor'. The World Trade Center twin tower buildings and the Pentagon were just bombed by highjacked airplanes diving into them, full of people. The first building was hit at 8:48 a.m., the second one at 9:03 a.m. The second building collapsed first at 9:58 a.m., the first building collapsed second at 10:28 a.m.  The number page of references is here.

Not only is the Howitzer number 598, the Fleet Vehicle - ' Nuclear Submarine" USS George Washington is #598.

The first Fleet Ballistic Missile submarine George Washington (SSBN 598) was placed in commission at Groton, Conn.Commander George B. Osborn commanding. The first of nine nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines authorized by Congress, she was launched on 9 June 1959.

Armament: Nuclear

In 1955 the U.S. Navy began a joint venture with the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) to create a sea-based version of the Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic (IRBM). During the course of Jupiter testing, it became clear that the missiles' liquid fuels, especially the very volatile liquid oxygen, provided an unacceptable hazard during at-sea operations. For these reasons, the Navy abandoned the Jupiter program in late 1956 and began developing a solid fuel missile instead.

The Polaris A-1 was developed and declared suitable for launching from ships as well as submarines. The U.S.S. Observation Island and U.S.S. Compass Island were outfitted for Polaris launches. The Navy ordered five existing submarines to be modified to carry the Polaris missile, while other subs were built to the proper specifications. The first of the modified subs was called SSBM 598 George Washington, (originally the SSN 598 Scorpion). Since this was the first sub completed, all five of the renovated subs became known as George Washington Class.

During a Polaris launch, the missile was ejected vertically through a hatch on the deck of the sub, riding in a column of air. Once it was safely away from the sub, its solid propellant ignited and it flew to the target like other ballistic missiles. The Polaris A-1 was officially retired from service in October, 1965 when the last George Washington Class sub, the Abraham Lincoln, returned to port.

USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN 598) was the first ballistic missile submarine to be built. Originally designed to be a Skipjack-class fast attack sub, her partially constructed hull was cut and a 130-foot missile section added amidships. Commissioned 30 Dec. 1959, she successfully test-fired two Polaris A-1 missiles while submerged six months later. In November 1960, she departed for her first armed Polaris missile patrol, remaining submerged for more than 66 days. After deploying on 15 submerged patrols and steaming more than 100,000 miles, she was ready for refueling and refitting for longer range missiles.

Four other FBM submarines, USS Patrick Henry (SSBN 599), Theodore Roosevelt (SSBN 600), Robert E. Lee (SSBN 601) and Abraham Lincoln (SSBN 602) are included in the George Washington class . Although originally designed to carry the A-1 missile, all five were, in March 1967, being converted to handle the A-3 missiles.

9 APRIL 1981: The U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine USS George Washington (SSBN-598) collided with a Japanese freighter in the East China Sea. The freighter sank and the submarine suffered heavy damage to its sail which was repaired using part of the Abe Lincoln's SSBN 602 sail . The submarine carried a total of 16 nuclear warheads in its 16 Polaris A-3 missile tubes each with several MIRVs/missile.

The strategic nuclear submarine USS George Washington (SSBN-598) collided with the Japanese merchant vessel Missho Maru while "on routine operations" only 110 miles south-southwest of Sasebo, Japan. Two Japanese crew members were killed and another 13 rescued by Japanese destroyer after the Missho Maru sank.

The incident sparked a political furor in Japan, straining U.S.-Japanese relations only a month before a scheduled meeting between Prime Minister Zanko Suzuki and President Ronald Reagan. The United States was criticized because it waited 24 hours before notifying the Japanese authorities. After two days of furor, President Reagan and other U.S. officials expressed regret over the accident but refused to say what a strategic submarine was doing so close to Japan (only 20 miles outside the 12-mile limit) or whether it was carrying nuclear missiles.

In 1982, she returned to Pearl Harbor from her last missile patrol. The following year, the missiles were off-loaded in Bangor, Wa. In 1983 the 598 left Pearl Harbor for the last time as she began the journey thru the Panama Canal back to New London, her birthplace. On January 24 1985, the USS George Washington SS(B)N 598 was de-commisioned. She was officially stricken from the active ships roster on April 30, 1986

By the mid-1980s, Japan had become the host to the most extensive U.S. nuclear infrastructure in the Pacific with over two-dozens sites housing nuclear related facilities. Four of the U.S. Navy's six facilities designed to contact submerged submarines via very-low-frequency (VLF) transmissions, for example, were located in the Pacific; one of these was at Yosami in Japan. Moreover, four of five specially converted LORAN-C navigation beacons for communication with nuclear Trident submarines in the Pacific were located in Japan

The Nuclear Offload

The endless battles with non-nuclear countries over nuclear port visits, along with the overall thaw in the Cold War, gradually eroded the justification for maintaining tactical nuclear weapons at sea. During Congressional hearings in 1988, the U.S. Navy had pledged its commitment to modernizing its nuclear stockpile "through vigorous and sustained efforts." But behind the scenes the Navy had already taken its first steps toward a denuclearization of its combat fleet.

In early 1989, the U.S. Navy acknowledged that it had decided to scrap three tactical nuclear weapon systems: the ASROC ship-launched anti-submarine rocket; the SUBROC submarine-launched anti-submarine rocket; and the Terrier ship-launched anti-air missile. As a result, nearly 1,200 nuclear warheads would be removed from 142 ships and 27 submarines. While the move dramatically reduced the number of nuclear-capable ships, another 2,490 non-strategic nuclear weapons would remain in the fleet. The withdrawal of ASROC, SUBROC, and Terrier nuclear warheads was completed in early 1990.

Meanwhile, pressure was building in the White House for a complete removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the fleet. President Bush's national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, reportedly "leaned on" Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney to eliminate the weapons in an effort to undercut growing opposition in Scandinavia, the Pacific, and the Far East to nuclear port calls. Senior aides to Cheney, who opposed removal of nuclear cruise missiles from submarines, were overridden when Admiral Frank Kelso, the Chief of Naval Operations, made it clear that he did not object

On September 27, 1991, President Bush announced that all nuclear weapons would be offloaded from U.S. Navy surface ships and attack submarines and all ground-based nuclear weapons would be withdrawn to the United States. "From Saturday on," Pentagon spokesperson Pete Williams said shortly after the announcement, "no U.S. Navy surface ships or attack submarines have deployed from their ports with any tactical nuclear weapons on board.  (Complete article)

Nuclear submarine George Washinton 598

Reunion info: USS GEORGE WASHINGTON SSBN-598 September 14, 2001

CONTACT: Walt Liss MMC/SS(Ret), 55 Miller Rd., Preston, Ct 06365

Phone: Home/ 1-860-886-9268 Work/ 1-800-269-9994 ext 4690

e-mail: , ,

The Fleet

The U.S. Pacific Fleet

Ballistic Missile Submarine (Nuclear-POWERED) hull type 598

The Russian Northern Fleet

Analyses and commentary on Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation.


(From KOMO, Seattle)

Terrorism Threat To Trident Submarines

August 9, 2001

By KOMO Staff & News Services

'Real, Credible, Immediate Threat'

BREMERTON - The Coast Guard is enforcing 300-yard security zones around Trident nuclear submarines traveling through Northwest inland waters in response to a "real, credible and immediate threat," government documents say.

The heightened security, detailed in a new Coast Guard rule, was imposed under an emergency provision that allows the government to bypass normal rulemaking procedures to preserve national security.

Security zones also have been expanded along the waterfront at Naval Submarine Base Bangor, about eight miles north of Bremerton on Hood Canal, where the subs are based.

July 9 Notice

"The Navy is concerned about possible terrorist acts," said Lt. Paul M. Stocklin Jr., chief of the waterways branch at the Coast Guard Marine Safety Office in Seattle, which oversees the zones. "That potential threat still exists."

According to a notice published July 9 in the Federal Register, potential threats were detected after the October 2000 suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen that killed 17 sailors.

"The attack ... precipitated U.S. Navy security reviews, which have determined that immediate threats exist to naval bases and submarines in Puget Sound," the Federal Register notice said.

'Highly Classified'

It's not clear how the threats were detected or what they are.

The notice said it would be "contrary to the public interest to disclose the exact nature of the current threats ... as this information is highly classified, and if divulged would greatly damage U.S. intelligence sources and security postures."

But it said the threat "is real, credible and immediate."

"Immediate action is necessary to safeguard U.S. naval bases and submarines from sabotage, other subversive acts, or accidents, and otherwise protect naval assets vital to national security."

Apparent Contradiction

Security wasn't increased for surface Navy vessels based in Puget Sound or for their home ports, though Stocklin said that's under discussion.

"I know the Navy is concerned about security for all of its assets," he said. "I don't know if the threat was specifically against ballistic missile submarines."

In interviews with The Bremerton Sun on Wednesday, Navy officials denied there had been any specific threat. In Seattle, Navy spokeswoman Lt. Kim Marks said the measures were among those taken to "safeguard against terrorist actions" after the attack on the Cole.

Navy officials couldn't explain the apparent contradiction between her statement and the one in the Federal Register.

Eight Subs Based Here

Each of the eight Trident subs based at Bangor carries 24 long-range ballistic missiles capable of launching as many as 192 thermonuclear warheads. Each sub is powered by a nuclear reactor, and the base has bunkers full of nuclear warheads in storage or undergoing maintenance and repairs.

Under a recently implemented consolidation plan, the base's Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific is the only place on the West Coast where nuclear weapons are stored.

The Federal Register announcement said no public meeting was planned to explain the new precautions. It set a deadline of Sept. 7 for interested parties to comment or request a public meeting.

'We're Trying To Help'

Under the new security measures, no person or vessel is allowed within 300 yards of any Navy submarine traveling through Puget Sound or the Strait of Juan de Fuca. There were no previous restrictions.

In addition, no person or vessel is allowed within a security zone extending about 500 yards from the waterfront at the Bangor base. The new base security zone extends about 200 yards farther than the old one.

"We're trying to help the Navy protect their forces, and we're trying to accomplish that objective with the least amount of impact for the public," Stocklin said.

The rules are likely to become permanent, he said.

Marines taking part in a chemical warfare counter-terrorism exercise in Jacksonville, North Carolina.

Military role grows on home front

‘Mission creep’ becomes a domestic issue

By Robert Windrem


PHILADELPHIA — As Republicans gathered here last August to nominate George W. Bush for president, a drama played out in secret locations across the city as thousands of American soldiers stood poised for a catastrophic event. Along with a host of civilian emergency specialists, these specialized troops braced for a biological, chemical or nuclear terror attack on the GOP and its nominees — the kind of attack that might force a declaration of martial law.

NO SPECIFIC or credible threat ever surfaced in Philadelphia or in any of the dozen other U.S. cities hosting similarly high-profile events in the past five years. But the Philadelphia plan sheds light on a new domestic role for the military.

Some argue that the role makes sense in light of the threat posed by modern terrorist groups. But a diverse coalition of civilian law enforcement agencies, civil rights advocates and libertarian groups worry about allowing the military to play so prominent a role on U.S. soil.

“There used to be a bright line separating the military from involvement in civilian affairs,” says Steve Aftergood, who directs the Project on Government Secrecy at the American Federation of Scientists. “The pernicious aspect of terrorism is that it threatens to erode what is a clear distinction. We are seeing them on all these ‘fronts.’”

‘There used to be a bright line separating the military from involvement in civilian affairs. The pernicious aspect of terrorism is that it threatens to erode what is a clear distinction.’


Secrecy watchdog The “bright line” Aftergood refers to is called the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, enacted to prevent the military from engaging in police activities in the United States without the consent of Congress or the president. In the mid-1990s, after the bombings of the World Trade Center and the federal building in Oklahoma City — as well as a sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system — the law was amended to allow the attorney general to send armed troops into American cities in cases of catastrophic attacks.

This new role for the military prompted Rep. William Thornberry, a Texas Republican on the Armed Services Committee, to introduce a bill last month that would create an office called the National Homeland Security Agency to help civilian federal agencies do a job that the military is being drawn into by default. Thornberry, who is a rancher and fierce critic of government intrusion into the lives of its citizens, believes the country should be careful not to put the military in the position of acting as police in the United States. Thornberry may be facing a tough battle.


As the world’s borders have become more porous, the definition of national security has expanded into many new areas: counter-terrorism, tracking drug traffickers and disaster preparedness. Secretary of State Colin Powell said recently he will add immigration to that list as well.

The military’s move into domestic law enforcement territory began with drug interdiction along the U.S. border during the Reagan administration, and expanded significantly during the Clinton years.

Officials at several key civilian agencies — from the FBI to the Public Health Service and the Federal Emergency Management Agency — say the military’s growing role in preparing for a domestic terrorist attack is disconcerting.

“We used to be the main people involved in this,” said a domestic preparedness official with the Public Health Service who spoke only on condition of anonymity. “Now, there are fewer of us and more of them.”


Despite the Posse Comitatus Act and concerns about domestic mission creep, a doctrine known as “Garden Plot” exists in the Department of Defense that would allow the armed forces to step in to take control of civilian affairs following a

catastrophic event if the president requested it. As with the military’s posture abroad - the “Defense Condition” or “DEFCON” — there is a step-by-step system for military involvement at home as well. It’s known as Civilian Disorder Condition, or “CIDCON.”

This scenario is the last resort following the collapse of order at home. In this most dire of circumstances - possibly anarchy in the wake of a large-scale terrorist incident, for instance — the “Garden Plot” doctrine gives the president the power to invoke martial law under The Insurrection Act.

Here’s how it would have worked last August in Philadelphia:

Two military “Joint Task Force” units were available for quick deployment. One, called Joint Task Force-Civil Support, is based at Fort Monroe in Virginia. It is

trained to coordinate countermeasures for terrorist attacks and would generally be deployed without weapons.

The other unit, code-named “Task Force 250,” is meant to go in fully equipped for battle. This unit, according to documents obtained by NBC News, is meant to restore civil order after major terrorist events. “Task Force 250” is more commonly known as the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division based at Fort Bragg, N.C.


Even without a crisis, hundreds of servicemen were on hand in Philadelphia last summer, and more than 1,000 were on alert to move into the city if necessary.

Command centers and alternate command centers - in case the primary headquarters was destroyed - were established. Among those stationed the center:

More than 80 military bomb disposal teams, several Army biological advisory and assessment teams, four Department of Defense biological sampling vehicles and the Nuclear Emergency Search Team of the Department of Energy. The Navy even set up a facility for “use as a detainee processing center,” the documents say, in case there were numerous arrests.

In addition, some 10 military bases and another Marine Corps biological and chemical response teams were on alert.

Similar plans existed for the Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles last year and the NATO Summit in Washington, D.C., in 1999. Smaller plans have become commonplace for other events, including the annual State of the Union speech and the presidential inauguration.

These so-called “federal response plans” fill dozens of pages, complete with locations, phone numbers and contact names for counter-terrorist teams, civilian emergency response agencies, law enforcement and military operations.

They also contain instructions on the limits of the Task Force’s power while law and order are being restored. According to the documents obtained by NBC, the plans for the presidential conventions said: “Use deadly force only with great selectivity and precision.”


Defense Department documents describe the Joint Task Force-Civil Support as “the primary DoD command element for the planning and execution of military assistance to civil authorities for domestic counter-measure operations as a result of a weapons of mass destruction incident.”

But the military’s new role has added to confusion over who would ultimately be in charge in the event of a domestic catastrophe, according to several officials who spoke to NBC News.

“The U.S. government spends $12 billion a year on terrorist-related activities,” said one former Clinton administration official involved in counter-terrorism. “I think there will be a major review by the new crowd. There needs to be a national strategy and there needs to be an agency in charge. Someone at OMB [the Office of Management and Budget] has to put someone in charge.”

R. Michael Walker, who has served former presidents as both undersecretary of the Army and deputy director of FEMA, says that in spite of years of discussion, the issue of “who is in charge after an attack — the crisis management side or consequence management side — remains an issue.”

It is one more issue the Bush administration has to consider as it revamps the military worldwide.


The Pentagon is aware of the red flags raised by giving the military a role in a domestic crisis. For instance, prepared orders to the commanders of the Joint Task Force, obtained by NBC News, are kept ready for issuing on the stationery of the chairman of the military joint chiefs of staff.

The order says the military’s involvement in an attack at home would be complex, and adds: “It is intended this way to ensure that civil liberties and fundamental rights are protected as set forth in the Constitution.”

Robert Windrem is an investigative producer at NBC News based in New York. Independent military analyst Bill Arkin and MSNBC’s Michael Moran contributed to this report.


Military to get billions in weapons, but critics wonder if it's overkill

May 21, 2000



WASHINGTON - With President Clinton's support, Congress is poised to approve a defense budget that will clear the way for the most ambitious modernization of the military since President Ronald Reagan's Cold War build-up in 1981.

Despite protests that many of the Pentagon's proposed new weapons are needlessly expensive and no longer necessary, the defense budget allows the United States to continue production and development of a technologically impressive array of jet fighters, nuclear submarines, and attack helicopters.

Each weapon would be the most expensive of its type in history. During the next 10 to 15 years, the Pentagon plans to spend $350 billion to produce three new jet fighters, $65 billion to construct 30 Virginia class fast-attack submarines, and $48 billion for the Army's RAH-66 Comanche helicopter.

The $310 billion defense bill for the fiscal year beginning next October swept through the House last Thursday by on overwhelming vote of 353-63. The Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this month approved a similar bill and the full Senate is expected to pass it later this spring.

Both the Senate and House bills add $4.5 billion to Clinton's initial request, providing the Pentagon with its largest annual budget since the end of the Cold War in 1991.

"For the first time in many years, we have a real increase in defense spending,'' said Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner (R., Va.). Sen. Carl Levin (D., Mich.), the panel's ranking Democrat hailed the measure as a "good bipartisan bill,'' adding that "it makes sure that our forces remain the best-trained, best-equipped, and most capable fighting force in the world.''

But critics warn that Mr. Clinton and Congress are enthusiastically pouring billions of dollars into dazzling weapons at a time when the U.S. military is unmatched anywhere in the world. They insist that the U.S. is spending far more money on defense than any combination of potential adversaries. And they contend that the proposed systems are replacing the finest in the world.

The F-22, which critics complain will average $184 million a copy, replaces the Air Force's F-15, whose performance is unequaled by any other fighter. The Joint Strike Fighter will take the place of the F-16 fighter and the A-10 air-to-ground attack jet, two proven planes. The Virginia class submarine will replace the Los Angeles class of fast-attack submarines, some of which were still being built in the 1990s.

"The F-22 is a magnificent plane, but at $200 million a copy, I can buy a hell of lot of F-16s,'' said Lawrence Korb, former assistant secretary of defense under Mr. Reagan. "We're buying a new attack sub. It's better than the Los Angeles class. But there's nobody out there with submarines any more.

"What you have is a president who doesn't want to take on the military because of the baggage he brings to the office. You have a pretty robust economy and the military wanting to maximize its own image, which is pretty much a Cold War image.''

Ivan Eland, director of defense policy at the CATO Institute, a conservative think tank, said that "we have the best army, our air force is dominant, and our navy has bone-crushing dominance over any other fleet. The military says that the world is still a dangerous place, but it's a lot less dangerous than during the Cold War.''

The Joint Strike Fighter, which will be used by the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and British, is the only system provoking serious questions on Capitol Hill. The Senate is seeking to cut $150 million from Clinton's request for this year. The house budget includes all $856 million requested by Mr. Clinton.

Virtually everyone concedes that the U.S. military is the finest in the world. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the U.S. last year spent more than three times as much on defense as Russia and China combined.

Russia's once huge land army had been slashed to about 350,000 soldiers and its fleet of 70 submarines largely remains tied up at port. China has a vast army of 1.8 million soldiers, but its handful of submarines and nuclear missiles are no match for the U.S.

"We're outstripping the rest of the world in terms of what we're spending on the military,'' said Christopher Hellman, senior analyst for the Center for Defense Information. "You can justify that because we have to act anywhere in the world by ourselves at any time. But we already have that capability. [So] why are we are embarking on a modernization program that is unprecedented in peace time?''

But supporters of increased defense spending argue that as world's sole super power, the United States has unique responsibilities. U.S. forces have conducted eight major interventions abroad since 1983, including the invasion of Panama in 1989, the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and the air attacks in Kosovo and Serbia last year.

They correctly point out that in sheer numbers, the U.S. military has been dramatically slashed from a peak of 2.1 million men and women in the mid-1980s to 1.4 million. The Air Force has declined from 8,300 planes to 5,300 and the Navy has shrunk from 600 ships to barely 300.

They contend that while the F-15 and the F-16 are outstanding fighter planes, their earliest models flew in 1972. The first of the Los Angeles class submarines entered service in 1976, and the Navy is reluctant to extend the life of a submarine beyond 30 years.

"One of the keys to our military being the top military in the world is we've not ever rested on our laurels,'' said Sen. Rick Santorum (R., Pa.), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. "We need to continue to try and move ahead and stay ahead of the curve.''

The Air Force has argued that without the F-22, the U.S. "will steadily lose its edge in air superiority in the 21st century,'' warning that the F-15 cannot match proposed new Russian and French jets. "By 2005,'' the Air Force said in a written statement, "flying the F-15 into combat will be the equivalent of driving a 20-year-old car in the Indianapolis 500.''

But some fear that the replacements have become so technologically adept that they have priced themselves beyond all reason. The F-22's stealth characteristics will make it less vulnerable to surface-to-air missiles, and it will fly at supersonic speed without going to after-burners, which will increase its range.

"As much as I - as a loyal fighter pilot - would love to have an exotic fighter plane like that, there are some things you just can't afford,'' said former Sen. John Glenn (D., O.), a Marine Corps jet pilot in Korea. "This will be a great leap forward beyond the capability of the F-15. We're not inferior to anybody right now, but we do not have the margin of superiority that an F-22 would give us. But $180 million a copy for a fighter plane? Wow. If a pilot ever bends one, his career will go down the tubes.''

Last year, House lawmakers were so annoyed at the escalating costs of the F-22 that they tried to scale it back. Rep. Jerry Lewis (D., Calif.) and Rep. John Murtha (D., Pa.), the ranking members of the House subcommittee on defense appropriations, vowed to block $1.9 billion for fiscal year 2000 for continued production and testing of the jet. But faced with stout opposition from the Senate, lawmakers finally consented to provide $1.3 billion.

The Air Force has countered that the F-22's per-plane cost has been widely exaggerated. While more than $20 billion has been spent developing the jet, the Air Force contends the per-plane cost is $85 million rather than $184 million. The F-15 costs $45 million per copy, and the F-16's price tag is $25 million.

The Air Force appears to have won its way on the F-22, as has the Pentagon for the overall budget. House and Senate versions of the budget include more than $7.5 billion to continue production of the F-22, Joint Strike Fighter and F-18 Super Hornet. The bills also include $512 million to upgrade 120 M-1 tanks at the Lima tank plant and a 3.7 per cent pay raise for those in the military.

And if the Department of Defense continues to prevail, defense spending will increase throughout much of the next decade.

"One budgetary year, one submission or two submissions of real-growth increases does not a military make,'' Defense Secretary William Cohen told Congress in February. "It's going to take sustained commitment over the years.''

Wednesday August 15 10:56 AM ET

Lt. Gen. Discusses Missile Defense

By ROBERT BURNS, AP Military Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) - The head of the Pentagon's missile defense programs said Wednesday he is not fully confident in the ``basic functionality'' of the anti-missile system that successfully intercepted a mock warhead in space last month.

That is why the next test of the system, scheduled for October, will be a replay of the July 14 test, with no additional complexities such as putting more decoys aboard the target missile, Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, told a group of reporters.

The anti-missile system he referred to is called a ground-based interceptor. It is designed to destroy an intercontinental-range ballistic missile during the mid-course of flight, before its warheads re-enter the Earth's atmosphere. It is one of several missile defense approaches the Pentagon is researching and, of those designed to hit long-range missiles, it is the most technically advanced.

Kadish said he was pleased with the July test, in which the interceptor, using what is called ``hit-to-kill'' technology, destroyed the target missile 144 miles above the Pacific Ocean by steering itself into the missile's path and colliding at a combined speed of 4.6 miles per second.

``It is still not totally comfortable for me to say that we can make the hit-to-kill technology work consistently, even in that simple scenario,'' Kadish said, adding later, ``We still need some more reliability in there.''

The intercept was the second in four tries. The first success, in 1999, was followed by two failures, the second of which led to former President Clinton (news - web sites)'s decision last summer not to go ahead with deployment of the system.

The Pentagon at some point will make the intercept tests more challenging, and Kadish had said immediately after the successful July test that the next one might include more decoys, which release from a missile's re-entry vehicle while traveling through space to try to fool the interceptor.

He said Wednesday that the additional complexities probably will not be included until 2002.

Kadish said he is not worried about the interceptor's ability to distinguish between a decoy and the real warhead.

``I am worried that we have the reliability we need in his system's basic functionality,'' he said.

He noted that the July test was the first to use an in-flight communications system aboard the interceptor, a technology which allows the interceptor to receive navigation data from ground-based radars.

``We need a little bit more comfort there,'' he said.

On the Net: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization:

PRI: What Reagan's Star Wars Did to Soviet Union, Bush's Missile Defense Can do to Red China

WASHINGTON, Aug. 14, 2001  /U.S. Newswire/ -- "President Bush's theatre missile defense will do more than just protect the free world from attacks by rogue nations like Iraq, Libya, and China," said Steven Mosher, president of Population Research Institute, and best-selling author of 'Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World'. "This new defensive system, to be developed with Germany, Italy, Japan and Israel, will put tremendous pressure on Red China to evolve into a free market democracy or die."

"Just as Ronald Reagan's strategic defense initiative pushed Soviet leaders into desperate measures that ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and its rebirth as a democracy, so George Bush, by laying down the first layer of 'hit-and-kill' technologies, may push China into a similar systemic crisis," Mosher added.

In a recent issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Mosher was quoted as saying that building a missile defense "would eventually break the back of China's military budget," and that missile defense may help China "go the way of the former Soviet Union" ("United States missile defense action," by John Isaacs, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 1, 2001, No. 4, Vol. 57; Pg. 20 ; ISSN: 0096-3402).

Mosher said that "China's main strategic objective is to stealthily build up a conventional and nuclear weapons force able to intimidate Taiwan and defeat U.S. forces in Asia, while avoiding an all-out arms race with the U.S. By upping the ante with missile defense, Bush is forcing the Chinese Politburo into a stark choice: Go head-to-head with the U.S. and run the risk of systemic collapse, or defer military competition for a generation in favor of peacefully building up China's infrastructure. Odds are that Beijing will choose plowshares over swords. In buying time for ourselves, we buy time for China's democracy movement."

Mosher concluded: "The Bush Administration must be praised for its firm commitment to missile defense today. Twenty years from now, when Chinese hegemony has ceased being a threat to Asia, Americans will liken this peaceful initiative to Reagan's Cold War victory over the former Soviet Union."

--- Steven W. Mosher is president of Population Research Institute and expert on US/China relations and military affairs. PRI is committed to ending human rights abuses committed in the name of "family planning," and to ending counter-productive social and economic paradigms premised on the myth of "overpopulation.

Tuesday August 14 , 2001 - 4:41 AM ET

Rumsfeld Makes Clear US View on Treaty

By ROBERT BURNS, AP Military Writer

MOSCOW (AP) - If the United States and Russia moved no closer to negotiating a new approach to arms control during Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's brief visit it may be because he believes there isn't much to negotiate.

In a 14-hour day of private talks with top government officials and lively exchanges with Russian journalists and academics on Monday, Rumsfeld made it clear time and again that the Bush administration intends to aggressively pursue national missile defense, whether the Russians like it or not.

Clearly the Russians don't like it, but in the administration's view there is little the Russians can do to stop it.

What stands in the administration's way is a 29-year-old agreement - the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty - that President Bush wants to ``lay aside.'' He would prefer the Russians agree to join the United States in withdrawing from the ABM treaty, but if the Russians won't, then the United States probably will.

Rumsfeld returned to Washington early Tuesday.

Before he left Moscow, Rumsfeld said the Bush administration intends to continuing talking to the Russians about abandoning the ABM treaty and making further cuts in nuclear weapons. But it intends to do so without the kind of detailed negotiations over numbers that were a hallmark of arms control during the Cold War.

In describing the administration's approach to crafting a new kind of security relationship with Russia, Rumsfeld steered clear of the term ``negotiation.'' His Russian counterpart used it repeatedly.

Rumsfeld said the United States and Russia were in the midst of a ``process,'' and that the talks were ``consultations.'' Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, however, made clear that the Kremlin wants to negotiate - not just to codify nuclear force reductions but also to limit missile defenses.

``What we need now is a system of controllable restraints,'' Ivanov said at a joint news conference with Rumsfeld. He said the two sides need to find a way to create ``the very tightest of linkage'' between limits on offensive and defensive weaponry, and he predicted it would prove hard.

Ivanov anticipated ``detailed negotiations,'' but cautioned that first the two sides must reach a mutual understanding on ``thresholds and limits on both offensive and defensive systems.''

``I don't see any possible way that we could take something that complicated and do it only in a couple of months,'' he said.

Ivanov's reference to a ``couple of months'' is significant because soon - perhaps by the end of this year - the Bush administration will be faced with some tough choices if it cannot persuade Russia to do away with the ABM treaty.

Rumsfeld has said some aspects of the missile defense testing planned for 2002 will come into conflict with the ABM treaty. Either the administration will have to scale back or delay that testing or it will have to exercise its right under the treaty to give six months' notice of its intent to withdraw.

Asked by a reporter whether Rumsfeld had convinced him the ABM treaty had outlived its usefulness, Ivanov replied, ``I'm afraid not.''

For his part, Rumsfeld sees no point in negotiating on missile defense or on nuclear force reductions. In his view the Russians' interest in negotiation is a sign that they remain rooted in what he calls ``Cold War thinking.''

Why negotiate controls on each other's military power if the United States and Russia no longer are adversaries, he asks. Why not have a more relaxed security relationship, where treaties are not necessary?

The answer may be that Russians worry about America becoming too militarily dominant in the world.

Rumsfeld said Russia's main aim should be to move toward greater political and economic freedoms - to become more like nations ``where people want to invest and where there's growth and there's opportunity and civility.''

Prosperous countries don't worry about lobbing nuclear weapons at each other, he said.

``They don't have treaties with each other trying to control behavior so that it's not hostile. I mean, we don't have treaties with Mexico that keep us from bombing each other or attacking each other.''


Why Russians Fear Missile Defense

By Alexander Altounian  (Washington Post)

Wednesday, August 15, 2001

Why is Russia so afraid of national missile defense? At the meeting in Slovenia this past spring between presidents Bush and Vladimir Putin, the Russian leader made it clear he still regards missile defense as a "threat" to Russia.

After the American delegation returned to Washington, Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, repeated that the United States would proceed with missile defense with or without Russia. The next day Putin told American correspondents that in that case, Russia would eventually upgrade its strategic nuclear arsenal by "mounting multiple warheads on our missiles" to ensure that it would be able to overwhelm such a shield. Just this week, Putin and other Russian officials told the visiting American defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, that they were not interested in his proposals for a joint withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

As a Russian journalist I have a certain understanding of why my country reacts the way it does to missile defense. Russia is a nation that possesses nuclear weapons and is a member of the club of "untouchable" states. The mutual relations and behavior of members of this club are based on the presumption of mutual assured destruction in the case of a military conflict between two nuclear powers.

In recent years the United States and the international community have involved themselves in the internal conflicts of a number of different countries. But no one threatens to invade countries that possess nuclear arms -- obviously because of the possibility of nuclear retaliation.

If, however, one of the countries with nuclear weapons should succeed in constructing a reliable nuclear shield, then the traditional rule of mutual assured destruction would be broken. This country would be able to take a more aggressive stance toward the other members of the nuclear club -- which could include trying to "solve" their "internal" problems, and even using conventional weapons as an argument.

Many reasons against national missile defense have been expressed in the United States in recent months: It has a bad track record, is very costly and could destroy the ABM Treaty. Russia and others even threaten a new arms race if it is put into place. But why should Russia, which has no thought of threatening America with its nuclear arms, care if America wishes to protect itself? Has it any sound reason for being fearful? The answer is yes, it has.

In the past 10 years the United States has enjoyed the position of being the only remaining world power. During this time, the idea of an overseas invasion in order to protect human rights and defend U.S. interests has gradually become an acceptable and even commonplace understanding among the American political and security elite. Who, then, will decide whether Russian military atrocities in Chechnya threaten U.S. interests? Ultimately, it is the American president.

For Russian generals and politicians, who still fear their old enemies and imagine many plots, there are plenty of reasons to be suspicious. Like China, Russia suffers from a number of conflicts, both internal (Chechnya) and external (in the case of Georgia). This is a country that is more than ready to use its army to handle not only its own people but its neighbors as well.

International involvement in the cases of Tibet (for China) and Chechnya (for Russia) has usually been limited to political notes and "tough" questions posed by Western leaders during overseas meetings. By contrast, with interventions in places such as Serbia, Somalia or Iraq, Western-initiated military involvement has become almost routine.

Until recently, no member of the nuclear club has had to fear an external invasion aimed at stopping violations of basic human rights. Successful future deployment of a national missile defense could change this reality.

The Russian government might reasonably expect that its "national interests" in new areas of influence -- new bases in Georgia, Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet Union -- could be limited by the threat of NATO intervention.

Given the emergence of this new reality, it is surprising to me that the Bush team, at least on the rhetorical level, does not even try to camouflage its ambitions. Thus, for example, in February, during the annual Munich conference on Security Policy, Rumsfeld insisted that no one with peaceful intentions should fear missile defense.

These sentiments may sound peaceful to some, but to Russian generals and politicians, they are deeply disturbing. Who, they wonder, will decide whether Russia's "intention" to conquer Chechnya is "peaceful?" Who is to consider the extent of the humanitarian abuses, whether they are "severe and large-scale" or only "mild and small-scale." The American president will be the one to decide. And in the event he decides large-scale abuse has taken place, what is the next step?

On May 1 President Bush cited the war with Iraq as an argument for national missile defense: The alliance that rolled back Iraqi aggression, he said, "would have faced a very different situation had Hussein been able to blackmail [us] with nuclear weapons." That's one reason, Bush said, why the United States should build a national missile defense.

The logic of the president's argument is clear: The United States needs missile defense so it will be free to enter into a possible conflict without fear of being threatened by nuclear retaliation.

This is exactly the situation both Russia and China fear: an invasion to defend the independence of Georgia, or Taiwan, or to stop a "genocide," or whatever else the American president might take as evidence of a lack of "peaceful intentions." This is why the Russians fear missile defense.

Monday August 13, 2001-  2:11 PM ET

Russia Rejects ABM Withdrawal

By ROBERT BURNS, AP Military Writer

MOSCOW (AP) - Russian President Vladimir Putin (news - web sites) stood firm Monday against American determination to abandon the landmark 1972 treaty banning national missile defenses.

And while Putin expressed hope for a new deal on nuclear arms cuts, his government made clear that it expects detailed, potentially lengthy negotiations, which President Bush (news - web sites) is determined to avoid.

In remarks to reporters before meeting with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Putin said Russia has not changed its view that the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty should be preserved, even if amended.

``You know our attitude toward the ABM treaty of 1972,'' he said, speaking in Russian. ``For us, it's unconditionally linked with both the START I and START II treaties. I would like to underline that.''

He was referring to strategic arms reduction agreements of the 1990s, the second of which has yet to be implemented.

In Russia's view, abandoning the ABM treaty would mean the end of the nuclear arms treaties, and that in turn would undermine international security. Bush's view is that the treaty is no longer relevant and that, while it is linked to the issue of offensive nuclear weapons, setting it aside to give Washington a free hand on missile defense would not lessen the value of Russia's nuclear force.

At their meeting last month in Italy, Bush and Putin agreed to pursue the issues of both offensive and defensive weaponry, and they ordered aides to work out the details.

Rumsfeld held a daylong series of meetings here with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Ivanov, starting with a one-on-one session that lasted two hours and ending with a dinner at Rumsfeld's hotel. In between, the Pentagon (news - web sites) chief met with Putin for more than an hour and later fielded questions from Russian academics at the office of the ITAR-Tass news agency.

The officials' talks illuminated differences in fashioning a new U.S.-Russian security relationship.

Rumsfeld said the chief challenge for both sides is to ``shed that baggage'' of Cold War thinking.

``I think I have a much better understanding,'' after Monday's talks, ``of how difficult it is to go from a hostile relationship for 40 or 50 years to a totally different circumstance'' in which neither Russia nor the United States needs to fear the other or believe that treaties must govern their relationship.

``To the extent that suspicion - even misplaced - persists, then we ought to be able to find ways to demystify that and reduce those suspicions,'' he said, implying that the Russians would not oppose Bush's missile defense plan if they accepted the U.S. assertion that it is not designed to harm Russia.

Putin urged the Bush administration to provide more details.

``We would like to get military and technical parameters of the proposals which have been formulated by your department,'' he said to Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld reiterated that he cannot be more specific about the plan because its precise features are yet to be determined by research and testing.

The Russians also seemed bothered by Rumsfeld's refusal to say exactly what level of nuclear weapons Bush wants to keep. Rumsfeld said he would make a recommendation to Bush in late September or early October.

``For us it is important to hear answers'' to the question of how low Bush wants to go, when the American reductions would be implemented and what kind of measures would be taken to verify the cuts, Putin said.

Bush and Putin are to meet in October and again in November.

Ivanov was more explicit in saying his government wants to stick to the ABM treaty and that whatever approach the two countries take to arms control it should place limits on both offensive and defensive weaponry.

The Bush administration wants no limits on its effort to develop missile defenses.

Ivanov also appeared to dash the Bush administration's hopes that a deal could be struck relatively quickly, describing the relationship between offensive and defensive forces as ``very, very complicated.''

``I don't see any possible way that we could take something that complicated and do it only in a couple of months,'' he said.

For his part, Rumsfeld said that although no agreements were reached in Moscow, progress was made.

``Each side is, I believe, gaining a somewhat better perspective as to the thinking and the concerns and the hopes and expectations of the other,'' he said.

Rumsfeld repeatedly described the anticipated talks on nuclear force reductions as consultations, whereas the Russians referred to negotiations. Asked pointedly by a reporter whether the Bush administration was willing to negotiate a detailed agreement on force cuts, Rumsfeld replied, ``That's an open question.''

Wednesday August 15, 2001 12:26 pm Eastern Time

Hit-to-kill missile shield not sure thing-Pentagon

By Jim Wolf

WASHINGTON, Aug 15, 2001  (Reuters) - The head of the Pentagon's push to build a shield against ballistic missiles said on Wednesday he did not yet have complete confidence in the ``hit-to-kill'' technology that has destroyed two dummy warheads in four tests since 1999.

As a result, Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, said he planned to stick to virtually the same, one-decoy scenario for the next $100 million integrated flight test, due in mid- to late-October.

A prototype interceptor fired from Kwajalein atoll in the Marshall Islands smashed a dummy warhead into pieces no bigger than six inches on July 14, the first hit for the U.S. missile defense program since October 1999.

``It is still not totally comfortable for me to say that we can make hit-to-kill technology work consistently ... even in that simple scenario,'' Kadish said at a breakfast with defense reporters.

Such technology -- akin to hitting a bullet with a bullet -- is the furthest along of those the United States is exploring to protect against incoming warheads, including lasers aboard modified Boeing 747 aircraft and sea-launched interceptors that Kadish said may be five to 10 years from being ready to shoot down missiles in their ``boost'' phase.

On the other hand, he said he was confident in the eventual ability to distinguish a true target from decoys of the type a foe likely would use to try to slip a missile possibly tipped with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons through any future U.S. defenses.

``We are working very hard to make this a layered defensive system against states of concern,'' he said. By adding possible sea-, aircraft- and space-based bulwarks to the defensive shield, the Bush administration was complicating the counter-measure problem greatly for its foes, he added.

Kadish said he expected to phase more realistic countermeasures, such as multiple decoys, into ``hit-to-kill'' tests as early as next year. In the past two tests, the 4.5-foot (1.4 metre), 120-pound (54 kg) ``kill vehicle'' distinguished the dummy warhead from a single 5.5-foot (1.7 metre) Mylar balloon decoy.

During much of the July 14 test over the Pacific, the target signaled its location to the interceptor with a beacon that the Pentagon described as necessary only to make up for the lack of an advanced ``X-band'' radar that the United States plans to build later.

``We don't like (relying on such a beacon) but that's the way it is'' until the X-band radar is up and running, Kadish said.

Boeing (NYSE:BA - news) is the lead system integrator for the ground-based missile defense effort. TRW (NYSE:TRW - news) builds the system's battle command, control and communications system. Raytheon (NYSE:RTNA - news) builds the kill vehicle. Lockheed Martin (NYSE:LMT - news) is the prime contractor on the current booster system.

The Pentagon has said it plans to carry out four more missile defense tests in fiscal 2002 starting with the one due in October. The U.S. testing plans and construction of a new test facility in Alaska would ``bump up against'' the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty within months, not years, the Bush administration has said.

The ABM Treaty was negotiated between the United States and the old Soviet Union to ban the kind of nationwide defenses against long-range missiles that President Bush wants to build. Such defenses were seen as destabilizing during the Cold War, inviting both sides to try to overwhelm the other. Russia wants to preserve the treaty. Bush says it is a ``relic'' that should be scrapped or amended.

Kadish told reporters that preparing Fort Greely, Alaska, as a new missile defense test site -- including clearing trees and leveling the ground -- may begin by the end of this month. Such initial work has been judged ``treaty-compliant'' by the United States, he said.




The Army and Marine Corps constitute the nation's land forces. These forces provide unique and complementary capabilities for carrying out military missions. The Army provides forces for sustained combat operations on land, as well as for power projection and forcible-entry operations. The Marine Corps, as part of the nation's maritime forces, provides expeditionary forces to project combat power ashore either in support of naval campaigns or in conjunction with Army and Air Force units. These diverse capabilities give military commanders a range of options for conducting ground operations. Operationally, land forces are assigned to a joint force commander, who employs them in close coordination with aviation and naval forces.

The Army maintains heavy and light forces, based both in the United States and overseas. Light forces -- airborne, air assault, and light infantry units -- are tailored for forcible-entry operations and for operations on restricted terrain, such as mountains, jungles, and urban areas. Heavy forces -- armored and mechanized units -- are trained and equipped for mobile warfare and for operations against armies employing modern tanks and armored fighting vehicles. Light and heavy forces can operate independently or as part of a unified force, as was done in the Gulf War. Depending on the geographic location of both the forces and the crisis, Army forces stationed overseas provide either an initial or an additional source of combat power for regional deployments. For major conflicts, the Army can dispatch a U.S.-based contingency force of up to seven divisions plus support elements to any region of the world.

The Marine Corps maintains forces designed for seabased, self-sustained power projection and forcible entry ashore. Marine units are employed as part of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) consisting of four elements: ground combat, air combat, command, and service support. (The fixed-wing aviation component is discussed in the Aviation Forces chapter of this report.) Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), consisting of about 2,000 Marines, are forward deployed continuously in or near regions of vital U.S. interest; for example, in the past year MEUs have been embarked on amphibious ships patrolling in the western Pacific, near the Persian Gulf, and in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas. These forces provide a swift and effective means of responding to fast-breaking crises and can remain on station for indefinite periods of time, ready to intervene or take action if needed.


During the Cold War, the United States knew with some confidence the location, size, and type of forces it could face in combat. Today, while the prospect of global war has diminished, the world remains a dangerous place and the contingencies for which DoD must plan pose threats that are in many ways more diverse and unpredictable. To hedge against these unknowns, the United States must consider in its planning the range of operations that might be conducted, as well as the weaponry that potential adversaries might employ.


Threat Weapon Systems

In general, land force threats encountered in MRCs would be standing armies of foreign powers, armed with mixes of old and modern weapon systems. Many nations, including members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact alliance, are selling weapons on the international market. Thus, U.S. forces must be prepared to encounter a wide variety of systems in combat, including possibly some originally produced in the United States.

As illustrations, older tank systems that U.S. land forces might face include Soviet T-55s and T-62s, as well as early-generation T-72s; newer systems include later-generation Soviet T-72s with reactive armor and T-80(U)s with integral reactive armor. Older attack helicopters that potential adversaries might employ include Soviet MI-8/17 HIPs and German BO-105s; newer systems include Soviet MI-24/25 Hinds and MI-50 Hokums, and upgraded French SA-342 Gazelles.

New weapon technologies will add more advanced capabilities to threat forces. Examples include tank upgrades (e.g., day and night optics, active defense systems that redirect or destroy incoming projectiles), advanced antitank guided missiles capable of top attacks against tank turrets, increasingly accurate tactical ballistic missiles, and advanced artillery munitions.

Irregular forces will continue to be unable to match the combat power of heavy U.S. weaponry. However, these forces can still pose difficult challenges to U.S. forces. The proliferation of modern light arms, a fighting style that could necessitate operations in dense urban environments, and the ability of indigenous forces to submerge themselves within civil populations could negate some of the advantages of U.S. heavy weaponry.


Major Regional Conflicts

Major regional conflicts pose a heavy demand on U.S. forces and thus drive most force requirements. Land forces would play critical roles in all phases of an MRC. Described below is the Department's planning framework for MRCs. The Department recognizes, however, that the course of actual conflicts may be very unpredictable and therefore maintains the flexibility needed to cope with this uncertainty.

  • Phase I -- Halting the Invasion. Selected Army forces and Marine MAGTFs would move rapidly to help coalition forces establish a viable defense, thereby minimizing the loss of critical facilities and territory. These forces would be introduced through friendly ports and airfields, if possible. If necessary, forcible-entry operations could be conducted using sea-based, airborne, or air assault forces working singly or in concert. Selected heavy force elements, falling in on prepositioned equipment, also would participate in this opening phase of an MRC. Aviation and maritime forces would establish control of the air and sea, thus protecting the deployment and employment of ground units.

  • Phase II -- Force Buildup. As heavier ground elements arrived, emphasis would shift from halting the invasion to preparing for a counteroffensive. The majority of U.S. forces would reach the theater during this phase. Combat forces would arrive and deploy, and support forces would establish the necessary logistics structure to sustain large forces in intensive combat operations. Amphibious, air assault, and mechanized forces would conduct limited ground attacks along a broad front and engage rear-area targets with missile and artillery fire to ensure that the enemy could not regain the initiative. U.S. and coalition forces also would conduct an air campaign during this phase, in preparation for the counterattack.

  • Phase III -- Counteroffensive. Once sufficient forces were available in the theater, a large-scale air-land counterattack -- possibly including an amphibious assault -- would be launched. Land forces would have primary responsibility for engaging, enveloping, and defeating enemy ground formations. Major tasks would include breaching minefields and defensive barriers, maneuvering to destroy armored formations, dislodging and defeating dismounted infantry in defensive positions or on urban terrain, and destroying enemy artillery. The objective of the counteroffensive is decisive defeat of the enemy.

  • Phase IV -- Ensuring Postwar Stability. Once the enemy had been defeated, some land forces would remain in the theater to enforce the peace. These forces could be called upon to help in repatriating prisoners of war, to occupy and administer enemy territory, or to assist local authorities in restoring essential human services.

    The requirements of these major combat operations drive the overall size and structure of Army and Marine forces. To handle a single MRC, the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) concluded that the United States needs a force of four to five Army divisions, four to five Marine brigade-equivalents, and enhanced readiness brigades from the Army National Guard (ARNG). In order to prevail in two nearly simultaneous MRCs, based on the BUR analysis the Department has programmed the following forces:

    Additional details on the land force structure are provided later in this section and are summarized in Table IV-1.

    Military Operations Other Than War

    Although the primary purpose of U.S. land forces is to contribute to winning the nation's wars, they are also prepared to conduct a range of operations short of war. These missions, which are becoming more common in the post-Cold War era, include peace enforcement and peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, evacuations of U.S. citizens from crisis regions, counterdrug operations, and assistance to law enforcement agencies during civil disturbances. Although considered nontraditional, these operations, in fact, have a long heritage in U.S. military history and contribute directly to the security of the United States and its allies. For example, U.S. land forces are playing a key role in the Bosnian peacekeeping operation undertaken by NATO in December 1995. U.S. land forces also continue to be deployed in Haiti, where they are helping to ensure the restoration of democracy; they also are supporting peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in locales such as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The forces required for operations other than war normally are subsumed within those needed for MRCs. However, some tailoring of normal force groupings plus special training often are needed.

    Force Structure

    The FY 1996 budget continues the transition to a force structure supporting the two-MRC strategy defined in the Bottom-Up Review.


    In 1997, the Army will consist of four corps and 18 active and reserve divisions, down from five corps and 28 divisions at the end of the Cold War. The active force will continue to be reduced, declining from 18 divisions and an end-strength of 732,000 in FY 1990 to 10 divisions and an end-strength of 475,000 to 495,000 in FY 1999. (The FY 1999 objective will be established later this year, following completion of internal analyses and evaluations.) The 10 active divisions will include one airborne, one air assault, two light infantry, and six heavy (armored and mechanized) divisions. As FY 1996 began, active-duty strength numbered 510,000.

    Army reserve components -- the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve -- will continue to perform critical warfighting functions that they have fulfilled in the past. The 15 enhanced readiness brigades of the ARNG are fully incorporated into planning for two MRCs. Further, more than 60 percent of the combat support and combat service support required by active Army forces will come from the reserve components. Other ARNG forces, such as the eight National Guard divisions, will be maintained at readiness levels that allow them to mobilize in the event of an extended crisis or protracted operation. These forces also provide a deterrent hedge against the long-term resurgence of a global threat. All reserve forces, but particularly those from the ARNG, will play dominant roles in disaster relief operations in the United States. Consistent with the change in strategic requirements, total end-strength in the Army reserve components will decline from 736,000 in FY 1990 to 575,000 by FY 1998. At the beginning of FY 1996, Army reserve component end-strength stood at 630,000.


    The Marine Corps will maintain three active divisions, three active aircraft wings, and three active force service support groups (FSSGs), all task organized into three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). The MEF in the western Pacific will be somewhat smaller than in the past, however. Active Marine Corps end-strength has declined from 194,040 in FY 1991 to 174,000 today. The Marine Corps Reserve will maintain a division-wing-FSSG team to augment and reinforce the active force. Marine Corps Reserve end-strength today stands at 42,000, down from 44,900 in FY 1991.

    By FY 1999, the drawdown in Army and Marine Corps force structure to levels consistent with the BUR will be complete. Table IV-1 summarizes the planned FY 1999 force structure for the Army and Marine Corps.

    Table IV-1
    Army and Marine Corps
    Force Structure and End-Strength
      Objective (FY 1999)
    Active Component  
    Divisions 10
    Separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments 3
    End-strength [a] 475,000-495,000
    Army National Guard  
    Divisions 8
    Separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments 18 [b]
    End-strength [a] 367,000
    Army Reserve End-strength [a] 208,000
    Marine Corps  
    Active Component  
    Divisions 3
    Wings 3
    Force Service Support Groups 3
    End-strength [a] 174,000
    Reserve Component  
    Division 1
    Wing 1
    Force Service Support Group 1
    End-strength [a] 42,000
    [a] End-strength figures include all functional areas of combat, combat support, and combat service support.
    [b] Fifteen will be enhanced brigades.


    The following chart shows the location of major Army and Marine Corps units as of January 1996.

    The peacetime presence of U.S. forces overseas demonstrates the nation's commitment to the security of friends and allies and enhances U.S. crisis-response capabilities.


    The United States is committed to fulfilling a significant role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A corps headquarters and substantial elements of two Army divisions, including support elements, will be retained in Europe. These forces will provide an aggregate troop strength of 65,000. Two brigade sets of Army equipment will remain prepositioned in central Europe; one brigade set will remain in southern Europe. This materiel will allow in-place divisions to grow to full strength and an additional Army division to be deployed to the theater in the event of a conflict.

    Despite the overall reduction of forces in Europe, the units remaining in the theater are very active. The U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division, drawn from U.S. NATO forces in Germany, is providing the bulk of U.S. ground forces for the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Further, the U.S. European Command is deeply involved in forging links with the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union through the Partnership for Peace and other programs.

    Marine forces also maintain an active presence in Europe. A Marine Expeditionary Unit is continually deployed in the Mediterranean Sea; a Marine brigade-equivalent set of equipment has been prepositioned ashore in Norway; and another brigade-equivalent set has been placed aboard maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) stationed in the Mediterranean Sea. It was a forward-deployed MEU, operating as part of a joint task force, that rescued Air Force Captain Scott O'Grady last year when his aircraft was shot down over Bosnia and Herzegovina.


    The Army Second Infantry Division -- with two brigades plus other Eighth Army supporting elements and a total troop strength of over 27,000 -- will be maintained in South Korea to deter aggression from the north. The Army 25th Infantry Division (Light), stationed in Hawaii, is also oriented to the Pacific region, as is an Army special forces battalion maintained on Okinawa. In addition, prepositioned equipment is maintained ashore in Korea for one Army brigade. The Third Marine Division (one regiment of which is stationed in Hawaii) will remain on Okinawa, and one MPS squadron with a Marine brigade-set of equipment will continue to be stationed in the vicinity of Guam.


    Two brigade sets of Army equipment will be stored ashore in the region. One of these sets will be maintained in Kuwait for use by U.S. forces that will deploy to the region on a rotational basis to train and exercise with Kuwaiti forces. The second set will be located in Qatar. In addition, one brigade set of Army equipment will be prepositioned afloat, for use in either Southwest Asia or elsewhere as needed. One MPS squadron with a Marine brigade-set of equipment will be maintained in the region.


    Maintaining ready, capable forces is the top priority of the defense program. The compensation and quality of life initiatives discussed in earlier sections of this report are key to attracting and retaining the high-quality personnel on whom readiness depends. Education and training are major contributors to readiness and will continue to receive close attention. DoD has been very responsive to the needs of the combatant commanders in providing trained and educated forces, and it has put a robust process in place to improve its position in the years ahead.

    The Army and Marine Corps provide a wide range of training opportunities for their forces. These include joint and single-service exercise programs in the United States and large multinational exercises conducted regularly abroad. The use of battle simulators at home bases and combat training centers (CTCs) allows Army and Marine forces to hone critical skills in advance of field exercises and operational deployments. The relative emphasis on simulators for basic and collective training continues to increase as computer hardware and software technology improve.

    Army Training

    The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany, use instrumented field exercises to improve the readiness of battalion- and brigade-sized units. The Army's goal is to train 12 brigades at the NTC each year and 10 brigades at the JRTC, while providing annual training opportunities at the CMTC for all of its European-based infantry and armor battalions.

    The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) gives division and corps headquarters staffs specialized training in wartime command functions. This program combines seminars and battle simulations at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, with computer-assisted command post exercises at home stations. Plans call for all active component division and corps staffs to receive BCTP training once every two years; all ARNG division and brigade staffs will train once every three years.

    Marine Corps Training

    Marine units conduct large-scale live-fire and maneuver field exercises at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center at 29 Palms, California. Eight active and two reserve infantry battalions, plus associated combat support and combat service support elements, train each year in MAGTF-level exercises. The Mountain Warfare Training Center in Bridgeport, California, prepares Marine units for both mountain and cold-weather operations. Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) undergo an intense, 26-week predeployment training period, during which they receive extensive training both ashore and at sea.

    Joint and Multinational Training

    Army and Marine forces participate in joint and multinational training exercises both in the United States and abroad. Joint exercises involve forces of more than one military department; multinational exercises involve forces of foreign nations. Both are critical in developing and honing procedures for mutual support, seamless integration, and unified command and control. Major exercises in 1995 included Unified Endeavor at Fort Hood, Texas; Roving Sands at Fort Bliss, Texas; Bright Star 95 in Egypt; Cobra Gold 95 in Thailand; Indigo Desert in Kuwait; Ulchi Focus Lens 95 in Korea; and Fuertes Caminos in South America.

    Training Challenges -- Funding

    Crisis-response operations continue to be a significant responsibility for land forces and bear directly on readiness. These deployments, coupled with routine overseas presence missions, place heavy strains on the already limited operation and maintenance accounts, which also fund training and sustainment programs. The Department is acutely aware of this problem and is working with Congress to find a long-term method of funding contingencies that does not harm readiness. In the short term, to ease burdens on the active force, reserve units are being used in peacekeeping roles in Haiti and the Sinai. In addition, congressional passage last year of a $2.5 billion emergency supplemental appropriation for contingencies provided much-needed relief. The land forces component of these funds was $1.1 billion; the supplemental allowed Army and Marine Corps commanders to avoid abbreviating and curtailing field exercises in order to fund contingency operations out of operation and maintenance accounts.


    Modernization programs for the Army and Marine Corps lay the technological groundwork for longer-term enhancements in combat power and preserve the combat edge that U.S. land forces now possess over potential adversaries. Retention of this edge is vital if U.S. forces are to prevail in the shortest possible time and with the fewest possible casualties.

    The sections that follow present highlights of modernization programs being pursued by the Army and Marine Corps. As this report went to press, funding needed to support recapitalization initiatives of all four Services was under review. Annual production rates and funding objectives for some programs addressed in this chapter could change as a result of that assessment. Moreover, other changes could be made as a result of subsequent reprogramming requests. The figures given here reflect the status of programs at the time of the report's publication; adjusted figures, where applicable, will be included in the President's budget submission to Congress.


    The Army strategy for waging war is to win rapidly with minimum casualties by denying an opponent the ability to maintain a coherent operational plan or to respond decisively to changing battlefield conditions. This concept requires both superior weaponry and a superior ability to concentrate the efforts of intelligence, logistics, fire support, and maneuver forces at the decisive time and place. To this end, Army modernization programs continue to emphasize five interrelated areas where U.S. forces must maintain a combat edge: battlefield intelligence and communications; precision strike; battlefield maneuver; force protection; and force projection and sustainment. To achieve these objectives, the Army is integrating selected capabilities (e.g., night-vision devices, information digitization) into the force through system upgrades, while pursuing only those new programs of highest priority.


    The M1A2 upgrade program will improve the lethality, mobility, and survivability of approximately 1,000 older Abrams M1 tanks. Enhancements include a 120mm gun, suspension improvements, a nuclear-biological-chemical protection system, and improved armor. Battlefield performance is being enhanced through the addition of a commander's independent thermal viewer, an independent commander's weapon station, position navigation equipment, and a digital data bus and radio interface unit permitting the rapid transfer of data between the Abrams and other systems on the battlefield. The M1A2 upgrade program began in FY 1993. To date, 206 upgrades have been funded. The Army currently plans to award a five-year contract beginning in FY 1996 for at 600 additional upgrades.


    The A3 upgrade to the Bradley fighting vehicle system will complement the capabilities provided by the M1A2. Approximately 1,602 existing Bradley A2s will be remanufactured into A3s. In addition to providing digital communications capability, enhanced situational awareness, and improved sustainability, the A3 upgrade increases the lethality of the Bradley by adding an improved fire control system and a commander's independent thermal viewer. When equipped with upgraded Bradleys, mechanized infantry units will be able to share battlefield data with M1A2-equipped armor units. Engineering and manufacturing development of the A3 upgrade will continue through FY 1999. Low-rate initial production is scheduled to begin in FY 1997.


    The Comanche (RAH-66) is the first helicopter designed for armed reconnaissance. This aircraft will allow Army commanders to pass near real-time intelligence to soldiers throughout the battlefield. It will significantly expand the Army's ability to locate enemy forces, mass fire against them in close and deep tactical operations, and synchronize Army actions throughout the land component commander's area of operation. The Comanche will replace three aging helicopter systems -- the AH-1, OH-58, and OH-6. The AH-1, OH-58A/C, and the OH-6 fleets all average more than 25 years of age and lack the capabilities needed on the 21st century battlefield. The younger OH-58D is not capable of handling modern payloads. The Comanche will continue in research and development during the program years. Current plans call for procurement to begin in FY 2006, with a total of 1,292 helicopters slated for production through FY 2027.


    This modification to the Apache system will provide ground commanders with a long-range helicopter capable of delivering massed, rapid fire in day or night and in adverse weather. Longbow's digitized target acquisition system can automatically detect and classify targets. The target acquisition system uses a millimeterwave radar to direct a fire-and-forget version of the Hellfire II missile. Initial operational tests and evaluation of the Longbow system were conducted early in 1995, and the system was approved for production in October 1995. Current plans call for 758 Apache helicopters to be converted to the Longbow configuration through FY 2008.


    ATACMS is a surface-to-surface guided missile capable of striking targets beyond the range of existing Army cannons and rockets. This advanced weapon is fired from the M270, which also is the delivery vehicle for the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS). ATACMS Block I missiles, with antipersonnel/antimateriel (APAM) bomblets, were fielded beginning in FY 1990. An improved version of the weapon, designated ATACMS Block IA, with greater range and accuracy, will enter service in FY 1998; a total of 800 of these missiles are programmed for production. Two follow-on versions of ATACMS are scheduled for fielding after the turn of the century. ATACMS Block II missiles, carrying the Brilliant Antiarmor Technology submunition (discussed below), will enter service in FY 2001; an inventory objective of 1,206 missiles has been established for this variant. In FY 2003, the extended-range ATACMS Block IIA will be fielded; a total of 600 of these missiles are planned for procurement.


    BAT and SADARM are fire-and-forget submunitions designed to destroy tanks and other armored targets. BAT submunitions will be carried deep into enemy territory by ATACMS. Once released, BAT will use infrared and acoustic sensors to autonomously locate and automatically attack moving armored vehicles. BAT will begin contractor developmental testing in FY 1996 and start low-rate initial production in FY 1998.

    SADARM will be delivered to its target by 155mm artillery projectiles. The submunition is designed to destroy lightly-armored vehicles, primarily self-propelled artillery. Once dispensed from its carrier, SADARM will locate its target using dual-mode millimeter-wave and infrared sensors. SADARM began low-rate initial production in FY 1995 and is scheduled for initial operational testing in FY 1998. A decision on full-rate production will be made in FY 1999. Current plans call for procurement of 73,532 projectiles (with two SADARM submunitions per projectile) through FY 2012. A fully funded product improvement program for SADARM will increase the submunition's footprint and lethality through improved electronics; the product-improved version will enter production in FY 2002.


    This new man-portable missile system will improve the antiarmor capability of dismounted Army and Marine forces. It is slated to replace the Dragon antitank system in infantry, scout, and combat engineer units. The Javelin can destroy both conventional and reactive armor targets from frontal or top attack positions. The system will improve soldier protection in two ways. First, its fire-and-forget technology will allow gunners to launch their missiles and immediately take cover. Second, the Javelin can also be safely fired from enclosed positions. Javelin is currently in low-rate initial production; a decision on full-rate production will be made in 1997.


    The Crusader (formerly designated the Advanced Field Artillery System and Future Armored Resupply Vehicle) is a new-generation self-propelled indirect-fire cannon and artillery resupply system. It will replace the M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzer and the M992 field artillery ammunition supply vehicle used by heavy Army forces. Compared to those earlier systems, Crusader will provide a significant increase in range, accuracy, rate of fire, mobility, and survivability, restoring the Army's cannon artillery supremacy. Innovations incorporated in the system include an advanced cannon system, automated ammunition handling, and improved fire control capabilities. Crusader will be in research and development during the program years; production is scheduled to begin in FY 2003, with the first unit to be equipped in FY 2005. Current plans call for the procurement of 824 Crusader systems (824 cannons and 824 resupply vehicles) through FY 2012.


    This new family of 2 1/2-ton and 5-ton trucks will be used by combat, combat support, and combat service support units to move troops, equipment, and supplies within operating theaters. The trucks will be produced in a variety of versions, all incorporating a common chassis. This will reduce production costs and save maintenance time and expenses. The new truck lines will overcome several significant aging problems. The current fleets of 2 1/2-ton and 5-ton trucks are now more than 20 years old and will average more than 30 years in age by the end of FY 2001. The reliability problems, and particularly the limited off-road capability, of these vehicles were documented in the Gulf War. FMTV will have much greater off-road mobility and will be much easier to maintain than the systems it will replace. Current plans call for delivery of 53,600 FMTVs through FY 2015.


    This group of programs -- including but not limited to the Army Digitization program, Army Global Command and Control System, and Army Tactical Command and Control System -- will modernize Army command and control systems. The primary goal of this major research and development initiative is to provide digital communications links between commanders and their forces, and among individual force elements, enabling information to be passed around the battlefield in near real time. The program's broader goal is to improve situational awareness and decision support for commanders in the field. As part of this initiative, communications systems are being upgraded to carry the immense amounts of digital information that will have to be processed, and to give them the computer hardware and software to do that. The various systems included in this initiative will be field tested through the year 1999; a decision on full procurement will be made in FY 2000.

    Marine Corps

    Marine Corps modernization requirements derive from the operational maneuver from the sea concept, which provides for amphibious assaults to be launched further offshore, with greater survivability, flexibility, speed, surprise, and combat power. Initiatives that improve amphibious and aerial assault capability, land mobility, mine countermeasures, and fire support capabilities are essential to this concept.

    V-22 OSPREY

    This tilt-rotor aircraft will replace the Marine Corps' aging fleet of CH-46E and CH-53A/D helicopters. The V-22's combination of range, speed, and payload will enable Marine units to move assault forces and supplies faster from ship to shore and deeper within the area of operations. This improvement in mobility will also enhance the survivability of ships carrying the aircraft. Amphibious vessels will be able to remain further offshore, decreasing their vulnerability to shore-based missiles, underwater mines, and detection by ground surveillance systems. The V-22 program is currently in engineering and manufacturing development, with low-rate production scheduled to begin in FY 1997. A decision on full-rate production will be made in FY 2001. Current plans call for the procurement of 523 aircraft through FY 2021, including 50 aircraft modified for special operations. Initial operational capability is anticipated in FY 2001.


    The Marine Corps is examining alternatives for upgrading or replacing its aging fleet of utility and attack helicopters. Alternatives include the addition of improved four-blade lift capabilities to both helicopter fleets, the incorporation of an improved targeting system and an integrated weapons station on the AH-1W, and various replacement options. The program will undergo an acquisition milestone review in late FY 1996, at which time a decision on proceeding into demonstration/validation will be made.


    This new amphibious assault vehicle will allow Marine forces to launch assaults from points over the horizon, move rapidly to the beach, and continue the attack inland in a seamless operation. It will also provide armor-protected transport and direct fire support to Marine infantry forces ashore. The AAAV will replace the AAV7A1, which dates from the early 1970s and is nearing the end of its service life. The AAAV will have much greater mobility in the water than the AAV7A1, and will have the speed and cross-country mobility to operate with the M1A1 tank. Currently, two contractors are working to define AAAV concepts. Development will proceed under a demonstration and validation contract to be competitively awarded in early 1996. A low-rate initial production contract is scheduled to be awarded in FY 2004; 1,013 vehicles are planned for procurement through FY 2013.


    This new towed cannon system will replace the M198 155mm howitzer used by Army and Marine forces. Substantially lighter than the M198, the LW155 will significantly enhance ship-to-shore mobility, while increasing the survivability and responsiveness of artillery support for ground operations. The requirements for this joint program were defined in the first half of 1995, at which time concept definition activities were initiated. Upon completion of a shoot-off among competing systems during 1996, the program will enter the engineering and manufacturing development phase. An acquisition objective of 598 LW155s has been established. Low-rate production is scheduled to begin in FY 2000, with full operational capability slated for FY 2006.


    This short-range antiarmor assault weapon will improve Marine light antitank capability in the field. A shoulder-mounted, 20-pound fire-and-forget system, the Predator will improve upon the range and lethality of the AT4, which it is slated to replace. The current acquisition target is 21,012 systems. Operational requirements were established in 1994, and the program is currently in engineering and manufacturing development. Procurement is scheduled to start in FY 1999, with full operational capability planned for FY 2001.

    Table IV-2
    Key Army and Marine Corps Modernization Programs
      Current Dollars (Millions)
      FY 1995 Actual FY 1996 Actual FY 1997 Budgeted FY 1998 Planned
    Army RDT&E        
    Abrams Upgrade 11.7 38.8 71.5 33.3
    Bradley Upgrade 75.1 117.9 89.2 66.3
    Comanche 474.9 292.2 288.6 288.8
    Apache Longbow 169.6 23.0 5.9 --
    ATACMS/APAM 36.3 26.4 4.9 --
    ATACMS/BAT 115.1 195.7 180.4 177.7
    SADARM 40.5 16.2 10.1 22.6
    Javelin 29.6 1.0 -- --
    Crusader 172.4 201.6 267.9 337.6
    FMTV 4.3 -- -- --
    Digitization 82.7 99.1 87.4 27.8
    Army Procurement        
    Abrams Upgrade 308.7 496.7 539.8 650.6
    Bradley Upgrade -- -- 210.2 221.4
    Apache Longbow 117.0 417.7 379.5 439.0
    ATACMS/APAM 112.8 121.3 92.8 98.1
    ATACMS/BAT -- -- -- 120.9
    SADARM 29.8 41.1 60.3 69.5
    Javelin 212.6 200.9 162.1 152.3
    FMTV 371.2 150.8 240.0 135.3
    Digitization -- -- -- 75.6
    Navy RDT&E [a]        
    V-22 452.7 736.8 576.8 522.7
    Helicopter Upgrades/ Replacements 89.0 87.0 113.1 145.3
    Navy Procurement [b]        
    V-22 -- 46.6 602.3 522.7
    Marine Corps RDT&E        
    AAAV 23.6 32.4 41.3 62.4
    LW155 6.4 10.9 11.5 31.3
    Short-Range Assault Weapon 17.3 31.5 33.3 0.5
    [a] Navy funds applied to Marine Corps RDT&E.
    [b] Navy funds applied to Marine Corps procurement.


    Under this program, the Marine Corps is remanufacturing 5-ton trucks used by combat, combat support, and combat service support units to move troops, equipment, and sustainment supplies. The current fleet will begin to reach the end of its service life in FY 1999; its limited mobility and load-carrying capacity were demonstrated during the Gulf War. In upgrading the fleet, the remanufacturing program will emphasize modern, nondevelopmental off-road truck technologies. Planned enhancements include the installation of an improved engine, independent suspension, and central tire inflation system. Plans call for a total of 8,080 vehicles to be remanufactured through FY 2004.

    Additional modernization programs for the Marine Corps are discussed in the Maritime Forces section of this report.


    Both the Army and Marine Corps will take additional steps in FY 1997 to streamline and adapt their forces to post-Cold War requirements. The FY 1997-2001 program will preserve combat readiness, while making the selective enhancements needed to keep Army and Marine equipment and munitions inventories capable and modern. The force structure and modernization initiatives outlined in this chapter represent a balanced approach to meeting future needs.

    From:  (For some reason, you can't read this page on the front side, only on the source side:

    Thirty thousand nuclear weapons of different categories are suspected to be in possession of different countries. The United States of America is estimated to hold 15,500; Russia between 13,200 to 20,200; France 482, China 434, United Kingdom 200, Israel 100 plus, India 60 plus and Pakistan between 15 to 25. USA and Soviet Union (now Russia) have agreed between themselves to reduce their holdings to a total of 7,000 by the year 2003. However, it is common knowledge that the world is moving towards an era of peace and even the old rivalry between the two world giants has receded. Why then the need to maintain such a huge stock? With no military threat to individual European countries any longer in sight, should the US nuclear umbrella not be enough for NATO countries? These and similar other questions raise the need of a study of the world nuclear situation particularly in Pakistan, which is under tremendous pressure from G8 to abrogate its nuclear programme and whose people are currently engaged in evolving a consensus on whether or when to sign CTBT?

    A recent Washington Post report based on an unidentified intelligence source gives Pakistan superiority over India in numbers of nuclear weapons, their technology and delivery systems. This claim, which has been denied by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister in Washington itself, lends further urgency to the need for all Pakistanis to know what is the actual nuclear situation in the world. Further, to understand what nuclear politics is currently being practiced by certain nuclear weapon states to advance their own interests. This inspired and so-called intelligence report, which is more likely a plant, therefore, has deeper implications than meets the eye. However, though Pakistan might be the target of the report, were India to get encouraged and speed up its declared nuclear ambitions, would the whole region extending from Red Sea and the Gulf to the Asia-Pacific states, from Japan to New Zealand through Australia, remain unaffected and escape its fall out. Further, this canard of Pakistan’s nuclear superiority when taken together with other similar unsubstantiated intelligence leaks, like Pakistan receiving assistance from North Korea and China to further its nuclear weapons program-me and lately of China increasing it intelligence activities in United States to obtain nuclear secrets, only give credence to certain conclusions, which only India and its inspired lobby in United States would want. To say the least, the whole proposition has possibility of dangerous fall-out for the world and requires serious considerations by American authorities - at least to the extent of issuing a denial that any US government intelligence agency was involved in preparing this report.

    The United States of America with 15,500 weapons is modernizing and reducing its arsenal in accordance with its new post-Cold War requirements. It will retain 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. The number of land-based Minuteman III missiles has been reduced from 530 to 500. All short-range nuclear attack missiles have been retired from service. The START II treaty goal is to reduce the number of warheads to 3500 by the year 2003. This force will be augmented with B-52 bombers carrying air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), and 20 B-2’s with up to 16 gravity bombs each and some tactical weapons.

    Russia’s arsenal of 13,200 - 20,200 nuclear weapons inherited from the former Soviet Union has dwindled and aged. That country aims to reduce this number further to the 3,500 warhead level agreed to with the U.S. in the START II accord, but, the cost of safely destroying missiles and warheads is hampering Moscow’s ability to reduce the arsenal quickly. In 1999, Russia still had about 20,000 warheads, many of them slated for destruction. Extensive missile systems, a fleet of aging nuclear submarines, plus long-range bombers continues to make Russia a power to reckon with.

    China’s nuclear arsenal is relatively small with 434 warheads but it includes the three major strategic components: land, air and submarine launched systems. US defence analysts regard China’s arsenal as defensive. It appears the Chinese leadership is deeply committed to rapid economic development of the country while maintaining the credibility of its defence. And, there are indications to suggest that modernization, if not expansion remains under consideration. On arms control, China refuses to take part until US and Russian arsenals are reduced to a level comparable to that of Britain, France and China.

    France with 482 weapons maintains a nuclear bomber force and a small fleet of nuclear missile submarines. Its arsenal, on paper at least, is the third most powerful in the world. However, post-Cold War reductions are sweeping, including the elimination of the old land-based missiles. At the same time, modernization continues. Like China and Britain, France has chosen to stay out of arms control efforts, arguing its forces are purely defensive.

    The United Kingdom possesses 200 nuclear weapons. Its bomber force was phased out of service in 1998, leaving only a submarine-based deterrent. Nonetheless, the force remains formidable; all based on four new Vanguard class nuclear powered submarines. The submarines are armed with US supplied Trident II D-5 missiles.

    India detonated a nuclear device in May 1974. For over two decades after that, it continued to claim that no bombs were being built and that only peaceful research was in progress. Then, all of a sudden, in May 1998, India carried out a series of nuclear tests. The West’s response was a calculated cool anger. India has enough plutonium for over 80 weapons. It continues to work on improvements to its Prithvi and Agni ballistic missiles, and warhead technology.

    Pakistan, ever aware of India’s intentions, began its nuclear weapons programme soon after India exploded a nuclear device in 1974. By the late 1980’s, Pakistan was capable of building nuclear weapons, and in 1990, that fact prompted the US, UK and Japan to cut off aid to Islamabad. Pakistan is believed to have several warheads completed but unassembled, which could take several hours to prepare for use. After the cool response of the West to India’s demonstration of its nuclear might at Pokhran, next to its border, Pakistan was left with no choice and several weapons were tested soon after India’s May 1998 explosions. The country has also developed the Hatf I and Hatf-II ballistic missiles with ranges, which cover a significant part of India.

    Nuclear Programme

    The situation in other countries with on-going nuclear programmes is somewhat ambiguous but appears to be as described below:

    Egypt started a nuclear weapons programme during the 1960s under Gamal Abdel Nasser. Despite generous Soviet patronage in other areas of Nasser’s military programme, Moscow apparently stopped short of providing nuclear weapons technology. Egypt’s programme continued through the seventies but, according to US intelligence officials, produced little results. By the end of the decade, Egypt’s secret-weapons development efforts were being directed toward chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles. These programmes were largely ended after the Camp David accords in 1979. However, according to US sources, Egypt continued to maintain contacts with Chinese and North Korean sources for ballistic missile technology.

    Pursuit of nuclear weapons predates the Islamic revolution of 1979 when according to this scribe’s information the Shahin-Shah was planning to acquire eight nuclear power stations from Europe. However, Iran under post-revolution regimes recommitted itself and, according to US intelligence estimates, may be only a matter of a few years from attaining nuclear status. Though Iran denies it is trying to build a bomb, according to US sources senior Iranians privately have cited the large, unacknowledged but well propagated and accepted Israeli nuclear arsenal, as well as, efforts in neighbouring Iraq till the 1990 Gulf War as a rationale for its own programme. The Indian and Pakistan bomb tests must have intensified any interest in this field. Iran’s main source of technology and nuclear material is considered by the US sources to be China, with Russia supplying civilian nuclear power technology. They also claim that China has also sold missile technology to Iran.

    Iraq’s potential as a nuclear threat had convinced Israel enough to dispatch its airforce jets to destroy an Iraqi research reactor at Osirak in 1981, violating Saudi Arabian airspace in the process. This piratical act was also contrary to the UN Charter. After the Gulf war of 1990, USA and UK in the UN Security Council demanded and obtained access for UN weapons inspectors to visit Iraqi facilities as part of the war’s armistice terms. They claimed to have found that Baghdad’s scientists had been on the verge of success without specifying the specific fields. According to US sources Iraq’s programme was aided enormously by former Soviet and Chinese technology. UNSCOM inspectors feel they crippled most of Iraq’s nuclear research facilities before they lost access to the country in late 1998. However, Western experts fear the Iraqis have retained enough knowledge to be able to quickly reapply the same to a new nuclear weapons programme.

    Israel is believed to have a nuclear stock of 100 plus weapons. Whether true or otherwise, this large suspected stockpile will be difficult to disregard for any one. Specially, when Israel has also demonstrated its ability to produce medium range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Recent revelations suggest that the Israeli arsenal is a mix of gravity bombs and missiles. The Israeli air force would strongly rely on US-supplied aircraft such as the F-4E and F-15 to deliver its nuclear weapons. In 1973, a friend in Paris informed this scribe that Israel had already tested a nuclear device in a friendly country.

    Libya is thought to lack the technical resources to develop nuclear weapons on its own or even with significant outside help. The threat posed by Libya, in Western eyes at least, is that its regime might find a way to purchase such a weapon and supply it to a terrorist group. Washington and London suspect Libya’s complicity in the 1987 bombing of a Pan Am 747 jetliner, which only increased their fears. Both the Soviet Union and China have supplied civilian nuclear reactor technology to Libya in the past. US intelligence agencies believe a low-level effort to build a bomb is under way but that it probably has not progressed far.

    North Korea in 1993, after US intelligence raised fears of a North Korean nuclear weapon, saying the North had diverted enough plutonium from an old Soviet-designed reactor to produce at least one crude bomb. After a period of tension, Washington and Pyongyang signed a nuclear agreement through which the US, Japan and South Korea would aid North Korea in building a proliferation-safe, Western-style nuclear plant. North Korea, in exchange, agreed to a cessation of its nuclear weapons programme and opened its research sites to international inspection. The 1994 agreement remains extremely controversial. In the United States and Japan, many on the right have serious doubts about Washington’s ability to verify the North’s compliance. Groundbreaking on the North’s new Western-funded reactor took place in the summer of 1997. The country reportedly, successfully tested recently a long-range ballistic missile type causing much alarm to Japan and USA. In 1976, during a visit to a certain facility in North Korea, this scribe was inadvertently, or by design, ushered into a room for about thirty seconds. The equipment there appeared to be an advanced type of laser, which showed the highly evolved state of technology in that country even at that time. It should also be remembered that Japan, during its occupation of Korea had set up much heavy industry in the North to process raw materials from the Manchurian mines (occupied by Japan from China at the height of the colonial era). This included a nuclear facility.

    Syria like many of Israel’s near neighbours, is thought by Western sources to have launched a programme aimed at building a nuclear weapon in the 1970s after it became clear Israel had obtained such weapons. The programme - presumably aided by Russian and Chinese technology, is not thought to have progressed very far as Syria lacks both the technical infrastructure and money for serious nuclear research. However, according to American sources, China has provided Syria with ballistic missile technology. But for what purposes that technology could be used remains unclear.

    Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Introduced to the United Nations by Australia, and officially endorsed in September 1996. The treaty calls for a total worldwide ban on the detonation of all nuclear devices.India, and as a result Pakistan, have vowed not to sign it because it does not call for the elimination of existing nuclear weapons. Israel’s case remains doubtful. The treaty must be signed by all 44 countries with nuclear capabilities in order to enter into force and become law. The US Senate recently refused to give its approval to the treaty.


    START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks II). Signed by the US and USSR in 1993. Ratified by the US Senate in 1996, ratified by Russian parliament April 2000. Reduces deployed (active duty) arsenals of both the US and Russia to 3000-3500 warheads by 2003 and bans MIRVed & ICBMs (but not SLBMs). No warheads are actually required to be destroyed. The US Senate finally ratified this treaty on 26 Jan. 1996 by a vote of 87-4. It now requires only the approval of the Russian Duma to go into effect. A rider attached by the Senate prohibits compliance with treaty terms unless it formally goes into effect. US planning for stockpile management accordingly assumes maintenance of the higher START I level for the indefinite future. The Russian Duma gave its approval to START II last month, it seems to forestall US threat to go in for an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) System in case of Russian failure to approve START II.

    START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I). Signed by the US and USSR in 1991. Ratified and formally entered into force December 5, 1994. Reduces arsenals by about 30%. The original signatory USSR has since dissolved, and the states of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and recently Ukraine have endorsed the treaty by signing the START I Protocol. As a result of Ukraine’s joining NPT, the treaty went into effect in December 1994.

    Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Signed by the US and the Soviet Union in 1976. Ratified and formally entered into force in 1990. Prohibits nuclear explosions for “peaceful purposes” exceeding 150 kilotons.


    Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Signed by the US and the Soviet Union in 1974. Ratified and formally entered into force in 1990. Prohibits military nuclear explosions exceeding 150 kilotons. Commits US and Soviet Union to “continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapons tests.”

    Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty. Signed by the US and USSR and entered into force in 1972. Prohibits deployment of a nationwide defence against strategic ballistic missile attack by limiting each country to two ABM deployment areas. In 1974, the treaty parties agreed to reduce ABM sites to one for each side. Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine were recognized as USSR successor states following the dissolution of the USSR. Only one ABM site is permitted among the four states.The treaty does not include theatre ballistic missile defence (TMD) provided they do not pose a threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other party and are not tested to give such systems that capability.


    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Signed in 1968. Entered into force in 1970. 182 signatories by August, 1996. Preamble recalls commitment to ban nuclear weapons tests. Article VI: “Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament...” On May 11, 1995, over 170 countries voted to extend the Treaty indefinitely and without conditions.


    Limited Test Ban Treaty. Signed and entered into force in 1963. 131 participants by August, 1996. Prohibits nuclear explosions anywhere but underground. Preamble commits signatories to seek “to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.”


    The history of world’s nuclearization dates back to the period between the First and the Second World Wars. A number of countries in Europe, USA and Japan had commenced research programmes, which could only lead to a nuclear weapon - the atomic bomb as it was originally called. It would seem that Germany was the most advanced in this field but the Second World War ended before she could produce a weapon. At that time, the German medium range ballistic missile programme too had reached the testing stage. United States and Japan were close second in the nuclear race but luck favoured the former as after Germany’s defeat a number of leading German nuclear scientists and equipment fell into American hands (as well as the Soviet) who were able to accelerate the US programme to fruitation. Japan, on the other hand lost the uranium oxide that was being transported by a German submarine, whose captain surrendered his vessel to the Americans as the war ended while en route to Japan. It is only a matter of conjecture what would have happened if the Government of General Tojo had acquired the atomic bomb before the Americans. In the event, soon after the formation of the United Nations, USA and UK moved that organization to ban further nuclear tests. But, the Soviet Union went ahead and within a decade of USA’s acquisition exploded its own atomic device. Thereafter, UK with reported assistance from USA, and later France tested their own weapons. The four then tried to pre-empt China by having a Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) but Beijing went ahead to demonstrate its own capability at Lop Nor in 1964. Thereafter, despite NPT, India exploded what it called a peaceful nuclear device in 1974. Her nuclear programme, which she maintained, was for peaceful purposes only suddenly burst into a series of nuclear tests in May 1998. These tests then produced an appropriate response from Pakistan a fortnight later. Israel, however, still remains the sole maverick and a wild card in this nuclear game today. What Iran and North Korea might decide for themselves in the coming years must remain a guessing game at present. Both reportedly have the capacity to go ahead with a full nuclear programme.

    Today, morality or threat to humanity or inability to have appropriate command and control systems are being flaunted as the reasons for the world; other than the five, plus two Is; not to go in for a nuclear programme. But, is that really so? The question immediately arises - does morality have two faces? The truth lies in a parable from the book ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ - “If you give them artillery, you make them independent,” (Non-proliferation: not a moral issue by MA Siddiqui - Dawn June 25, 2000). The truth is that USA, Russia and UK do not want Pakistan or any country other than the 2 Is (India and Israel) to possess weapons of mass destruction. They realize fully that in all future world conflicts, whether economic, political, diplomatic or military are bound to be on the peripheries of ideological divides. These ideologies need not be based on religion. Capitalism laced with democracy, which is the present economic ideology of G8, being in conflict with the economic values of Islam and of Chinese Socialism there are bound to raise frictions if not conflicts which could, like in the past, lead to physical conflicts. G8 countries would like to retain their control of Mideast oil and gas, the Southeast Asian rubber, wood, oil and spices; the Central Asian ores, oil and gas; and Sahara’s sand rich in oil, gas and uranium. If these countries, which happen to be Muslims, were by some miracle to decide to use their raw materials amongst themselves and form an economic union for the purpose, a union even less cohesive than the European Economic Union, that would be the end of  G8s economic power. And if history is any guide wars break out for even lesser reasons than the loss of complete economic power. Under these circumstances, weapons of mass destruction carried on aircraft or missiles, being a longer range and more destructive form of artillery, are the last items they would like to see in the hands of their adversaries. We in Pakistan have to appreciate that it is this fear of the likely loss of economic power, for which G8 would most likely be willing to fight to the last if the other party did not possess the ability to retaliate in sufficient strength to dissuade aggression. This ability to dissuade is the sole reason they do not want any other country to possess adequate nuclear arsenal. India and Israel being capitalistic in nature, both having adopted democracy, are gradually becoming more and more at home with G8. On the other hand any Islamic Democracy e.g. Malaysia will find inherent differences in social economic values like Islamic form of banking etc and Zakat which the West considers a form of Socialism. All this leads to the genuine fear amongst G8, India and Israel of what at present might appear a very remote possibility of these countries, which constitutes the central core of the world, to come closer and build up a defence umbrella for themselves resting on the nuclear programmes of the countries of the region, and make what they call the Islamic bomb. The situation would then become very grave in their considerations. To my mind were the people of this vast region to become practicing Muslims rather than preaching or reforming types, God might give us the wisdom to get closer to everyone’s benefit, and much earlier than generally visualized. This scenario of confrontation might not have to arise were G8 leaders to follow the example of the English Liberals of the 18th and 19th centuries, whose foresight saved a revolution in England, and adopt a policy of trust and sharing equally with the rest of the world. At the moment their policy appears to be managed the world and to maintain the status quo through organizations like the UN agencies, WB, IMF, other International Financial Institutions, the multi-nationals and by ensuring pliable governments in other countries.

    For Pakistanis, can they afford to overlook the great disparity in USA and UK’s attitude in the matter of nuclear proliferation towards Pakistan on one side and India and Israel on the other?

    Pakistan co-operated with USA and UK throughout the period of cold war and helped them to fight off the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, an act that finally brought down the Communist oligarchy in Moscow.

    All throughout that period India had close defence, economic and political co-operation with the Soviets much to the detriment of Western interests. Further, both India and Israel have for generations flouted UN Resolutions with impunity and have maintained the worst kind of human rights’ record, specially with religious and ethnic minorities, and in occupied territories. Yet, despite all these faults neither USA nor UK, the two greatest proponents of non-proliferation were only moved into action after Pakistan responded to the Indian second and third series of tests. In addition, while Pakistan was a close ally of USA, laws like the Symmington and Pressler were passed which for all purposes were Pakistan specific. No similar laws were ever made for India despite full knowledge of her on-going nuclear programme. Restrictions and embargoes imposed on Pakistan and India after Pakistan’s nuclear tests are practically still in force against Pakistan except where it specifically suits USA, while the same restrictions and embargoes have been greatly eased for India. Compared to Israel, the discrimination is even worse against Pakistan as none of the American non-proliferation laws appear to apply to that country. How, then, can Pakistan ever hope for USA and UK to deal with equal justice between Pakistan and India or Israel, specially in the matter of nuclear weapons and technology.

    Lastly, the inspired plant in the Washington Post about Pakistan’s nuclear superiority over India when taken together with American intelligence claim of China and North Korea helping Pakistan’s nuclear programme and China intensifying her intelligence gathering in United States to modernize Chinese nuclear weapons could only have been designed firstly, to queer the pitch of any Pak-American talks that might have been in the offing and, in addition, to prepare grounds for the United States to share sensitive dual purpose technologies with India concerning nuclear weapons and missiles under the recent scientific agreement between the two countries.



    Nuclear delivery system

    Year deployed Maximum range Yield

    SLBM Trident D-5

    1995 7,456 mi 100 KT

    Source: Center for Defense Information




    Nuclear delivery system 

    Year deployed Maximum range




    1995 1,55 mi


    Testing 1,553 mi




      528 mi

    MiG-27 Flogger

    1986 242 mi

    Source: Center for Defense Information





    Possible delivery system

    Year deployed Maximum range



    Hatf 1

    1995 50 mi

    Hatf 2

    Testing  186 mi


    Testing   1,000 mi +

    M-11 (DF-11, CSS-7)                                      

    1992 (not deployed) 186 mi

    Aircraft F-16 Falcon

    1983 391 mi

    Source: Center for Defense Information





    Possible delivery system

    Year deployed Maximum range

    Launcher total




    Jericho-1      ~50          

    1973 311 mi

    Jericho-2      ~50

    1990 932 mi 



    F-4E-2000 Phantom

      994 mi 



    F-16 Falcon

    1980 391 mi



    Source: Center for Defense Information


    Nuclear Systems      
    Nuclear delivery vehicle Year deployed Maximum range Yield
    ICBM Minuteman III 1980 8,078 mi 335 KT
    Peacekeeper (MX) 1986 5,965 mi 300 or 400 KT
    SLBMTrident C-4 1980 4,598mi 100 KT
    Trident D-5 1989 7,456mi 100KT(W-76) 300-475 KT (W-88)
    Aircraft B-52H Stratofortress 1962 10,000 mi 200 KT
    B-1B Lancer

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