Something brewing we don't know about????

compiled by Dee Finney


4-18-03 -  DREAM:  I was managing an apartment building somewhere in Milwaukee, WI. A better opportunity came up for me so I moved up the street about a block to a different building. I was so much liked by the people in my building, half of them moved to the new building with me.

I hadn't yet picked up the 'media' mail for the new building, so I got the key, which was a large round key - not a  normal key and opened the box - it was empty.

While I was standing there, I overheard a Geraldo Rivera look-alike talking to two painters as they walked by. He said that three Cong (Kong?) men, who were sleeping around with some white women and so they endangered a Tulghur operation, they were taken out by the C.I.A.


When I got to my office, I told this bit of news to a psychologist friend. She said there was no way anyone could have known information like that.

As I was talking to her, the radio was on with the news and the announcer began talking about the Tulghur area and some war operation that happened 25 years earlier.

I said to the psychologist, "How could I know such information, even if I dreamed it?  Even if I sat in front of the TV day and night 25 years ago?

She couldn't answer the question. She had no clue.


Here is the first mail for the media mailbox. Didn't take long to come in either.

Hi, I was dreaming words I didn't know also, reminded me to search for them. On TV after I dreamed I saw the big city burning we saw red tracer fires of some kind in Baghdad. But I know that dreams have to "dry" most of the time and I dreamed about laundry that was still dripping that belonged to a UFO a few days ago also.

Love, Sheila

here is an article on Media & the Medes -- http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10117a.htm

Preparing the Battlefield

The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran.

by Seymour M. Hersh July 7, 2008

Operations outside the knowledge and control of commanders have eroded “the coherence of military strategy,” one general says.

L ate last year, Congress agreed to a request from President Bush to fund a major escalation of covert operations against Iran, according to current and former military, intelligence, and congressional sources. These operations, for which the President sought up to four hundred million dollars, were described in a Presidential Finding signed by Bush, and are designed to destabilize the country’s religious leadership. The covert activities involve support of the minority Ahwazi Arab and Baluchi groups and other dissident organizations. They also include gathering intelligence about Iran’s suspected nuclear-weapons program.

Clandestine operations against Iran are not new. United States Special Operations Forces have been conducting cross-border operations from southern Iraq, with Presidential authorization, since last year. These have included seizing members of Al Quds, the commando arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and taking them to Iraq for interrogation, and the pursuit of “high-value targets” in the President’s war on terror, who may be captured or killed. But the scale and the scope of the operations in Iran, which involve the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), have now been significantly expanded, according to the current and former officials. Many of these activities are not specified in the new Finding, and some congressional leaders have had serious questions about their nature.

Under federal law, a Presidential Finding, which is highly classified, must be issued when a covert intelligence operation gets under way and, at a minimum, must be made known to Democratic and Republican leaders in the House and the Senate and to the ranking members of their respective intelligence committees—the so-called Gang of Eight. Money for the operation can then be reprogrammed from previous appropriations, as needed, by the relevant congressional committees, which also can be briefed.

“The Finding was focussed on undermining Iran’s nuclear ambitions and trying to undermine the government through regime change,” a person familiar with its contents said, and involved “working with opposition groups and passing money.” The Finding provided for a whole new range of activities in southern Iran and in the areas, in the east, where Baluchi political opposition is strong, he said.

Although some legislators were troubled by aspects of the Finding, and “there was a significant amount of high-level discussion” about it, according to the source familiar with it, the funding for the escalation was approved. In other words, some members of the Democratic leadership—Congress has been under Democratic control since the 2006 elections—were willing, in secret, to go along with the Administration in expanding covert activities directed at Iran, while the Party’s presumptive candidate for President, Barack Obama, has said that he favors direct talks and diplomacy.

The request for funding came in the same period in which the Administration was coming to terms with a National Intelligence Estimate, released in December, that concluded that Iran had halted its work on nuclear weapons in 2003. The Administration downplayed the significance of the N.I.E., and, while saying that it was committed to diplomacy, continued to emphasize that urgent action was essential to counter the Iranian nuclear threat. President Bush questioned the N.I.E.’s conclusions, and senior national-security officials, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, made similar statements. (So did Senator John McCain, the presumptive Republican Presidential nominee.) Meanwhile, the Administration also revived charges that the Iranian leadership has been involved in the killing of American soldiers in Iraq: both directly, by dispatching commando units into Iraq, and indirectly, by supplying materials used for roadside bombs and other lethal goods. (There have been questions about the accuracy of the claims; the Times, among others, has reported that “significant uncertainties remain about the extent of that involvement.”)

Military and civilian leaders in the Pentagon share the White House’s concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but there is disagreement about whether a military strike is the right solution. Some Pentagon officials believe, as they have let Congress and the media know, that bombing Iran is not a viable response to the nuclear-proliferation issue, and that more diplomacy is necessary.

A Democratic senator told me that, late last year, in an off-the-record lunch meeting, Secretary of Defense Gates met with the Democratic caucus in the Senate. (Such meetings are held regularly.) Gates warned of the consequences if the Bush Administration staged a preëmptive strike on Iran, saying, as the senator recalled, “We’ll create generations of jihadists, and our grandchildren will be battling our enemies here in America.” Gates’s comments stunned the Democrats at the lunch, and another senator asked whether Gates was speaking for Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney. Gates’s answer, the senator told me, was “Let’s just say that I’m here speaking for myself.” (A spokesman for Gates confirmed that he discussed the consequences of a strike at the meeting, but would not address what he said, other than to dispute the senator’s characterization.)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose chairman is Admiral Mike Mullen, were “pushing back very hard” against White House pressure to undertake a military strike against Iran, the person familiar with the Finding told me. Similarly, a Pentagon consultant who is involved in the war on terror said that “at least ten senior flag and general officers, including combatant commanders”—the four-star officers who direct military operations around the world—“have weighed in on that issue.”

The most outspoken of those officers is Admiral William Fallon, who until recently was the head of U.S. Central Command, and thus in charge of American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In March, Fallon resigned under pressure, after giving a series of interviews stating his reservations about an armed attack on Iran. For example, late last year he told the Financial Times that the “real objective” of U.S. policy was to change the Iranians’ behavior, and that “attacking them as a means to get to that spot strikes me as being not the first choice.”

Admiral Fallon acknowledged, when I spoke to him in June, that he had heard that there were people in the White House who were upset by his public statements. “Too many people believe you have to be either for or against the Iranians,” he told me. “Let’s get serious. Eighty million people live there, and everyone’s an individual. The idea that they’re only one way or another is nonsense.”

When it came to the Iraq war, Fallon said, “Did I bitch about some of the things that were being proposed? You bet. Some of them were very stupid.”

The Democratic leadership’s agreement to commit hundreds of millions of dollars for more secret operations in Iran was remarkable, given the general concerns of officials like Gates, Fallon, and many others. “The oversight process has not kept pace—it’s been coöpted” by the Administration, the person familiar with the contents of the Finding said. “The process is broken, and this is dangerous stuff we’re authorizing.”

Senior Democrats in Congress told me that they had concerns about the possibility that their understanding of what the new operations entail differs from the White House’s. One issue has to do with a reference in the Finding, the person familiar with it recalled, to potential defensive lethal action by U.S. operatives in Iran. (In early May, the journalist Andrew Cockburn published elements of the Finding in Counterpunch, a newsletter and online magazine.)

The language was inserted into the Finding at the urging of the C.I.A., a former senior intelligence official said. The covert operations set forth in the Finding essentially run parallel to those of a secret military task force, now operating in Iran, that is under the control of JSOC. Under the Bush Administration’s interpretation of the law, clandestine military activities, unlike covert C.I.A. operations, do not need to be depicted in a Finding, because the President has a constitutional right to command combat forces in the field without congressional interference. But the borders between operations are not always clear: in Iran, C.I.A. agents and regional assets have the language skills and the local knowledge to make contacts for the JSOC operatives, and have been working with them to direct personnel, matériel, and money into Iran from an obscure base in western Afghanistan. As a result, Congress has been given only a partial view of how the money it authorized may be used. One of JSOC’s task-force missions, the pursuit of “high-value targets,” was not directly addressed in the Finding. There is a growing realization among some legislators that the Bush Administration, in recent years, has conflated what is an intelligence operation and what is a military one in order to avoid fully informing Congress about what it is doing.

“This is a big deal,” the person familiar with the Finding said. “The C.I.A. needed the Finding to do its traditional stuff, but the Finding does not apply to JSOC. The President signed an Executive Order after September 11th giving the Pentagon license to do things that it had never been able to do before without notifying Congress. The claim was that the military was ‘preparing the battle space,’ and by using that term they were able to circumvent congressional oversight. Everything is justified in terms of fighting the global war on terror.” He added, “The Administration has been fuzzing the lines; there used to be a shade of gray”—between operations that had to be briefed to the senior congressional leadership and those which did not—“but now it’s a shade of mush.”

“The agency says we’re not going to get in the position of helping to kill people without a Finding,” the former senior intelligence official told me. He was referring to the legal threat confronting some agency operatives for their involvement in the rendition and alleged torture of suspects in the war on terror. “This drove the military people up the wall,” he said. As far as the C.I.A. was concerned, the former senior intelligence official said, “the over-all authorization includes killing, but it’s not as though that’s what they’re setting out to do. It’s about gathering information, enlisting support.” The Finding sent to Congress was a compromise, providing legal cover for the C.I.A. while referring to the use of lethal force in ambiguous terms.

The defensive-lethal language led some Democrats, according to congressional sources familiar with their views, to call in the director of the C.I.A., Air Force General Michael V. Hayden, for a special briefing. Hayden reassured the legislators that the language did nothing more than provide authority for Special Forces operatives on the ground in Iran to shoot their way out if they faced capture or harm.

The legislators were far from convinced. One congressman subsequently wrote a personal letter to President Bush insisting that “no lethal action, period” had been authorized within Iran’s borders. As of June, he had received no answer.

Members of Congress have expressed skepticism in the past about the information provided by the White House. On March 15, 2005, David Obey, then the ranking Democrat on the Republican-led House Appropriations Committee, announced that he was putting aside an amendment that he had intended to offer that day, and that would have cut off all funding for national-intelligence programs unless the President agreed to keep Congress fully informed about clandestine military activities undertaken in the war on terror. He had changed his mind, he said, because the White House promised better coöperation. “The Executive Branch understands that we are not trying to dictate what they do,” he said in a floor speech at the time. “We are simply trying to see to it that what they do is consistent with American values and will not get the country in trouble.”

Obey declined to comment on the specifics of the operations in Iran, but he did tell me that the White House reneged on its promise to consult more fully with Congress. He said, “I suspect there’s something going on, but I don’t know what to believe. Cheney has always wanted to go after Iran, and if he had more time he’d find a way to do it. We still don’t get enough information from the agencies, and I have very little confidence that they give us information on the edge.”

None of the four Democrats in the Gang of Eight—Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate Intelligence Committee chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, and House Intelligence Committee chairman Silvestre Reyes—would comment on the Finding, with some noting that it was highly classified. An aide to one member of the Democratic leadership responded, on his behalf, by pointing to the limitations of the Gang of Eight process. The notification of a Finding, the aide said, “is just that—notification, and not a sign-off on activities. Proper oversight of ongoing intelligence activities is done by fully briefing the members of the intelligence committee.” However, Congress does have the means to challenge the White House once it has been sent a Finding. It has the power to withhold funding for any government operation. The members of the House and Senate Democratic leadership who have access to the Finding can also, if they choose to do so, and if they have shared concerns, come up with ways to exert their influence on Administration policy. (A spokesman for the C.I.A. said, “As a rule, we don’t comment one way or the other on allegations of covert activities or purported findings.” The White House also declined to comment.)

A member of the House Appropriations Committee acknowledged that, even with a Democratic victory in November, “it will take another year before we get the intelligence activities under control.” He went on, “We control the money and they can’t do anything without the money. Money is what it’s all about. But I’m very leery of this Administration.” He added, “This Administration has been so secretive.”

One irony of Admiral Fallon’s departure is that he was, in many areas, in agreement with President Bush on the threat posed by Iran. They had a good working relationship, Fallon told me, and, when he ran CENTCOM, were in regular communication. On March 4th, a week before his resignation, Fallon testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, saying that he was “encouraged” about the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Regarding the role played by Iran’s leaders, he said, “They’ve been absolutely unhelpful, very damaging, and I absolutely don’t condone any of their activities. And I have yet to see anything since I’ve been in this job in the way of a public action by Iran that’s been at all helpful in this region.”

Fallon made it clear in our conversations that he considered it inappropriate to comment publicly about the President, the Vice-President, or Special Operations. But he said he had heard that people in the White House had been “struggling” with his views on Iran. “When I arrived at CENTCOM, the Iranians were funding every entity inside Iraq. It was in their interest to get us out, and so they decided to kill as many Americans as they could. And why not? They didn’t know who’d come out ahead, but they wanted us out. I decided that I couldn’t resolve the situation in Iraq without the neighborhood. To get this problem in Iraq solved, we had to somehow involve Iran and Syria. I had to work the neighborhood.”

Fallon told me that his focus had been not on the Iranian nuclear issue, or on regime change there, but on “putting out the fires in Iraq.” There were constant discussions in Washington and in the field about how to engage Iran and, on the subject of the bombing option, Fallon said, he believed that “it would happen only if the Iranians did something stupid.”

Fallon’s early retirement, however, appears to have been provoked not only by his negative comments about bombing Iran but also by his strong belief in the chain of command and his insistence on being informed about Special Operations in his area of responsibility. One of Fallon’s defenders is retired Marine General John J. (Jack) Sheehan, whose last assignment was as commander-in-chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command, where Fallon was a deputy. Last year, Sheehan rejected a White House offer to become the President’s “czar” for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. “One of the reasons the White House selected Fallon for CENTCOM was that he’s known to be a strategic thinker and had demonstrated those skills in the Pacific,” Sheehan told me. (Fallon served as commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific from 2005 to 2007.) “He was charged with coming up with an over-all coherent strategy for Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and, by law, the combatant commander is responsible for all military operations within his A.O.”—area of operations. “That was not happening,” Sheehan said. “When Fallon tried to make sense of all the overt and covert activity conducted by the military in his area of responsibility, a small group in the White House leadership shut him out.”

The law cited by Sheehan is the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, known as Goldwater-Nichols, which defined the chain of command: from the President to the Secretary of Defense, through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on to the various combatant commanders, who were put in charge of all aspects of military operations, including joint training and logistics. That authority, the act stated, was not to be shared with other echelons of command. But the Bush Administration, as part of its global war on terror, instituted new policies that undercut regional commanders-in-chief; for example, it gave Special Operations teams, at military commands around the world, the highest priority in terms of securing support and equipment. The degradation of the traditional chain of command in the past few years has been a point of tension between the White House and the uniformed military.

“The coherence of military strategy is being eroded because of undue civilian influence and direction of nonconventional military operations,” Sheehan said. “If you have small groups planning and conducting military operations outside the knowledge and control of the combatant commander, by default you can’t have a coherent military strategy. You end up with a disaster, like the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.”

Admiral Fallon, who is known as Fox, was aware that he would face special difficulties as the first Navy officer to lead CENTCOM, which had always been headed by a ground commander, one of his military colleagues told me. He was also aware that the Special Operations community would be a concern. “Fox said that there’s a lot of strange stuff going on in Special Ops, and I told him he had to figure out what they were really doing,” Fallon’s colleague said. “The Special Ops guys eventually figured out they needed Fox, and so they began to talk to him. Fox would have won his fight with Special Ops but for Cheney.”

The Pentagon consultant said, “Fallon went down because, in his own way, he was trying to prevent a war with Iran, and you have to admire him for that.”

In recent months, according to the Iranian media, there has been a surge in violence in Iran; it is impossible at this early stage, however, to credit JSOC or C.I.A. activities, or to assess their impact on the Iranian leadership. The Iranian press reports are being carefully monitored by retired Air Force Colonel Sam Gardiner, who has taught strategy at the National War College and now conducts war games centered on Iran for the federal government, think tanks, and universities. The Iranian press “is very open in describing the killings going on inside the country,” Gardiner said. It is, he said, “a controlled press, which makes it more important that it publishes these things. We begin to see inside the government.” He added, “Hardly a day goes by now we don’t see a clash somewhere. There were three or four incidents over a recent weekend, and the Iranians are even naming the Revolutionary Guard officers who have been killed.”

Earlier this year, a militant Ahwazi group claimed to have assassinated a Revolutionary Guard colonel, and the Iranian government acknowledged that an explosion in a cultural center in Shiraz, in the southern part of the country, which killed at least twelve people and injured more than two hundred, had been a terrorist act and not, as it earlier insisted, an accident. It could not be learned whether there has been American involvement in any specific incident in Iran, but, according to Gardiner, the Iranians have begun publicly blaming the U.S., Great Britain, and, more recently, the C.I.A. for some incidents. The agency was involved in a coup in Iran in 1953, and its support for the unpopular regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi—who was overthrown in 1979—was condemned for years by the ruling mullahs in Tehran, to great effect. “This is the ultimate for the Iranians—to blame the C.I.A.,” Gardiner said. “This is new, and it’s an escalation—a ratcheting up of tensions. It rallies support for the regime and shows the people that there is a continuing threat from the ‘Great Satan.’ ” In Gardiner’s view, the violence, rather than weakening Iran’s religious government, may generate support for it.

Many of the activities may be being carried out by dissidents in Iran, and not by Americans in the field. One problem with “passing money” (to use the term of the person familiar with the Finding) in a covert setting is that it is hard to control where the money goes and whom it benefits. Nonetheless, the former senior intelligence official said, “We’ve got exposure, because of the transfer of our weapons and our communications gear. The Iranians will be able to make the argument that the opposition was inspired by the Americans. How many times have we tried this without asking the right questions? Is the risk worth it?” One possible consequence of these operations would be a violent Iranian crackdown on one of the dissident groups, which could give the Bush Administration a reason to intervene.

A strategy of using ethnic minorities to undermine Iran is flawed, according to Vali Nasr, who teaches international politics at Tufts University and is also a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Just because Lebanon, Iraq, and Pakistan have ethnic problems, it does not mean that Iran is suffering from the same issue,” Nasr told me. “Iran is an old country—like France and Germany—and its citizens are just as nationalistic. The U.S. is overestimating ethnic tension in Iran.” The minority groups that the U.S. is reaching out to are either well integrated or small and marginal, without much influence on the government or much ability to present a political challenge, Nasr said. “You can always find some activist groups that will go and kill a policeman, but working with the minorities will backfire, and alienate the majority of the population.”

The Administration may have been willing to rely on dissident organizations in Iran even when there was reason to believe that the groups had operated against American interests in the past. The use of Baluchi elements, for example, is problematic, Robert Baer, a former C.I.A. clandestine officer who worked for nearly two decades in South Asia and the Middle East, told me. “The Baluchis are Sunni fundamentalists who hate the regime in Tehran, but you can also describe them as Al Qaeda,” Baer told me. “These are guys who cut off the heads of nonbelievers—in this case, it’s Shiite Iranians. The irony is that we’re once again working with Sunni fundamentalists, just as we did in Afghanistan in the nineteen-eighties.” Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted for his role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is considered one of the leading planners of the September 11th attacks, are Baluchi Sunni fundamentalists.

One of the most active and violent anti-regime groups in Iran today is the Jundallah, also known as the Iranian People’s Resistance Movement, which describes itself as a resistance force fighting for the rights of Sunnis in Iran. “This is a vicious Salafi organization whose followers attended the same madrassas as the Taliban and Pakistani extremists,” Nasr told me. “They are suspected of having links to Al Qaeda and they are also thought to be tied to the drug culture.” The Jundallah took responsibility for the bombing of a busload of Revolutionary Guard soldiers in February, 2007. At least eleven Guard members were killed. According to Baer and to press reports, the Jundallah is among the groups in Iran that are benefitting from U.S. support.

The C.I.A. and Special Operations communities also have long-standing ties to two other dissident groups in Iran: the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, known in the West as the M.E.K., and a Kurdish separatist group, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan, or PJAK.

The M.E.K. has been on the State Department’s terrorist list for more than a decade, yet in recent years the group has received arms and intelligence, directly or indirectly, from the United States. Some of the newly authorized covert funds, the Pentagon consultant told me, may well end up in M.E.K. coffers. “The new task force will work with the M.E.K. The Administration is desperate for results.” He added, “The M.E.K. has no C.P.A. auditing the books, and its leaders are thought to have been lining their pockets for years. If people only knew what the M.E.K. is getting, and how much is going to its bank accounts—and yet it is almost useless for the purposes the Administration intends.”

The Kurdish party, PJAK, which has also been reported to be covertly supported by the United States, has been operating against Iran from bases in northern Iraq for at least three years. (Iran, like Iraq and Turkey, has a Kurdish minority, and PJAK and other groups have sought self-rule in territory that is now part of each of those countries.) In recent weeks, according to Sam Gardiner, the military strategist, there has been a marked increase in the number of PJAK armed engagements with Iranians and terrorist attacks on Iranian targets. In early June, the news agency Fars reported that a dozen PJAK members and four Iranian border guards were killed in a clash near the Iraq border; a similar attack in May killed three Revolutionary Guards and nine PJAK fighters. PJAK has also subjected Turkey, a member of NATO, to repeated terrorist attacks, and reports of American support for the group have been a source of friction between the two governments.

Gardiner also mentioned a trip that the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, made to Tehran in June. After his return, Maliki announced that his government would ban any contact between foreigners and the M.E.K.—a slap at the U.S.’s dealings with the group. Maliki declared that Iraq was not willing to be a staging ground for covert operations against other countries. This was a sign, Gardiner said, of “Maliki’s increasingly choosing the interests of Iraq over the interests of the United States.” In terms of U.S. allegations of Iranian involvement in the killing of American soldiers, he said, “Maliki was unwilling to play the blame-Iran game.” Gardiner added that Pakistan had just agreed to turn over a Jundallah leader to the Iranian government. America’s covert operations, he said, “seem to be harming relations with the governments of both Iraq and Pakistan and could well be strengthening the connection between Tehran and Baghdad.”

The White House’s reliance on questionable operatives, and on plans involving possible lethal action inside Iran, has created anger as well as anxiety within the Special Operations and intelligence communities. JSOC’s operations in Iran are believed to be modelled on a program that has, with some success, used surrogates to target the Taliban leadership in the tribal territories of Waziristan, along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. But the situations in Waziristan and Iran are not comparable.

In Waziristan, “the program works because it’s small and smart guys are running it,” the former senior intelligence official told me. “It’s being executed by professionals. The N.S.A., the C.I.A., and the D.I.A.”—the Defense Intelligence Agency—“are right in there with the Special Forces and Pakistani intelligence, and they’re dealing with serious bad guys.” He added, “We have to be really careful in calling in the missiles. We have to hit certain houses at certain times. The people on the ground are watching through binoculars a few hundred yards away and calling specific locations, in latitude and longitude. We keep the Predator loitering until the targets go into a house, and we have to make sure our guys are far enough away so they don’t get hit.” One of the most prominent victims of the program, the former official said, was Abu Laith al-Libi, a senior Al Qaeda* commander, who was killed on January 31st, reportedly in a missile strike that also killed eleven other people.

A dispatch published on March 26th by the Washington Post reported on the increasing number of successful strikes against Taliban and other insurgent units in Pakistan’s tribal areas. A follow-up article noted that, in response, the Taliban had killed “dozens of people” suspected of providing information to the United States and its allies on the whereabouts of Taliban leaders. Many of the victims were thought to be American spies, and their executions—a beheading, in one case—were videotaped and distributed by DVD as a warning to others.

It is not simple to replicate the program in Iran. “Everybody’s arguing about the high-value-target list,” the former senior intelligence official said. “The Special Ops guys are pissed off because Cheney’s office set up priorities for categories of targets, and now he’s getting impatient and applying pressure for results. But it takes a long time to get the right guys in place.”

The Pentagon consultant told me, “We’ve had wonderful results in the Horn of Africa with the use of surrogates and false flags—basic counterintelligence and counter-insurgency tactics. And we’re beginning to tie them in knots in Afghanistan. But the White House is going to kill the program if they use it to go after Iran. It’s one thing to engage in selective strikes and assassinations in Waziristan and another in Iran. The White House believes that one size fits all, but the legal issues surrounding extrajudicial killings in Waziristan are less of a problem because Al Qaeda and the Taliban cross the border into Afghanistan and back again, often with U.S. and NATO forces in hot pursuit. The situation is not nearly as clear in the Iranian case. All the considerations—judicial, strategic, and political—are different in Iran.”

He added, “There is huge opposition inside the intelligence community to the idea of waging a covert war inside Iran, and using Baluchis and Ahwazis as surrogates. The leaders of our Special Operations community all have remarkable physical courage, but they are less likely to voice their opposition to policy. Iran is not Waziristan.”

A Gallup poll taken last November, before the N.I.E. was made public, found that seventy-three per cent of those surveyed thought that the United States should use economic action and diplomacy to stop Iran’s nuclear program, while only eighteen per cent favored direct military action. Republicans were twice as likely as Democrats to endorse a military strike. Weariness with the war in Iraq has undoubtedly affected the public’s tolerance for an attack on Iran. This mood could change quickly, however. The potential for escalation became clear in early January, when five Iranian patrol boats, believed to be under the command of the Revolutionary Guard, made a series of aggressive moves toward three Navy warships sailing through the Strait of Hormuz. Initial reports of the incident made public by the Pentagon press office said that the Iranians had transmitted threats, over ship-to-ship radio, to “explode” the American ships. At a White House news conference, the President, on the day he left for an eight-day trip to the Middle East, called the incident “provocative” and “dangerous,” and there was, very briefly, a sense of crisis and of outrage at Iran. “TWO MINUTES FROM WAR” was the headline in one British newspaper.

The crisis was quickly defused by Vice-Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, the commander of U.S. naval forces in the region. No warning shots were fired, the Admiral told the Pentagon press corps on January 7th, via teleconference from his headquarters, in Bahrain. “Yes, it’s more serious than we have seen, but, to put it in context, we do interact with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and their Navy regularly,” Cosgriff said. “I didn’t get the sense from the reports I was receiving that there was a sense of being afraid of these five boats.”

Admiral Cosgriff’s caution was well founded: within a week, the Pentagon acknowledged that it could not positively identify the Iranian boats as the source of the ominous radio transmission, and press reports suggested that it had instead come from a prankster long known for sending fake messages in the region. Nonetheless, Cosgriff’s demeanor angered Cheney, according to the former senior intelligence official. But a lesson was learned in the incident: The public had supported the idea of retaliation, and was even asking why the U.S. didn’t do more. The former official said that, a few weeks later, a meeting took place in the Vice-President’s office. “The subject was how to create a casus belli between Tehran and Washington,” he said.

In June, President Bush went on a farewell tour of Europe. He had tea with Queen Elizabeth II and dinner with Nicolas Sarkozy and Carla Bruni, the President and First Lady of France. The serious business was conducted out of sight, and involved a series of meetings on a new diplomatic effort to persuade the Iranians to halt their uranium-enrichment program. (Iran argues that its enrichment program is for civilian purposes and is legal under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.) Secretary of State Rice had been involved with developing a new package of incentives. But the Administration’s essential negotiating position seemed unchanged: talks could not take place until Iran halted the program. The Iranians have repeatedly and categorically rejected that precondition, leaving the diplomatic situation in a stalemate; they have not yet formally responded to the new incentives.

The continuing impasse alarms many observers. Joschka Fischer, the former German Foreign Minister, recently wrote in a syndicated column that it may not “be possible to freeze the Iranian nuclear program for the duration of the negotiations to avoid a military confrontation before they are completed. Should this newest attempt fail, things will soon get serious. Deadly serious.” When I spoke to him last week, Fischer, who has extensive contacts in the diplomatic community, said that the latest European approach includes a new element: the willingness of the U.S. and the Europeans to accept something less than a complete cessation of enrichment as an intermediate step. “The proposal says that the Iranians must stop manufacturing new centrifuges and the other side will stop all further sanction activities in the U.N. Security Council,” Fischer said, although Iran would still have to freeze its enrichment activities when formal negotiations begin. “This could be acceptable to the Iranians—if they have good will.”

The big question, Fischer added, is in Washington. “I think the Americans are deeply divided on the issue of what to do about Iran,” he said. “Some officials are concerned about the fallout from a military attack and others think an attack is unavoidable. I know the Europeans, but I have no idea where the Americans will end up on this issue.”

There is another complication: American Presidential politics. Barack Obama has said that, if elected, he would begin talks with Iran with no “self-defeating” preconditions (although only after diplomatic groundwork had been laid). That position has been vigorously criticized by John McCain. The Washington Post recently quoted Randy Scheunemann, the McCain campaign’s national-security director, as stating that McCain supports the White House’s position, and that the program be suspended before talks begin. What Obama is proposing, Scheunemann said, “is unilateral cowboy summitry.”

Scheunemann, who is known as a neoconservative, is also the McCain campaign’s most important channel of communication with the White House. He is a friend of David Addington, Dick Cheney’s chief of staff. I have heard differing accounts of Scheunemann’s influence with McCain; though some close to the McCain campaign talk about him as a possible national-security adviser, others say he is someone who isn’t taken seriously while “telling Cheney and others what they want to hear,” as a senior McCain adviser put it.

It is not known whether McCain, who is the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, has been formally briefed on the operations in Iran. At the annual conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, in June, Obama repeated his plea for “tough and principled diplomacy.” But he also said, along with McCain, that he would keep the threat of military action against Iran on the table. 

*Correction, August 7, 2008: Abu Laith al-Libi was a senior Al Qaeda commander, not a senior Taliban commander, as originally stated.

FROM: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh








During his exile, Khomeini coordinated an upsurge of opposition--first from Iraq and then from France, after 1978--demanding the Shah's abdication. On January 16, 1979, in what was officially described as a "vacation," the Shah fled Iran.

The Regency and Supreme Army Councils established for the Shah's absence proved unable to function, and Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar was unable to effect compromise with his former National Front colleagues or with Khomeini. Crowds in excess of 1,000,000 demonstrated in Tehran, proving the wide appeal of Khomeini, who arrived in Iran amid wild rejoicing on February 1, 1979. Ten days later Bakhtiar went into hiding, eventually to find exile in Paris.

The republic ... On April 1, after a landslide victory in a national referendum (in which only one choice was offered and the balloting was not secret), Khomeini declared an Islamic republic, subsequently invested with a new constitution reflecting his ideals of Islamic government. Fundamentalist measures followed, and revolutionary committees patrolled the streets enforcing Islamic codes of behaviour and dress. Efforts were made to suppress Western influence, and many of the Western-educated elite fled the country.

Anti-American sentiment was strong, and the Shah's admission to the United States for medical treatment touched off a huge demonstration in Tehran demanding his extradition. On November 4, 1979, supporters of the revolution took control of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, seized 66 U.S. citizens there and at the foreign ministry, and, with the exception of 14 who were granted early release and despite the death of the Shah on July 27, 1980, held them hostage until January 20, 1981. Also in November 1979, the republic's first prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan, resigned. The republic's first president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, opposed the holding of the U.S. embassy. He was impeached by the Majles and forced to flee to France, together with opposition leader Massoud Rajavi of the outlawed Mujahedin-e Khalq (Fighters for the People) faction, with whom he formed the National Council of Resistance for the overthrow of the Khomeini regime. The Mujahedin stepped up a campaign of sporadic and highly demoralizing bombing throughout the country that killed many clerics and government leaders, including the bombing on June 28, 1981, of the headquarters of the ruling Islamic Republican Party, in which 73 people were killed. Bani-Sadr's successor, former prime minister Mohammad Ali Rajai, and his prime minister were killed in another bombing on August 30. Hojatolislam Sayyed Ali Khamenei was elected to succeed him in October and was reelected in 1985. The early years of the revolutionary government were marked by the virtual elimination of political opposition and the consolidation and regularization of revolutionary organizations. Unrelenting executions on sometimes trivial allegations, rumours of torture, persecution of Baha'is, arbitrary arrests, bad prison conditions, and the denial of basic rights tarnished the reputation of the republic's leaders...

The cease-fire redirected attention to long-standing factional conflicts within the government between "conservatives," "pragmatists," and "leftists" over economic, social, and foreign policy objectives. These conflicts were underscored in November 1986 when, denunciations of the "Great Satan" aside, it was revealed that, with Khomeini's consent, Iran had accepted arms shipments from the United States in exchange for Iranian assistance in the release of American hostages held in Lebanon by Shi'ite extremists. The factionalism only served to further increase disillusionment among the Iranian population, whose decimated numbers suffered high unemployment, inflation, and shortages brought on primarily by the war.

Ayatollah Khomeini died of a heart attack on June 3, 1989. The transition of power was surprisingly smooth, orderly, and quick. The Assembly of Experts met in emergency session on June 4 and elected President Khamenei the new faqih, or spiritual leader, simultaneously promoting him to the status of ayatollah. Presidential elections and a referendum on constitutional amendments were moved up to July 28, and Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Majles since 1980, was elected with 95 percent of the vote; he ran virtually unopposed.

The Iranian Revolution 1978-1979

State    Entry      Exit      Combat Forces      Population            Losses

Iran     1979      1987         305000             43000000                 70000

Rebels 1979      1987         50000               10000000                20000

The Islamic republic... Revolution of 1978-79... The sense that in both the agricultural and industrial spheres too much had been attempted too rapidly and that mistakes had been made and expectations disappointed was manifested in demonstrations against the government in 1978; many people were killed, and martial law was imposed in the major cities in September. This ended the relaxation of government controls, begun in 1977, that had encouraged protests and that had led to the emergence of religious activists allied with extremist "Dedicated Fighter" groups, the Mujahedin; these groups were opposed to the influx of foreigners, particularly Americans, and to a westernization they saw as threatening to those traditional values subsumed under the cloak of Shi'ite Islam. Upon the approval by the Majles of all of his  ministerial nominations (representing a healthy balance of the factions), Rafsanjani began the process of rebuilding the war-torn economy. Considered a "pragmatist," or "moderate," Rafsanjani favoured a policy of economic liberalization, privatization of industry, and a rapprochement with the West that would encourage much-needed foreign investment. A move toward the latter was facilitated with the resumption of diplomatic ties between Iran and the United Kingdom on September 27, 1990, despite the fatwa (religious edict) issued by Khomeini 18 months earlier calling for the death of the British author Salman Rushdie, whose novel The Satanic Verses (1988) was considered blasphemous to Islam.

FROM: http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/india/iran1978.htm

FROM: http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_19.shtml

I Persian Gulf War (Iraq-Iran War), 1980-1988

By Tom Cooper & F. Bishop

Jan 10, 2003, 05:25

The Mother of all Build-Ups

During the 1970s, both Iran and Iraq invested heavily on their air forces, creating not only two of the largest and most powerful air arms in the Middle East, but also worldwide. The circumstances and the results of these investments remain largely unnoticed, just like the details about the deployment and operations of both air forces in the long and bloody war of attrition between the two countries, fought between 1980 and 1988.

In 1960s and 1970s, Iran was a firm US ally; consequently, the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) was developed along the USAF lines, and relied on US threat perceptions, doctrine, strategies, tactics, purchasing, production, as well as training policies. Everything in the IIAF, its air power doctrine and capabilities, was tailored for supporting a joint US-Iranian operation against a possible Soviet invasion of Iran from the north. Even the traditions and markings of the IIAF strongly resembled those of the US Air Force (USAF). A chain of huge air bases and a widespread early warning system were erected against the USSR. Consequently, the self-sufficient structure of the IIAF was weak during the 1970s, and was planned to be developed during the 1980s. Instead, during the 1970s, Iran was turned into a huge forward base for local as well as the US forces, where huge stocks of spare parts and weapons were piled. Partially, such a policy was also influenced by the fact that after learning about Israeli problems in 1973, the Iranians began to order additional amounts of equipment, spare parts and weapons, which could enable them to fight an intensive war for many months without any external help. The IIAF’s strategic stocks, managed by the costly Peacelog automated inventory system, became so huge that even in 1986 the emerging Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) was still using bombs and missiles purchased during the 1970s – even if expired shelf-lives of most items caused operating difficulties.

By constantly taking part in joint exercises with the USAF, USN, RAF and the Turkish and Pakistani air forces, in addition to sending its best crews and pilots for training courses to the US and Israel, the IIAF honed the skills of its chain of command, pilots, and technical personnel to highest possible degrees. Iranian reconnaissance assets were also involved in constant monitoring operations along the Soviet borders, together with USAF/CIA personnel and equipment. The IIAF was trained to function as a member of a team with large and far-reaching objectives, and so had to keep the pace. There were some problems, like lack of proper EW systems and gaps in radar coverage of the Iranian airspace, as well as a lack of effective anti-shipping systems, but they were recognized and measures were taken to rectify them. During the late 1960s and through 1970s, the IIAF took delivery from the USA up to 104 Northrop F-5A/Bs Freedom Fighters, and then continued with purchases of 32 McDonnell Douglas F-4Ds, 177 F-4Es, 165 F-5E/Fs, at least 20 RF-4Es (only 16 of which were delivered “officially”), and 80 Grumman F-14As, as well as a large fleet of Boeing 707-3J9C tankers, Lockheed C-130E/H Hercules transports, and a number of Boeing 747-2J9C strategic transports. By 1979, up to 300 F-16A/Bs, seven Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft and other assets were on order, negotiations for 75 more F-14As were due to start, and the IIAF was also to build the most comprehensive training installations outside the USA, very similar to those used for the Red Flag exercises. Training began with a fast pace, in the US, and young Iranian officers started undergoing F-16 flying and AWACS control courses.

Despite having only 450 combat aircraft, and planning to get around 400 more by 1982, bases and facilities built in Iran could easily accommodate and support as many as 3,000 fighter and support aircraft. For comparison, when the US deployed its forces to the region after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in late 1990, it stationed around 2,400 aircraft on various air bases – spread in five countries in the region – as well as on aircraft carriers, within six months. Interestingly this number peaked at 2,790 aircraft (very close to the 3,000 number) on February 24, 1991. The infrastructure for such an operation was not available, however, and had to be hastily improvised: on most air bases, the US, British, and French aircraft initially stood exposed to a harsh climate, and even if after several months a large number of makeshift shelters were built, most of the aircraft were not properly protected for the duration of their deployment in the area, while most airfields were simply overtaxed. No such problems would be encountered, if bases in Iran were available to the Gulf alliance.

Iraq, to the contrary, could not count on any such support. Although the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) is the oldest Arab air force (established already in 1924), the policies of the country’s leadership increasingly isolated it from the outside world. For more than 30 years, the IrAF was organized, trained, and equipped by the British, and the British influenced every aspect of the Iraqi air force structure and operations, including the “air policing” of Kurdish areas in northern Iraq. After the fall of the monarchy, in 1958, the IrAF began to increasingly equip itself with Soviet-built aircraft.

To many observers, it was “logical” therefore to describe the IrAF as an entity “operating according to the Soviet doctrine,” while the fact was that after purchasing over 60 Hawker Hunters during the early 1960s, the Iraqis were never satisfied with what they had got from the Soviets, and tried hard to get more hardware from the West. For different reasons, however, deals for SEPECAT Jaguars, BAe Hawks, and Dassault Mirage 5s were all spoiled, and it was not before 1977 that Iraq finally ordered its first large numbers of Western combat aircraft and helicopters - from France.

The isolation from the outside was felt also in training, operations, and capabilities of the IrAF. Under constant observation and heavy pressure by the ruling regimes, the IrAF became at least as much a victim of the usual tendency of its officers to mix into the politics, as it suffered from being equipped with second-class hardware supplied by the USSR, which simply would not make it more capable of defending the huge Iraqi airspace. This was one of the reasons why the IrAF leaned heavily on Indian Air Force (IAF) – instead on the Soviets – for training during the 1970s and a better part of 1980s. This changed only to a slight degree in 1979, when a massive contract was signed with Moscow, covering delivery of over 200 combat aircraft and helicopters, including the first Mi-25 Hinds and MiG-25 Foxbats. The purchase of the latter, namely, was conditioned by the Soviets on the presence of a large number of their advisors, which were to keep the Foxbats – stationed at the Shoaibah AB, near Basrah – under control for a number of years to come.

The IrAF had also some limited combat experiences from a few wars against Israel, and the continuous low intensity fighting against the Kurdish insurgency. The Iraqis barely learned any important lessons from the war in 1967, but very closely observed the October War of 1973, in which several IrAF squadrons took part as well. The Iraqis understood very well that under given circumstances, they did not have any choice but to form an air defense command along the Soviet lines, equipped with almost 100 Mikoyan MiG-21s, over two hundred SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 SAM sites, and a large number of anti aircraft guns. Despite the size of their country, and the long borders with their neighbors, however, the Iraqis could merely concentrate their SAM sites and point defense interceptors around the vital installations: between such areas, over 90% of the Iraqi airspace was not permanently defended. The rest of the air force, was equipped with MiG-23s – which were a huge disappointment for the Iraqis – limited-capability Sukhoi Su-7s (mainly used for training) and Su-20/-22 attack planes, while a single bomber wing flew Ilyushin Il-28s, and Tupolev Tu-16s and Tu-22s.

Thus, while by 1979 the IIAF was an excellent force on the verge of becoming a power of strategic proportions equipped with first-class weapons and systems, the IrAF was still a small tactical asset, the most modern combat aircraft of which was MiG-23.

The Iraqi Invasion

The chain of events, which finally led to the Iraqi invasion of its eastern neighbor, was directly initiated by the Islamic revolution in Iran, in February 1979, which followed a series of unrests throughout the country, starting in 1978. The demise of the Shah’s regime had tremendous consequences for the IIAF, which not only lost its name, but also its whole command staff. Constant purges through 1979 and 1980, and plans by the new regime to “cleanse” the air force – suspected of being “royalist” and “disloyal to Islam” – not only caused hundreds of the air force officers to be purged, imprisoned or executed, but finally threatened even the bare existence of the whole service. This was certainly one of the most influential reasons for the Iraqis to attack Iran; it was clear, namely, that the IrAF had no chances against an intact and fully operational Iranian air force.

Although the combat operations during the First Persian Gulf War were “officially” started on the afternoon of September 22, 1980, intensive fighting along the central sector of the Iraqi-Iranian border erupted already on September 4, and until today, Iraqis consider this date as the starting point of the war. During most of September, both the IrAF and the IRIAF supported ground forces with a large number of reconnaissance and combat sorties. Far better equipped and trained Iranians caused extensive losses to the Iraqis, even if their operations were hampered by technical problems, and also by the need to simultaneously fight an Iraqi-supported Kurdish revolt in the northwest Iran – which was costly in terms of helicopters, aircraft, and crews lost. Despite losses, the lack of any powerful Iranian response during early skirmishes, the reports on the dreadful condition of the Iranian armed forces, and the clandestine support from the US (which delivered blueprints of the Iranian air defense system to Baghdad), Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, ensured Iraqis that a war against Iran could be successfully initiated and quickly concluded probably with the crushing of the new regime in Tehran itself.

Therefore, on the afternoon of September 22, 1980, the Iraqis initiated a war against Iran with a massive armored onslaught into the southwestern province of Khuzestan, and a simultaneous two-wave attack by the IrAF against most important IRIAF air bases in western and central Iran. The air offensive – flown by heavily armed aircraft but lacking the needed capabilities, and pilots who lacked proper training – turned into a complete failure, and not even another try, on the following morning, could preclude the IRIAF to respond in full power. Only four hours after the first Iraqi attack, namely, four Iranian F-4 Phantoms bombed the Rashid AB, in southern Baghdad, and – utilizing IIAF-era contingency plans – on the morning of September 23, no less than 140 Iranian F-4D/E Phantoms, F-5E/Fs and F-14s – responded by an aerial onslaught against Iraq. Thus a relative “aerial siege” of Iraq was initiated, which was to last for almost a week, and during which the IRIAF continued to put large formations of fighter-bombers over Iraq each morning, systematically destroying Iraqi oil-production and war-fighting capabilities, and also forcing most of the IrAF into exile, in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Equipped with ECM pods, BL.755 CBUs, and the Mk.80 series of bombs, and using specially reconnoitered ingress corridors, the Iranians had not much problems in flying almost completely undisturbed deep into Iraq. If the IrAF managed to intercept any formation, its fighters were usually detected in time, and shot down in large numbers. On September 25, for example, no less than five MiG-21s and MiG-23s were shot down in a single air combat near Baghdad, in exchange for two damaged Phantoms

When the IrAF tried to attack deep into Iran, even if flying along „blind spots“ of the Iranian early warning radar system - the Iraqi formations were frequently intercepted, and several times shot down to the last plane. Especially units equipped with the MiG-23s suffered severely.

After almost a week of intensive attacks against Iraqi targets, the IRIAF had to change its strategy, as the Iraqi Army was now driving almost 60km deep into southern Iran putting several Iranian cities and important air bases under threat, while the list of the targets in Iraq was almost exhausted, and bad weather hampered many of the operations. Consequently, the Iranians threw the whole power of their air force to stop the Iraqis. This task was completed by late October 1980, albeit at a very heavy price, as a lack of proper EW systems, and even chaff and flare dispensers, became evident. The Iraqi invasion, however, saved the lives of numerous Iranian unattached officers, who were released from Islamic regime’s prisons, in order to help in the fighting. Together with other skilled personnel, these pilots were to become the most important asset at the hands of the IRIAF for the rest of the war.

See More about this war and photos at:  http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_19.shtml

Tulghur, Iran

Latitude 36.8167 Longitude Altitude (feet) 5748
Lat (DMS) 36° 49' 0N Long (DMS) Altitude (meters) 1751

Middle East, bordering the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea, between Iraq and Pakistan
AVN based WAPF forecast for Tulghur. Not valid for navigation.
Time Cloud Cover Altimeter Rain or Snow Winds & Temperature
Surface (5748')
1415Z (now) Overcast 1020.3/30.21" Lots (3.2 cm) 331@11 -4°C
215Z (+12h) Scattered 1023.6/30.31" None 332@15 -5°C
1415Z (+24h) Scattered 1018.5/30.16" None 303@5 1°C
215Z (+36h) Scattered 1017.5/30.13" None 238@9 2°C
1415Z (+48h) Scattered 1008.8/29.87" Some 216@10 13°C
215Z (+60h) Overcast 1009.0/29.88" Some 225@18 9°C
1415Z (+72h) Overcast 1006.7/29.81" Lots (1.3 cm) 256@12 16°C
215Z (+84h) Overcast 1010.9/29.93" Lots (3.8 cm) 17@0 10°C
1415Z (+96h) Overcast 1010.4/29.92" Lots (4.7 cm) 210@14 12°C

Google links for Tulghur   Google links for Tulghur, Iran

FAST/Alltheweb images for Tulghur    FAST/Alltheweb images for Tulghur, Iran





Facts taken from the CIA page on Iran: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html

Known as Persia until 1935, Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979 after the ruling shah was forced into exile. Conservative clerical forces subsequently crushed westernizing liberal elements. Militant Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979 and held it until 20 January 1981. During 1980-88, Iran fought a bloody, indecisive war with Iraq over disputed territory. Key current issues affecting the country include the pace of accepting outside modernizing influences and reconciliation between clerical control of the regime and popular government participation and widespread demands for reform.


66,622,704 (July 2002 est.)


total: 1.648 million sq km
land: 1.636 million sq km
water: 12,000 sq km

Area - comparative: slightly larger than Alaska

Land boundaries:
total: 5,440 km

Border countries: Afghanistan 936 km, Armenia 35 km, Azerbaijan-proper 432 km, Azerbaijan-Naxcivan exclave 179 km, Iraq 1,458 km, Pakistan 909 km, Turkey 499 km, Turkmenistan 992 km

Coastline  :  2,440 km; note - Iran also borders the Caspian Sea (740 km)

Terrain:  rugged, mountainous rim; high, central basin with deserts, mountains; small, discontinuous plains along both coasts

Elevation extremes:  lowest point: Caspian Sea -28 m    highest point: Kuh-e Damavand 5,671 m

Natural resources:   petroleum, natural gas, coal, chromium, copper, iron ore, lead, manganese, zinc, sulfur

Land use:  arable land: 10.17%   permanent crops: 1.16%   other: 88.67% (1998 est.)

Irrigated land:  75,620 sq km (1998 est.)

Natural hazards:  periodic droughts, floods; dust storms, sandstorms; earthquakes along western border and in the northeast

Environment - current issues:

air pollution, especially in urban areas, from vehicle emissions, refinery operations, and industrial effluents; deforestation; overgrazing; desertification; oil pollution in the Persian Gulf; wetland losses from drought; soil degradation (salination); inadequate supplies of potable water; water pollution from raw sewage and industrial waste; urbanization

Environment - international agreements:  party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Marine Dumping, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Wetlands

signed, but not ratified: Environmental Modification, Law of the Sea, Marine Life Conservation

Geography - note: strategic location on the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, which are vital maritime pathways for crude oil transport


FROM: http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/PrintStory.pl?document_id=134677184&zsection_id=268774049&slug=iran17&date=20030417

Thursday, April 17, 2003, 12:00 a.m. Pacific

Iran to oppose any U.S. effort to rule in Iraq

By Ali Akbar Dareini

The Associated Press

TEHRAN, Iran - Iranian President Mohammad Khatami said yesterday his country will not recognize a U.S.-installed interim administration in Iraq and will support Syria if it is attacked.

It was the first time a senior official had defined Iran's already well-known stance on a postwar Iraq.

"We will not recognize any administration other than an all-Iraqi government. However, we are not seeking tension or confrontation with anybody," Khatami told reporters after a Cabinet meeting.

On Tuesday, retired U.S. Gen. Jay Garner, chosen by the United States to lead the interim administration, opened a conference in Ur, Iraq, with the goal of shaping Iraq's postwar government.

"The Iraqi nation will not accept any foreign rule," Khatami said. "It is in the interests of morality, civility and international law that an administration representing all Iraqi ethnic, religious groups take over in Iraq, and in the long term a government is elected on the basis of one vote for each Iraqi citizen."

In the first official Iranian comment on U.S. claims that Syria was hosting officials of Saddam Hussein's regime, Khatami said the rhetoric was a "bluff" and that Iran would support Syria if attacked.

"Syria is on the front line against Zionist pressures, defending the cause of the Palestinian nation, freedom and peace in the region," he said. "We will defend Syria, but it doesn't mean we will engage in military confrontation.

"We have big problems with America," he said. "But we don't welcome tensions either. If we feel they are changing their behavior, then a new situation may emerge (in our relations)."

Meanwhile, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said the failure of the Iraqi Republican Guards in defending their country against U.S.-led coalition forces would remain "an eternal disgrace."

"The world always pays tribute to defenders who resist, even if they are defeated by the enemy, but is ashamed of their humiliating surrender," state-run Tehran television quoted Khamenei as saying.

Iran is reportedly developing a nuclear-weapons program and still supports terrorist groups. But Iran is no Iraq: It is not dominated by a single, brutal dictator. It has held elections. And while the country is ruled by Islamic clerics, it has a strong reformist element that openly challenges authority.

Iran's Shiite majority does not see eye to eye with those in Iraq, who are less supportive of the Iranian model of rule by an Islamic council and may participate in an Iraqi government that is more democratic than Iran's.

Such division among Shiites makes the Iranian rulers particularly nervous. Iraq's regime change and the presence of U.S. troops could cause a greater relaxation of control by the clerics in Iran, said Juan Cole, an Iranian expert and political-science professor at the University of Michigan. That would give the reform movement more clout.

Religious scholars are talking openly about the prospect of an invigorated, more moderate center of Shiite Islam developing in Najaf, an ancient center of Shiism in Iraq, that would vie with Qom, the current center of authority in the Shiite world.

Arab Shiites have gone to Qom in recent decades because Najaf was isolated by Saddam and tainted by association with his regime. But many are tired of seeing their faith dominated by Iranians, a majority of whom are Persian rather than Arab.

Information from The Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles Times is included in this report.

Copyright ? 2003 The Seattle Times Company

Latest earthquake

CNN.com - Death toll rising in northern Iran quake - June 22, 2002.

... CNN's Lisa Mirando has more on a powerful earthquake that hit Northwestern Iran and has caused hundreds of deaths


Death toll rising in northern Iran quake

June 22, 2002

Villagers look on and pray for the wrapped body of a victim following an earthquake that destroyed the Iranian village of Changoleh.

From Journalist Shirzad Bozorgmehr

TEHRAN, Iran (CNN) -- Hundreds of people were killed or injured as an earthquake and a series of aftershocks rocked northern Iran Saturday, Iranian media reports said.

In Boinzahra, a town in Qazvin province, at least 500 people have been killed and at least 1,500 have been injured, according to Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, a TV network.

IRNA said some 60 villages around Avaj had been razed to the ground or lost at least half of their buildings, with a pair of early strong aftershocks inflicting more damage.

The Red Crescent, which mobilized to aid the residents of the region, expects more casualties, news reports said.

The National Earthquake Information Center in Golden, Colorado, said the quake's magnitude was 6.3.

Don Blakeman, a geophysicist at the National Earthquake Information Center in Colorado in the United States said the quake took place at 7:28 a.m. local time.

He said the epicenter of the quake was between the cities of Hamadan and Qazvin, around 220 kilometers (140 miles) west of Tehran, and that the terrain in the region is mountainous and has many villages.

Major aftershocks, infrastructure devastated

Major aftershocks were reported for hours after the main quake.

Bou'in-Zahra Gov. Ali Mousavi said the quake devastated the villages' water and power infrastructure, IRNA reported, according to The Associated Press.

Buildings in the region are made of mud and are very susceptible to this type of natural catastrophe.

"Usually with this kind of building we lose a lot of people," Professor Fariborz Nateghi, a government advisor on earthquake engineering, told the Reuters news agency. "You lose the walls and the ceiling collapses. They are major killers."

IRNA was quoted by Reuters as saying 80 people had been killed in one village alone near Avaj, a town of 3,600 people close to the top of a high pass through the rugged Nobaran Mountains.

Iranian military forces have airdropped blankets, food, and medicine to people in the region and are helping residents set up shelters.

Iran lies on a major seismic line and is prone to quakes. Moderate tremors are reported in various parts of the country almost daily.

President Bush, in a written statement Saturday, said he was "saddened" to learn about the "tragic event" and sent his condolences to the families of the victims.

"Human suffering knows no political boundaries," Bush said, extending a hand to a country he has labeled part of an "axis of evil."

A woman carries supplies in Abdareh village, which was destroyed by an earthquake that killed more than 50 in the village.

"We stand ready to assist the people of Iran as needed and as desired," the president said.

Earthquakes in northern Iran -- where the Arabian tectonic plate, pushed northward by the African plate, collides with the Eurasian plate -- tend to be especially strong.

A June 1990, magnitude 7.7 earthquake centered near the Caspian Sea, destroyed three cities and more than 700 villages, killing 40,000 people. Another quake of about the same magnitude in the same area nearly 30 years earlier killed 12,000 people.

President Mohammad Khatami issued a message of condolence to the Iranian nation, AP reports, quoting local television.

Khatami also instructed the Interior Ministry to cooperate with other agencies to act quickly in offering assistance to the victims. Three days of mourning have also been declared in the provinces, according to the same report.

Over 500 Dead, 1,200 Injured in Iran Earthquake

... Last updated at: (Beijing Time) Sunday, June 23, 2002. Over 500 Dead,

1,200 Injured in Iran Earthquake. More than 500 people were ...

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200206/ 23/eng20020623_98369.shtml -

Over 500 Dead, 1,200 Injured in Iran Earthquake

More than 500 people were killed andat least 1,200 others injured in a strong earthquake early Saturdayin Iran, the state IRNA news agency reported.

More than 500 people were killed andat least 1,200 others injured in a strong earthquake early Saturdayin Iran, the state IRNA news agency reported.

The quake, which hit Iran's northern, central and western provinces of Gilan, Tehran, Kurdestan, Qazvin, Zanjan and Hamedan at around local time 7:30 a.m. (0300 GMT), was succeeded by several aftershocks between 8:10 a.m. (0340 GMT) and 15:11 p.m. (1041 GMT) with the magnitudes between 4.1 and 5.2 degrees on the open-ended Richard scale.

The Seismological Institute of Geophysics Center of the Tehran University said the tremor was of 6.0 degrees on the open-ended Richard scale. It located the epicenter of the tremor at Bouin Zahra in Qazvin Province.

Majid Shalviri, head of the Red Crescent Society of the Qazvin province, said that "in the village of Kisse-Jin only, 80 people have been killed."

Following the devastating tremor, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami ordered Interior Minister Abdolvahed Mousavi Lari to personally take "the grave responsibilities" in this tragic event.

The Iranian president asked Lari to use all means of the country with the coordination of other state apparatus to rapidly assist those affected by the quake.

Iran embraces a number of quake-prone zones. Tens of thousands of people were killed in Bouin Zahra in a strong earthquake in September, 1984.

In 1990, a seven plus Richter-degree earthquake hit northern provinces of Zanjan and Gilan, in which tens of thousands of people lost their lives.

Official reports have said that as of 1991 over 950 earthquakes have jolted Iran, claiming 17,600 lives and injuring 53,300 others.

FROM:  http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/10/1/93327.shtml

Muslim Viet Cong

John LeBoutillier

Monday, Oct. 1, 2001

Three weeks ago tomorrow were the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  Since then we have had a torrent of loud rhetoric from the administration – and no retaliation.

We read that we have an "evolving" plan.

But lost in the 24-7 coverage of this disaster is a subtle – but huge – change in the goals of this effort.

Originally, President Bush and his War Cabinet all said, "We will target the terrorists and the states that harbor them."

Colin Powell changed that last week when he was asked about Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz's urging to go after Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Powell said, "We will go after terrorism. I'll leave it at that."

Suddenly we are not going after the "states" that harbor the terrorists.

There can be no victory if we leave the very governments that arm, finance and support Osama bin Laden in power.

Thus, even before our response has been delivered, we have undergone severe mission creep. The administration had originally ratcheted up the rhetoric to a fevered pitch, promising that "those who did this will hear from us soon."

Clearly, what has happened since then is that our so-called coalition partners have leaned on Powell to back off any thoughts of widespread bombing/invasion of other countries other than Afghanistan. And even there, we have resorted to nothing but Special Ops and – hold your breath because it is right out of our failed Vietnam effort – defoliating the poppy fields!

Of course the specter of Vietnam hovers over all that we do militarily. The popular phrase has always been "If we do that, a lot of body bags are going to be coming home."

On Sept. 11, 6,000 body bags were filled – right here in our back yard! War was declared that day, and yet many – Powell and this useless coalition – still want a 'measured response.'

Back in World War II – the last real war the USA won – we didn't believe in 'measured responses.' We believed in killing the enemy – all of them.

Korea – fought under U.N. auspices – was a 'tie' precisely because we did not fight to defeat and kill the enemy.

The situation on the ground in Vietnam in the early 1960s is a perfect analogy to this post-Sept. 11 world. There we fought against a state-supported guerrilla organization – the Viet Cong – which disguised its suicidally devoted followers in civilian clothes and infiltrated them into the everyday life of South Vietnam. From "inside" these Viet Cong soldiers then waged a war against soldiers, civilians and the South Vietnamese infrastructure.

We never effectively defeated the Viet Cong for one reason: We never cut off its support, its supplies and its direction by invading North Vietnam and taking control of enemy territory. Had we done this, the Viet Cong would have ceased to be a threat.

In this present-day war we need to define a few things:

1) Who exactly is the enemy here? Is it merely 'fundamental Islam'?

2) Is this a War on Terrorism?

The answers to both questions are simple: No.

The enemy here is more than 'fundamental Islam.' And this is not a War on Terrorism.

This is a war on all those who declared war on us by killing 6,000 Americans.

That means we must kill everyone in any way involved in waging war on America. And we'd better kill them soon – before they unleash an even more horrendous attack on us.

If our enemies are going to use a suitcase nuke or biological/chemical agents, those weapons do not come from a cave in the mountains of Afghanistan. They come from secret government research facilities – most likely either in Iraq or Iran.

These nations have declared war on the USA. Only they have cleverly disguised it by hiding behind the veil of Osama bin Laden. He is their Viet Cong.

He does the dirty work – but if Saddam and the ayatollahs and their political parties and supporters are eliminated, then the Osama bin Laden threat is largely defused.

We'd better be prepared to kill – or be killed.

Listening to 'coalition partners' is a prescription for another Vietnam-like failure.

Sadly, we can already see the 'mission creep' and lack of clear focus that have caused us to lose most wars and conflicts since 1945.

Is it going to take yet another, even more horrendous, attack to get the American government mad enough to kill our enemies – before millions of American civilians are killed?

War on Terrorism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Immediately following and in response to the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack, the United States government announced its intentions to begin a "War on Terrorism" (or "War on Terror"), a protracted struggle against terrorists and states that aid terrorists. US-led military forces invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq under the rubric of the War on Terrorism.

Many governments have pledged their support for the initiative. The US has received military help from the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, India the Netherlands, Spain, Australia, Japan, Pakistan, and France, among others. The "War on Terrorism" quickly became the dominant framework in which international relations were analyzed, supplanting the old Cold War and in some cases the War on Drugs. Many pre-existing disputes were re-cast in terms of the War on Terrorism, including Plan Colombia and the Colombian civil war; the United States' diplomatic and military disputes with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea; the war between Russia and Chechnya; and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The two largest campaigns undertaken as part of the War have been the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. Although many countries are involved, making arrests of suspected terrorists, freezing bank accounts and participating in military action, the war is overwhelmingly viewed as an American initiative. Some even view it as George Bush's personal war. There was a previous War on Terrorism declared during the 1980s, by U.S. President Ronald Reagan, though that one never gained as widespread support or traction as the later one.

Overall Strategy

The United States has based its counter-terrorist strategy on several steps:

Denial of safe havens in which terrorists can train and equip members

Restriction of funding of terrorist organizations

Degradation of terrorist networks by capturing and/or killing intermediate leaders

Detention of suspected and known terrorists. See the section below for further details

Obtaining information, through various techniques, allegedly including torture, from captured terrorists of other members of their organization, training sites, methods, and funding

Expanding and improving efficiency of intelligence capabilities and foreign and domestic policing

In doing so, the strategy is not very different from successful counter-guerrilla operations, such as Malaysia in the 1950s. There is a fine distinction between guerrilla operations and terrorist operations. Many guerrilla organizations, such as the Zionist terrorist group known as the Irgun in British-Mandated Palestine, and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) during the Algerian Civil War, and the Viet Cong, included urban terrorism as part of their overall strategy.

Denial of safe havens involves a fairly large military force; however, as in Afghanistan in 2002, once the major safe haven areas are overrun, the large-scale forces can be withdrawn and special forces, such as U.S. Special Operations Forces or the British Special Air Service (SAS), operate more effectively.

In addition, the U.S. Army is involved in increasingly large civil affairs programs in Afghanistan to provide employment for Afghans and to reduce sympathy in the civilian population for parties the United States has designated as terrorist.

The U.S. strategy faces several obstacles:

Terrorist groups can continue to operate, albeit at a less-sophisticated scale

The strengths of American intelligence gathering are signal intelligence and photo intelligence gathering. Organizations that avoid use of cellular phones and radios and rely on couriers have a lower profile. On the other hand, such organizations also have a slower planning and reaction time.

Political opposition to American policies inside countries in which terrorists operate, as in Pakistan, where al Queda and the Taliban have supporters who share religious or ethnic affiliations.

Legal opposition to American methods of detaining suspected terrorists.

Interrogation methods

A Washington Post investigation published on December 26, 2002 quotes anonymous CIA and other government officials who claim that US military and CIA personnel employ physical coercion during their interrogation of suspects and that US officials believe these practices are necessary and unavoidable in light of the September 11th terrorist attacks. They state that CIA is using "stress and duress" techniques at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, a base leased from Britain at Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean, and numerous other secret facilities worldwide.

The CIA reportedly transfers suspects, along with a list of questions, to foreign intelligence services of countries routinely criticized by the US Department of State for torturing suspects, where they are alleged to be severely tortured with the assent and encouragement of the United States. These countries include Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria. One official stated, "We don't kick the [expletive] out of them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of them."

Anonymous sources quoted in the Washington Post article have stated that those held in the CIA detention center "are sometimes kept standing or kneeling for hours, in black hoods or spray-painted goggles," and are duct-taped to stretchers for transport. The Post continues that according to Americans with direct knowledge and others who have witnessed the treatment, that suspects are often beat-up and confined in tiny rooms and are also blindfolded and handcuffed following arrest. Later, suspects are sometimes "held in awkward, painful positions and deprived of sleep with a 24-hour bombardment of lights" and loud noises. The Post article goes on to say that national security officials suggested that pain killers, on at least one occasion, were "used selectively" to treat a detainee that was shot in the groin during apprehension.

Nevertheless, the Post admits that there is no direct evidence that the US government is mistreating prisoners. Additionally, as reported by Reuters, the U.S. military denied these allegations and stated that the Post's article was "false on several points".

National security officials interviewed for the investigation defended the use of such techniques as necessary to prevent further terrorist attacks. As one official put it, "If you don't violate someone's human rights some of the time, you probably aren't doing your job."

The human rights organization Human Rights Watch called on the United States to respond to these reports by publicly denouncing the use of torture. In response to reports that some of the evidence that Colin Powell intended to present against Iraq to the United Nations was derived from torture, Human Rights Watch sent a letter to Powell, asking him to use that speech as an opportunity to condemn any use of torture to gather intelligence.

The techniques reported to be used are similar to techniques that have been used by the Soviet Union on captured CIA operatives, according to accounts by retired CIA agents. In addition, similar techniques were used by French security services in the Algerian War of Independence and in the suppression of the Secret Army Organization in the 1960s. Ethically, such techniques are seen by human rights advocates as deplorable, but interrogators see them as necessary when information must be gained from a reluctant subject.

Article taken from the cached copy of www.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_on_Terrorism  which was not responding.



... Born in Saudi Arabia in 1957, bin Laden drew inspiration from Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979. He had dreams of similar revolts in other Muslim countries. ...




... And they enjoy the support and sponsorship in close cooperation with such sovereign states as Iraq and Iran, havens in Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern




... USSR. To stem that process - and also in fear of Khomeini's 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran - the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. ...


... at the Redstone Arsenal and adjoining facilities - US Missile Command etc - now exceed the volumes of money and egregious conduct of Iran-Contra itself. ...


... taking control of most of Afghanistan in 1996, the Taliban have declared holy wars against the northern-based anti-Taliban alliance, Russia and Iran, but never


... Afghanistan is bounded by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to the north, Iran to the west, China to the east and Pakistan to the south. ...


... The two Hercules could not fly over Iran, but Turkmenistan, the third ex-Soviet state bordering Afghanistan granted permission. ...


. -- Radical states with reputations for supporting terror, such as Iran and Libya, are seeking germ weapons. -- Terrorists ...


... 11. After September 11th there are 111 days left to the end of the year. 119 is the area code to Iraq/Iran. 1 + 1 + 9 = 11. Twin ...

The American Tragedy: A Symbolic Event, Manifest Revelation

... This is the area of ancient Persia, and present day Iran. The ... ruin.

The American Tragedy: A Symbolic Event, Part One

... Humanity On The Pollen Path http://www.greatdreams.com/plpath1.htm. ...
The history of Persian Jews dates back to ancient Iran marked by the emancipation of the ...


... military support to the Northern Alliance fighters, and those plans intensified yesterday with meetings in
Tajikstan that were also attended by Iran and India. ...


... Afghanistan is bounded by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to the north, Iran to the west, China to the east and Pakistan to the south. ...


... Afghanistan borders Iran, India, and even China but, more importantly, the Central Asian Republics of the former
Soviet Union, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and


... British Airways also canceled flights to Islamabad in Pakistan while Italy's Alitalia said it canceled flights to
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iran. ...

9-11 Attack on America

... politicsandprotest.org/. BOMBING OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER - 9-11-2001 http://www.greatdreams.com/trade_day7.htm. Sept 11:...


... Cuba and Iran led nonaligned nations in seeking to fix blame on the United States, which shocked fellow negotiators at the start of the four-week round of ...


... The government had two sets of relevant information--foreign intelligence, gathered by the CIA from watching terrorist states such as Iran and Iraq, and ...


... Some media issues - an incomplete November 2000 interview. Iran: Things you'll never hear - June 2000. Institutional violence -- undated interview. ...


... The other was in 1990 in Iran. Perhaps ... bonding. Dee had a dream about "Lady Liberty" this morning (http://www.greatdreams.com/freedom.htm). ...

Net Talk - David Icke's E~Magazine Article

... France, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Black Sea, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and ... is about the crash of Flight 111: http://www.greatdreams.com/crash.htm ...

11 Eleven Theme in September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack

... See also GreatDreams.com > Terrorism - World Trade Center - list of elevens and discussion of ...
The country code for Iraq and Iran is 119; New York was the 11th ...


... Others were from Britain, Canada, Germany, Italy, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iran, Spain, St. Kitts and Russia. ...


... These are the people who through their surrogates find ways to protect huge shipments of heroin from
Hong Kong, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and to ensure that ..

Transcript of President Bush's Speech

... Dozens of Pakistanis, more than 130 Israelis, more than 250 citizens of India, men and women from
El Salvador, Iran, Mexico and Japan, and hundreds of British ...

Freedom Activist Network's Guide To Conspiracies

... Great Dreams Earthchanges' Illuminati www.greatdreams.com/consp.htm#ILLUMINATI

Project X Newsletter, 16th issue - June the 5th, 1999

... people / bad weather, http://www.greatdreams.com, http://www.greatdreams.com/radar.htm ...
City, the British Isles, central Europe, the Iraq-Iran border, Pakistan ...


... major upheavals. Perhaps Iraq will be revisited, but Iran and the Pan-Islamic movement should likewise be on the march. And within ...


... to the court testimony, the meetings were to sabotage President Jimmy Carter's reelection campaign
by delaying the release of American hostages in Iran. ...


... Dick Cheney repeated the promise to prevent Iraq, Iran and North Korea from threatening America ... http://www.greatdreams.com/dreams_and_prophecy_of_iraq.htm. ...

UFO Links

... Area51/Corridor/1341/ricardo.html 1976: Sep 19: The Tehran, Iran/F-4 ... Area51/Nova/8874
UFOs and Extraterrestrials (20000918) http://www.greatdreams.com/ufos.htm ...

World War 3

... when the Medo-Persian empire took over(persia is modern day Iran). ...
Disaster; http://www.baproducts.com/552000.htm

http://www.greatdreams.com/poleshift.htm ...

! Gerardus' Grist ! Numbers and Numerology !

119 is the area code to Iraq/Iran. ... Gerardus =====

For more see: http://www.greatdreams.com/trade_numbers.htm


RAYELAN:...***TWO powerful "FACTIONS"----

... Many people have speculated that Iran was behind the bombing. If Argentina forces a Swiss bank to give them bank records, they might ...


... possible. "Let's say they know it was a surrogate from Iran that was responsible. ... Donaldson. "Iran is a very tough nut to screw with. ...


... Afghanistan from Iranian rule, and then went on to acquire territory from the deteriorating empires to the west and east---
the Safavi dynasty in Iran and the ...

1999 predictions

... In a clear warning to countries such as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, he said that those who harboured or helped terrorists ... http://www.greatdreams.com/prophecy.htm . ...

6 Seals of Revelation

... The Hezbollah are stationed in Lebanon, Syria and Iran Will the MidEast War ...
http://www.greatdreams.com/plans.htm Cheops, the Great Pyramid


... I covered a few of them here: http://www.greatdreams.com/hallfire.htm. ...

98/03/14 19:40:30 30.08N 57.61E 33.0 6.9Ms A NORTHERN IRAN. ...


... provided additional US-origin food assistance for displaced persons in Afghanistan and refugees in neighboring countries,
including Pakistan, Iran and Central


... May 10, 1997 - IRAN - Up to 2,000 people were killed and thousands injured when an earthquake measuring 7.1
rocked rural areas of eastern Iran. ...


... 4th millennia = 3999 to 3000 BC, 3rd 2999-2000 BC  They are historical epics that tell of relations between Mesopotamia and Iran. ... www.greatdreams.com/gil1.htm. ...


... http://www.greatdreams.com/separate.htm. POLITICAL DREAMS - YEAR 2000. ... ... All 50 Senate Republicans, plus eight ... http://www.greatdreams.com/pol2000.htm. ...


... in a series of hawkish comments by senior figures in the Bush administration following the president's characterization of
North Korea, Iraq and Iran as an ...


... Hoon, testifying before a parliamentary defense committee, identified Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya as "states of concern" and warned that "they can be ...


... of my article about the solar eclipse (http://www.greatdreams.com/eclipse.htm ...
Germany, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Black Sea, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan


... NUMBERS. http://www.greatdreams.com/gem1.htm
The ... Persia. The Magis of long ago have nothing to do presently with the Shah of Iran... and ...


... Mr. Sheehan has a long and distinguished history as public interest counsel in milestone cases, such as the Pentagon Papers,
Iran-Contra, Three Mile Island ...


... when the us wanted the 'butcher of baghdad' to use the nasties on iran...and now ...
http://www.greatdreams.com/smallpox.htm SMALL POX - THE DREAM AND THE REALITY. ...



... The Iran-Contra Scandal (Morgana's Observatory) ... ...

Also, Adnan Khashoggi's name has been associated with http://www.greatdreams.com/crash.htm Archives: Daniel ...


... an attack on Iraq by saying: "We decide for ourselves what we're going to do."
Vice-President Dick Cheney repeated the promise to prevent Iraq, Iran and North ...


... Hezbollah's more than 5,000 members, subsidized and trained by Iran, are concentrated in the southern slums of
Beirut and al - Biqa (Bekaa) Valley; they become ...


... They present solid evidence that Libya, Iraq, and Iran have each expressed interest in both ingredients and advice. ...

Matrix Messages

... in Eastern Turkey near the Iran border. (Morton, 2000, Internet). ...


Matrix Messages

... remains of the Ark of Ziusudra, in eastern Turkey, near the Iran border


The Forgotten Afghan Refugees. ... The refugees are dispersed throughout Iran. ...


... 98/03/14 19:40:30 30.08N 57.61E 33.0 6.9Ms A NORTHERN IRAN. ...


... 3/24/2002 Dee777 writes: New page for today: http://www.greatdreams.com/biologics.html ...
nuclear) in the Middle East between 2003 - 2004 - with Iran/Iraq and ...

A NEW LOOK AT 2012......2039?

... This started out with the Iran hostages, the huge Nuclear War scare, the massive exploitation of Reaganomics,
the dominance of the corporate greed mentality


... The State of the Union address, in which Bush called Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an ''axis of evil'' that was threatening to the United States, seemed to ...

Star Wars: The Next Generation

... The 1998 report asserted that, within five years of deciding to do so, a rogue state such as North Korea or Iran
could acquire a ballistic missile capable of ...


... Dodi Fayed, beloved of Lady Diana, is a cousin of Adnan Khashoggi,
a CIA asset involved in sales of arms to Iran -- he and Oliver North. ...


Famous Sheep: Mohd. Ali, The Shah of Iran, Barbara Walters, Billy Jean King and King George IV. monkey Year ...


... The phenomenon was seen from two aircraft approaching Mehrabad Airport in Teheran, Iran on June 17, 1966
and reported by their pilots. ...


... We have never seen anything like it. Not in eight years of war with Iran," she said as she tried to console her son, Rami, who was crying uncontrollably. ...


... called it ``clearly the most urgent threat to US interests.'' It has a strong presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan and is
developing a presence in Iran and Iraq ...


... various manifestoes, including PLO, Al Fatah, armed struggle in Iran The Globalization ... Michael Pugliese
http://www.greatdreams.com/nwo.htm THE NEW WORLD ORDER ...


H. Irano-Afghan race (predominant in Iran and Afghanistan, primary element in Iraq, common [25%] in Turkey). ...


... the assassin's trail to Rome, beginning with his dramatic escape from prison in Turkey in November 1979,
and following his passage through Iran,, Bulgaria


... About 15,000 BC increasing population pressure throughout Turkestan and Iran occasioned
the first really extensive Andite movement toward India. ...


... He recently headed a panel that concluded countries such as North Korea and Iran
could eventually have the capacity to launch ballistic missiles at the United


... Since 1996, she has been saying that several nations, including Iraq and Iran,
were helping plan a major terrorist attack in lower Manhattan, specifically ...


... The Iranians were not an urban people, and the way of life which these expatriates followed appears to have
reflected that of Iran itself, with the nobles ...


... Anderson, United States (pollution) Ilyas Bayar, Turkey (agriculture) William W.Behrens III,
United States (resources) Farhad Hakimzadeh, Iran (population)


... throughout Europe. (Long-haired cats came considerably later from Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.),

Baffling Lunar Illusion

... [Vedic, also Vedism; ancient Indo-European speaking peoples who entered India 1500BC from the Persian/Iran region;
the name was taken from sacred texts known ...


... In 1979 the president, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, was replaced by Saddam Hussein,
and once more the political situation flared into hostilities with Iran. ...


... Iran and Iraq suffer large, deadly quakes every few years. Iran had a 7.7 magnitude quake in 1990. For more than 1,000 years Iran ...


... United Nations Member Flags - M - R United Nations Member Flags -
S - Z. China, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Korea North, Korea Sourth, Libya, Pakistan, ...


... keep their souls alive. Discs are clearly depicted in the 2,500 year old palace of Darius at Perseopolis in Iran.


... Will it be Iran, Iraq, the Red Chinese (fat chance, the Government is setting us up to be attacked
by them at a latter date via Nuclear weapons)


... He said he believed Palestinian militants have been trying to get shoulder-held missiles from Iran
and the Lebanese guerrilla group Hezbollah. ...


... Department in recent days were two former Republican senators, Warren Rudman of New Hampshire
and Jack Danforth of Missouri, and former Iran-Contra prosecutor ...